State ex rel. McGinty v. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 25 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-429,97-429
• Citation: 690 N.E.2d 1273,81 Ohio St.3d 283
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. McGINTY, Appellant, v. CLEVELAND CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 283

81 Ohio St.3d 283

690 N.E.2d 1273

The STATE ex rel. McGINTY, Appellant, v. CLEVELAND CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee.

No. 97-429.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 20, 1998.

Decided March 25, 1998.

Appellee, Cleveland City School District Board of Education ("board"), employed appellant, Michael McGinty, in various positions from 1965 until 1978 and from 1979 until the nonrenewal of his contract in 1993. From 1982 until 1993, McGinty held the title and performed the duties of "Manager-technical support." In this position, McGinty's duties enabled him to be considered either a "supervisor" or a "management level employee," as defined in R.C. 4117.01.

In 1987, the General Assembly amended R.C. 3319.02 to include certain noncertificated administrators within the definition of "other administrators." With the amendment, McGinty's position as manager in charge of technical support classified him as an R.C. 3319.02 "other administrator." As amended, R.C. 3319.02 provided:

"(A) As used in this section, 'other administrator' means any employee in a position for which a board of education requires a certificate of the type described by division (G), (K), or (M) of section 3319.22 of the Revised Code, provided that an employee required to have the type of certificate described by division (K) of such section spends less than fifty per cent of his time teaching or working with students, or any other employee, except the superintendent, whose job duties enable him to be considered as either a 'supervisor' or a 'management level employee,' as defined in Section 4117.01 of the Revised Code.

"* * *

"(C) * * * The board of education shall execute a written contract of employment with each assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, and other administrator it employs or reemploys. The term of such contract shall not exceed three years except that in the case of a person who has been employed by the school district as an assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or other administrator for three years or more, the term of his contract shall be for not more than five years and, unless the superintendent recommends otherwise, not less than two years. If the superintendent so recommends, the term of the contract of a person who has been employed by the school district as an assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or other administrator for three years or more may be one year, but all subsequent contracts granted such person shall be for a term of not less than two years and not more than five years. * * *" (Emphasis added.) (142 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2017-1018.)

During the school years commencing in 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991, the board did not execute any written employment contract with McGinty. In late 1987 and early 1988, the board tendered and withdrew a three-year written employment contract for McGinty. In 1991, the board rescinded its previous policy that authorized the Superintendent of Cleveland Public Schools to establish the employment contract terms of administrators employed by the board. The board resolved to ratify "any employment contracts" with administrators who had contracted with the superintendent. About nine months later, one of the board's attorneys advised the board that (1) before the September 10, 1987 effective date of the amendment to R.C. 3319.02, noncertificated administrators were probably unclassified civil service employees, (2) the 1987 amendment applied to noncertificated administrators who were appointed to their positions before the effective date of the amendment, and (3) the board probably had to offer limited contracts to noncertificated administrators as a condition of further employment.

In February 1992, the board resolved to direct the superintendent to prepare letters to be sent to the noncertificated administrators in order to clarify their contract status based on the 1987 amendment to R.C. 3319.02. A status report of board employees listed McGinty as an administrator who did not have any contract. In March 1992, the superintendent sent a letter to McGinty, which provided:

"The Board has determined that Ohio law, specifically Section 3319.02 of the Ohio Revised Code, has required since 1987 that a written limited contract govern your employment. As you are aware, for a variety of reasons no such contract was entered into in 1987 or thereafter. The Board has concluded that because you do not have a written limited contract as required by Ohio law, you are employed on an at-will basis, and the Board may legally terminate your employment at any time at the sole discretion of the Board.

"Nevertheless, as a gesture of good faith, the Board is willing to treat you as though you have a contract that expires in September of this year. Ohio Revised Code Section 3319.02 permits the Board either to renew or to decline to renew your contract as of that date. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

On March 28, 1992, upon the superintendent's recommendation, the board resolved to reemploy McGinty for one year, commencing August 8, 1992 and ending August 6, 1993. In October 1992, the board issued the one-year written contract to McGinty. Between the time in late 1987 and early 1988 when the board tendered and withdrew a three-year written contract and the time that the board issued a one-year written contract for the 1992-1993 school year, McGinty was evaluated on an annual basis by his superiors. According to McGinty, his superiors advised him during these evaluations that he would be employed each following year at a certain salary, and that he believed his annual evaluations and reemployment were done upon the recommendation of the superintendent and at the board's direction. By letter dated March 29, 1993, the board notified McGinty of its decision not to renew his administrative contract for the 1993-1994 school year pursuant to R.C. 3319.02. McGinty protested his nonrenewal and informed the superintendent that he believed that he was entitled to further employment under R.C. 3319.02.

In March 1996, McGinty filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. McGinty requested a writ of mandamus to compel the board to (1) issue him a two-year contract for the 1992-1993 and 1993-1994 school years and a second two-year contract for the 1994-1995 and 1995-1996 school years, (2) reinstate him pursuant to these contracts, and (3) pay him lost wages and benefits. Following the filing of evidence and briefs, the court of appeals denied the writ.

The cause is now before this court upon McGinty's appeal as of right as well as his request for oral argument.

Berkman, Gordon, Murray & DeVan, Jeremy A. Rosenbaum and Larry S. Gordon, Cleveland, for appellant.

Wanda Rembert Arnold and George S. Crisci, Cleveland, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Oral Argument

McGinty requests oral argument for this appeal. Under S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(1), certain appeals must be orally argued. In all other appeals, including this one, the court "may order oral argument on the merits either sua sponte or in response to a request by any party." S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2)(A). Among the factors we consider in determining whether to grant oral argument under S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2)(A) are whether the case involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues of law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict between courts of appeals. Cf. S.Ct.Prac.R. II(1)(A); Section 2(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.

For the following reasons, oral argument is not warranted. First, this case does not involve a matter of great public importance. There is no evidence or argument that this case will affect more administrators than McGinty. Second, the legal and factual issues are not sufficiently complex to warrant oral argument. Third, although McGinty raises a constitutional issue, i.e., the claimed retroactive application of the 1987 amendment to McGinty's employment, this issue is not a substantial one and can be resolved without oral argument. See discussion infra. Fourth, McGinty does not claim any conflict between courts of appeals. Finally, McGinty does not specify in his request any reason why oral argument would be beneficial to a resolution of this appeal.

Based on the foregoing, we deny McGinty's request for oral argument and proceed to the merits of his appeal.

Merits

McGinty asserts in his various propositions of law that the court of appeals erred by denying the writ of mandamus. In order to be entitled to the writ, McGinty had to establish a clear legal right to the issuance of two-year contracts from the 1992-1993 school year through the 1995-1996 school year and a corresponding clear legal duty for the board to provide these contracts. State ex rel. Stiller v. Columbiana Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 113, 114, 656 N.E.2d 679, 680. The parties stipulated that McGinty lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to compel the board to perform the requested acts. See, generally, State ex rel. Donaldson v. Athens City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 145, 149, 624 N.E.2d 709, 713.

The court of appeals determined that McGinty was employed under contracts by operation of law for school years 1987-1989, 1989-1991, and 1991-1993, and that he was properly notified of his termination of employment at the conclusion of the 1992-1993 school year.

McGinty contends that although the court of appeals correctly implied two-year contracts by operation of law, it erred in holding that his first contract by operation of law was for school years 1987-1989. McGinty claims that construing Am.H.B. No. 107, the 1987 amendment to R.C. 3319.02, to require an initial contract for 1987-1989 retroactively impairs his preexisting contract for the 1987-1988 school year. According to McGinty, the appropriate interpretation of the 1987 amendment to R.C. 3319.02 requires that his first...