State ex rel. McNeil v. St. Louis Cnty. Court

• Decision Date: 31 March 1868
• Citation: 42 Mo. 496
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. JOHN MCNEIL, Sheriff of St. Louis County, Relator, v. THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY COURT, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

42 Mo. 496

STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. JOHN MCNEIL, Sheriff of St. Louis County, Relator,

v.THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY COURT, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1868.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Harding & Crane, for relator.

I. The statute constitutes the Circuit Court the tribunal which is to determine the correctness of the accounts of the officers who are charged with furnishing stationery, fuel, attendance, etc., required for the use of the court. (Gen. Stat. 1865, p. 540, §§ 41, 42.)

II. The action of the Circuit Court must of necessity be final. If not, the County Court, an inferior tribunal, may annul or reverse the action of the superior court, viz: the Circuit Court.

III. The County Court has charge of the funds of the county, and has to pay the debts incurred by it. The claim in this case is one of their debts, which has already been proved, allowed, and audited by the court designated to perform that duty.

IV. The act respecting the county commissioners (Adj. Sess. Acts 1859, p. 448; see laws applicable to St. Louis county, p. 46, §§ 23-4) does not make it the duty of the auditor to audit accounts of this nature; and if it did, it is modified or repealed in respect to such demands by the General Statutes.

Kehr, for respondent.

Respondent bases its action upon sections 23, 34-38 of “An act concerning the county of St. Louis,” approved March 14, 1859. (Laws applicable to St. Louis county, p. 46.) Gen. Stat. of 1865, chap. 133, p. 540, §§ 41-2, must be regarded as modified by this act when applied to St. Louis county.

I. Although section 42 authorizes the Circuit Court to “adjust the account” and “certify the same for payment,” there is nothing in the language employed to prohibit an account thus audited from being subjected to the same process of adjustment which applies to other demands against the county. The fact of its being audited may be regarded as evidence to be submitted to the auditor to enable him to recommend the claim in his periodical report, and thus full force may be given to both laws.

II. The act of March 14, 1859, is not repealed by Gen. Stat. 1865, because: 1. Sections 41-2, chap. 133, do not operate as an original act of 1865; but, being merely reprints of §§ 71-2, p. 543, R. C. 1855, simply continued in force in the revision of 1865, their existence dates back to their first enactment. The mind of the legislature was therefore especially directed to the general law when the special law was enacted, and the revision of 1865 cannot be held to repeal the special act. (City and County of St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 509; State ex rel.Vastine v. Judge of St. Louis Prob. Ct., 38 Mo. 534.) 2. Chap. 224, p. 883, § 6, continues the special act in force, because there is nothing in the latter act inconsistent with or repugnant to the general law of 1865. The question how far a private, local, or temporary act is affected by a subsequent general law, has been fully and elaborately examined by the court in the cases of Deters v. Renick, 37 Mo. 597; State ex rel.Vastine v. Judge St. Louis Prob Ct., 38 Mo. 529; State ex rel. Mo. & Miss. R.R. Co. v. County Court of Macon County, 41 Mo. 453.

III. The act concerning courts (Gen. Stat. 1865, p. 540, § 41) must be held to be, in its feature respecting the auditing by the Circuit Court of the accounts therein referred to, inapplicable to St. Louis county. The County Court, by the act of March 14, 1859, was expressly inhibited from acting upon or considering any demand whatever against the county, unless the same were first presented, with the evidence in its favor, to the auditor of St. Louis county.

FAGG, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The application of the relator shows a refusal on the part of the respondent to draw a warrant on the St. Louis county treasury for the amount of an account duly certified for payment by the Circuit Court.

The facts stated in the application for the rule are not denied by the answer.

The cause shown by respondent against issuing the peremptory writ is simply a denial of the authority of the Circuit Court to audit any claims whatever against the county, and an allegation to the effect that that duty can alone be performed by the auditor of the county.

The case is to be considered upon a demurrer to the return. The items in the account were for days' services in attending the Circuit Court and for stationery furnished, amounting altogether to the sum of $97.25.

The office of county auditor does not exist in this State except by virtue of special legislative enactment. It seems to have been created in the county of St. Louis by an act of the legislature, approved March 14, 1859, entitled “An act concerning the county of St. Louis.” (Adj. Sess. Acts 1859, p. 448.) Section 23 of this act is as follows: “The auditor of St. Louis county shall be the general accountant of said county, and the keeper of all public account books, accounts, contracts, vouchers, documents, official bonds, and all paper relating to the accounts and contracts of said county and its revenue debt and fiscal affairs not herein...