State ex rel. Metcalf v. Baker

• Decision Date: 21 April 1911
• Docket Number: Nos. 17,115-(23).,s. 17,115-(23).
• Parties: STATE ex rel. FLORENCE METCALF v. F. E. BAKER.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

114 Minn. 209

STATE ex rel. FLORENCE METCALF v. F. E. BAKER.¹

Nos. 17,115-(23).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 21, 1911.

Upon a petition for a writ of prohibition to restrain respondent, as justice of the peace within the city of St. Paul, from proceeding to enforce a judgment in an action before him in which relator, a resident of St. Paul, is defendant, this court directed respondent to show cause why the writ should not issue. Writ discharged and proceedings dismissed.

Lloyd Peabody, for relator.

A. G. Wedge and O'Brien, Young & Stone, for respondent.

BROWN, J.

By chapter 211, p. 293, Sp. Laws 1876, chapters 369 and 403, pp. 1023, 1068, Sp. Laws 1889, provision was made for a certain number of justices of the peace for the city of St. Paul. These statutes have not been repealed, and are now in full force and effect. They were incorporated in the home rule charter of the city of St. Paul in 1900. Since the enactment of the statutes, justices of the peace have regularly been elected, and have qualified and exercised their jurisdiction within the limits of the city. Respondent herein was so elected and qualified, and now exercises the jurisdiction conferred upon him. In January, 1911, he entertained jurisdiction of a civil action brought against relator, the summons in which was served within the city, and rendered a judgment against her. He now threatens to issue an execution upon said judgment, and relator sued out a writ of prohibition to restrain and enjoin him from so doing. In answer to the writ in this court, respondent asserts his jurisdiction in the matter, and prays that the writ be discharged.

No question was raised on the argument whether prohibition was the proper remedy in such a case, and we therefore do not consider it, disposing of the case upon the merits.

It is contended by relator that respondent had no authority to entertain jurisdiction of the particular action, because the summons therein was served within the city. Reliance in support of this contention is had upon chapter 348, p. 400, Laws 1909 (R. L. Supp. 1909, § 3894), which provides as follows: "No justice of the peace shall issue any summons, or other process in a civil action to be served in any city having a population of two hundred thousand or over, except executions upon existing judgments, and service of summons in accordance with the provisions of section 3973, Revised Laws 1905, and other service of such process made within any such city shall be void."

We are of the opinion, and so hold, that this statute, though quite general in its terms, has no application, properly construed, to justices of the peace within the city of St. Paul, and, further, that it was not the intention of the legislature by its enactment to repeal or modify the special acts creating justice courts in the city. The original statute upon this subject, and of which the law of 1909 was a re-enactment, was chapter 345, p. 567, Laws 1901. That statute, like the act of 1909, provided that no justice of the peace should issue any summons or other process to be served within a city having a population of two hundred thousand or over, and declared every such service null and void. It is conceded that the statute, when originally enacted, applied only to the city of Minneapolis, for it was then the only city in the state having the designated population. It was not intended by the legislature that it should apply to justices within that city, for there were then no justice courts therein. They were abolished two years prior to its enactment. Chapter 380, p. 505, Sp. Laws 1899. The apparent purpose of the act, therefore, was to prevent justices outside that city from issuing process to be served within the city. It could not, in view of the facts surrounding its enactment, have been construed otherwise, had the question been raised at the time, and it is doubtful whether its re-enactment in 1909 gave it greater or an enlarged scope or operation.

And, again, we are clear that the enactment of the statute in 1909 should not be construed as a repeal or modification of the special statutes creating justice courts for the city of St. Paul. That such was the purpose of the statute is made at all plausible only by strained inference, and not from anything contained in its language, or in the history of its enactment. It contains no clause repealing "acts or parts of acts inconsistent therewith," and we apply, in construing it, the rule laid down in ...