State ex rel. Miller v. Leich

• Decision Date: 06 June 1906
• Docket Number: No. 20,738.,20,738.
• Citation: 78 N.E. 189,166 Ind. 680
• Parties: STATE ex rel. MILLER v. LEICH, Treasurer.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

166 Ind. 680

78 N.E. 189

STATE ex rel.MILLER

v.LEICH, Treasurer.

No. 20,738.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 6, 1906.

Appeal from Superior Court, Vanderburgh County; Alex Gilchrist, Judge.

Application for a writ of mandate by the state, on relation of Oscar G. Miller, against August Leich, treasurer of the city of Evansville, to compel respondent to accept the amount bid by petitioner and for which he purchased a certain tract of real estate in the city of Evansville at the regular tax sale of lots and lands situated in that city for delinquent taxes thereon February 8, 1904, which lot was offered for sale for delinquent taxes by the city treasurer for two successive years next preceding 1904, for which no person had bid a sum or sums equal to the delinquent taxes thereon, interest, and penalty, and for which petitioner was the highest bidder and purchaser, etc. From an order denying the application, petitioner appeals. Reversed.

George A. Cunningham and O. W. McGinnis, for appellant. A. J. Veneman, for appellee.

MONKS, J.

The controlling question in this case is whether the act of 1903, Acts 1903, pp. 230, 231, c. 132, being sections 8603a-8603c, Burns' Ann. St. Supp. 1905, applied to cities having a population of more than 50,000 and less than 100,000 inhabitants, to which class the city of Evansville belonged. Sections 3905-4053, Burns' Ann. St. 1901 (Acts 1893, p. 65, c. 59; Acts 1895, p. 258, c. 135). Section 1 of said act of 1903, being section 8603a, Burns' Ann. St. Supp. 1905, provides “that whenever any lands have been or shall hereafter be offered for sale for delinquent taxes, interest and penalty by the treasurer of the proper county for any two successive years and no person shall have bid therefor a sum equal to the delinquent taxes thereon, interest and penalty provided by law, then such county Treasurer shall at the next regular tax sale of lands for delinquent taxes in the year 1904, sell the same to the highest bidder, and the purchaser thereof shall acquire thereby the same interest therein as is acquired by purchasers of other lands at such delinquent tax sales.” If said act applied to the city of Evansville when this controversy arose in 1904, this case must be reversed; otherwise, it must be affirmed. Section 148 of the act governing the city of Evansville in 1904, being section 4052, Burns' Ann. St. 1901, expressly provides that “The laws of the state of Indiana concerning the assessment of property for taxation and the collection of taxes and the sale of property for delinquent taxes, the enforcement by foreclosure or other proceedings, so far as the same are not in conflict with this act,” shall apply to the cities governed thereby.

Appellee insists (1) that said act of 1903 (Acts 1903, pp. 230, 231, c. 132; sections 8603a-8603c, Burns' Ann. St. Supp. 1905) did not apply to the city of Evansville because said section 148, supra (Acts 1895, p. 292, c. 105; section 4052, Burns' Ann. St. 1901), which adopted the laws of the state concerning taxation, adopted only the laws in force when the act containing said section 148 (section 4052), supra, was passed in 1895 (Acts 1895, p. 292, c. 105). The general rule is that when a statute adopts a part or all of another statute by a specific and descriptive reference thereto, such adoption takes the statute as it exists at the time of adoption and does not include subsequent additions or modifications of the statute unless it does so by express intent. 2 Lewis' Sutherland, Stat. Const. § 405; Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, § 85, and cases in note 107; 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) p. 714; Culver v. People, 161 Ill. 89, 96, 97, 43 N. E. 812, and cases cited. But when the adopting statute makes no reference to any particular statute or part of statute by its title or otherwise, but refers to the law generally which governs a particular subject, the reference in such a case includes not only the law in force at the date of the adopting act but also all subsequent laws upon the particular subject referred to. 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, pp. 714, 715, and cases cited in note 1; Id. p. 751; Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, § 493; Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Const. pp. 789, 790; Culver v. People, 161 Ill. 89, 96, 97, 43 N. E. 812;Snell v. City of Chicago, 133 Ill. 413, 24 N. E. 532, 8 L. R. A. 858;Newman v. City of North Yakima, 7 Wash. 220, 34 Pac. 921;Ford v. Durie, 8 Wash. 87, 35 Pac. 595, 1082;Gaston v. Lamkin, 115 Mo. 20, 33, 21 S. W. 1100;City of St. Louis v. Gunning Co., 138 Mo. 347, 353, 354, 39 S. W. 788;Cole v. Donovan, 106 Mich. 692, 64 N. W. 741;Kugler's Appeal, 55 Pa. 123;Harris v. White, 81 N. Y. 532;Jones v. Dexter, 6 Fla. 276. There is nothing in said act of 1903 (Acts 1903, pp. 230-231, c. 132; ...