State ex rel. Merrick v. District Court of Hennepin County
| Decision Date | 21 February 1885 |
| Citation | 22 N.W. 625,33 Minn. 235 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota ex rel. Sarah B. Merrick v. District Court of Hennepin County |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Writ of certiorari, issued on the application of Sarah B. Merrick and directed to the district court for Hennepin county.
From the return made the following facts appear: From August 28 1883, to September 4, 1883, the Board of Park Commissioners of Minneapolis caused to be published daily, in the Evening Journal, a daily newspaper published in Minneapolis, a notice that it would, on September 5, 1883, apply to the district court for Hennepin county for the appointment of three park assessors to assess the sum of $ 147,125.72, ascertained as the amount required for the purchase and condemnation of the lands selected for the "Central Park," located in the fourth ward in Minneapolis, upon such land as the assessors shall deem specially benefited by such park and improvements, except upon such lots as had been exempted from such assessment.
On September 5, 1883, the district court, upon the application of the board, appointed three assessors to make the above assessment. The assessors so appointed gave notice of their meeting, to be held September 22, 1883, for the purpose of making such assessment, the notice being given by publication thereof in the said Evening Journal for ten successive days the first publication being made on September 10, 1883. On September 22, 1883, the assessors met pursuant to such notice, and made an assessment of the sum of $ 147,125.72 upon the property which they deemed benefited, including certain property of relator, which was assessed the sum of $ 350, which assessment was duly filed in the office of the clerk of the district court. Notice was thereupon given by the board of park commissioners, by publication in the Evening Journal for ten successive days, commencing October 7, 1883, that on October 18, 1883, it would apply to the district court for confirmation of the assessment.
Upon October 14, 1883, the relator filed in the district court written objections substantially as follows, viz.:
1. That Sp. Laws 1883, c. 281, the act under which the assessment is attempted to be made, is unconstitutional. That the legislature had no authority to pass the act, and the board derived no authority thereunder.
2. That section five of the above act, allowing the commissioners to exempt certain lands from the assessment, is in direct contravention of art. 9, § 1, of the constitution of Minnesota.
3. That the commissioners, under said section five, exempted certain land immediately contiguous to the park in question, and therefore the assessment is unjust and unequal.
4. That no notice of any of the proceedings herein, or of the appointment of the assessors, was ever given to relator, and that no hearing was had before the board or assessors as to whether relator's land was benefited.
5. That relator's land is over one-half mile from the park in question, and is in no manner benefited thereby.
6. That the assessors were freeholders and incompetent to act.
7. That the provisions of the act were never complied with, and the assessors had no authority to act.
8. That the act is unconstitutional in that it deprives the relator of her property without due process of law, and without hearing, and without giving her any legal or sufficient notice.
Upon the application for confirmation before Lochren, J., the relator offered evidence to prove that her land is one-half mile from the park and no part of the park can be seen therefrom; that three main thoroughfares separate it from the park, and that it is not on any street leading directly to the park; also that her land is in no way, manner or form specially benefited by the park, and that the assessment as made is not equal and uniform. The evidence was excluded by the court, and the relator's objections to the confirmation of the assessment were all overruled. The court found as facts that at a meeting of the board of park commissioners held July 31, 1883, when only eight members were present, a resolution was adopted authorizing and directing a purchase of a portion of the lands necessary for the park; that at a subsequent meeting held January 5, 1884 by a vote of twelve commissioners, resolutions were adopted directing payment of the purchase-money for the above lands upon a conveyance being made, and exempting certain other lands owned by the vendor from further assessment for the park. Thereupon the court made an order confirming the assessment.
J. M. Quarles, Ripley & Morrison, Jackson & Pond, Isaac Atwater and Merrick & Merrick, for relator.
Sp. Laws 1883, c. 281, is unconstitutional and void, because the board of park commissioners created thereby is not a municipal corporation. If this board is a municipal corporation, the act is valid, otherwise not. Const. art. 9, § 1. A municipal corporation is defined to be "the incorporation, by authority of the government, of the inhabitants of a particular place or district, and authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns." 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 20. See, also, Potter on Corporations, § 369; Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309; State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458. If the board is not a municipal corporation, the saying that it is a municipal corporation cannot make it so. The board has no connection whatever with the city council, the representative head of the government of the city of Minneapolis. They are independent of each other in their functions and operations. (1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 58.) The board is not a department of the city government; but, granting that it is, still it will not answer to confer authority upon a department when it is required to be conferred upon the whole municipal government. The conclusion is irresistible that, a constituent part of a municipal corporation not being equal to and the same as the corporation, conferring authority upon the part is not the same as conferring authority upon the corporation, unless the part selected be the representative head of the corporation. All corporate powers are usually vested in the city council.
The board of park commissioners, if a corporation at all, is a mere quasi corporation of the lowest order, and as such a mere agent of the state. 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 22; Cooley, Const. Lim. 240; Askew v. Hale Co., 54 Ala. 639; State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458; City of St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247; San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal. 493, 522; Com'rs of Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109; Finch v. Board of Education, 30 Ohio St. 37.
The act in question is unconstitutional and void because of the provisions of section five, allowing the board to exempt from assessment the lands of the vendors of the park site. This exemption is evidently intended as a part of the consideration paid for the land purchased for park purposes, and in that sense is doubtless designed to take the place of the assessment for benefits "upon the remaining contiguous lands." Assessments on all other lands specially benefited are levied by assessors appointed by the district court and are paid in money. It thus appears that there are two separate authorities, each differently constituted, raising taxes for the same purpose in the same assessment district, in modes entirely separate, distinct and different. It is clearly a flagrant violation of the constitutional mandate enjoining equality and uniformity in taxation. Const. art. 9, § 1; McComb v. Bell, 2 Minn. 256, (295;) Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 326, (366;) Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174; Fretwell v. Laffoon, 77 Mo. 26; Cooley on Taxation, 145, 153, 172; County of San Mateo v. South. P. R. Co., 13 F. 722; County of Santa Clara v. South. P. R. Co., 18 F. 385.
The assessment is invalid and void because there was no sufficient notice to the relator. The federal constitution guarantees to every citizen the opportunity of being heard before his property can be taken for any purpose or in any mode, and his property can only be taken by "due process of law." The notice given in this case and provided for in this act is entirely insufficient to insure the relator a hearing and to be the basis of "due process of law." Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183; City of Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Pa. St. 440, 448; Davidson v. Bd. of Administrators, 17 Alb. L. J. 223; County of San Mateo v. South. P. R. Co., 13 F. 722; County of Santa Clara v. South. P. R. Co., 18 F. 385.
The court erred in refusing to hear and consider the evidence offered to show that the lands of relator are not and never will be in any way specially benefited by Central Park, and that the assessment as made was not uniform and equal. The charter of the city of St. Paul, construed in State v. Bd. of Public Works, 27 Minn. 442, provides for different proceedings from those provided in the present act.
Daniel Fish, for respondent.
Certiorari to the district court of Hennepin county. The proceedings to be reviewed were had under an act of the legislature, (Sp Laws 1883, c. 281,) providing for the acquisition of lands for public parks in the city of Minneapolis, and for making special assessments of the cost upon property benefited thereby. The relator is the owner of lands upon which such assessments were made. We here indicate the nature of this enactment, so far as it is necessary to be considered in the decision of the case. The act creates a board of park commissioners consisting of certain persons named, together with the mayor and two members of the city council, which board is made a department of the city government. It provides for the...
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