State ex rel. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com'n v. McCann

• Decision Date: 11 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 685 S.W.2d 880
• Parties: STATE of Missouri ex rel. MISSOURI HIGHWAY AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, Successor to the State Highway Commission of Missouri, Appellant, v. Glenn E. McCANN, et al. Exceptions of Glenn E. McCann, et al., Respondents. 35,227.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 880

685 S.W.2d 880

STATE of Missouri ex rel. MISSOURI HIGHWAY AND

TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, Successor to the State

Highway Commission of Missouri, Appellant, v. Glenn E. McCANN, et al. Exceptions of Glenn E. McCann, et

al., Respondents.

No. WD 35,227.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Western District.

Dec. 11, 1984.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Overruled and Denied

Jan. 29, 1985.

Application to Transfer Denied

April 2, 1985.

Bruce A. Ring, Chief Counsel, Kansas City, Earl H. Schrader, Kansas City, Jr., Leland F. Dempsey, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Missouri Highway & Transp. Com'n, for appellant.

James W. Farley, Becky Ingrum Dolph, Farley, for respondents.

Before DIXON, P.J., and SHANGLER and SOMERVILLE, JJ.

SHANGLER, Judge.

The Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission commenced a series of condemnation actions to take private lands for the construction of Interstate 435 in Platte County around the circumference of Kansas City to facilitate interstate traffic flow as well as access to that environ. The condemnation actions began in the circuit court of Platte County in early 1974 and continued into 1975. The commissioners duly returned reports and thereafter the Highway Commission as well as all the landowners excepted to the awards. These separate litigations [fifteen in number] remained altogether quiescent until year 1983 when the Highway Commission moved for trial settings--on March 8, 1983, as to one aggregate of the cases, and on May 18, 1983, as to the other. The landowners moved to dismiss the exceptions for want of prosecution; and after hearing and rehearing, the court entered judgments of dismissal as to all fifteen cases.

The Highway Commission contends on appeal that (1) as an agent of the sovereign it is immune from a termination of its rights due to delay or passage of time, and hence from judgment of dismissal, and (2) that the delay in the prosecution of the exceptions was, in any case, excusable.

The motions to dismiss were heard separately, but adjudicated on the same evidence:

In 1970 the Congress authorized additional interstate highway construction, and I-435 was an adjunct of that project. That route was not a part of the original interstate system design, so that it fell to the Highway Commission to establish a location for the way. The purpose of that improvement was not only to facilitate interstate traffic but to provide vehicular access to and around Kansas City. A segment of I-435 was designated to run through Platte County and to traverse incorporated [Kansas City] and unincorporated areas of that locale. That region was then for the most part agricultural and so without the network of service and access roads usual to developed areas. At this same time, however, the area was in transformation: the recent completion of the Kansas City International Airport was a stimulus for market speculation of land located within a ten-mile perimeter. As a result, land prices within that ambit were at an average of $5200 per acre in 1974, and some choice locations yielded as much as $12,000 per acre. The expected development did not come to pass, however, so that the average price per acre plummeted to $1350 by 1983.

It was against this scene that the Highway Commission commenced design for the I-435 installation. The witness Satterlee, district engineer for Missouri, testified that the basic information from which the commission adduced its traffic projections was the 1970 census. That source indicated "substantial growth in the vicinity of the airport." In addition to the census information, the Highway Commission depended on its own system of traffic projection to design the location of the route, the number of lanes, interchange locations and cross-streets. The preliminary plans were submitted to a "design public hearing," as prelude to the development of detailed plans for the entire I-435 project. Those plans were filed with the condemnation petitions, and acquisition of the right-of-way commenced. A segment of the addition to the I-435 system impinged on Kansas City and was designed in consultation with that municipality. The plan contemplated a reticule of access roads, cross-roads and cross-street structures as appurtenances of the highway, and an urban agreement was concluded between the State and Kansas City to that end. The construction was to be installed conformably to the master plan conceived by the municipality for that area of Platte County.

The condemnation petitions were all filed by the end of March, 1975. A glimmer of doubt as to the integrity of the plans for the highway occurred to the Highway Commission as early as 1974, even while these expropriations were still under way. Commission studies confirmed that the oil embargo of that year had reduced the number of vehicle miles of travel in the vicinity of the proposed improvements. The intimation of a continued highway disuse was confirmed in 1979 when the Commission determined another pattern of decreased vehicle miles traveled, this time due to increased fuel prices. The Commission determined to reevaluate the continued efficacy of the plans for the I-435 project, but decided to await the 1980 Census for that purpose--data not available until 1981. The Commission commenced the redesign in earnest in 1981, and concluded the work in February of 1983. The district engineer Satterlee attributed the need to redesign as much to the failure of Kansas City to disclose its plans for the access and other appurtenant roads, as to the permanently diminished traffic use. In 1981, with the 1980 Census data in hand, the Commission began the redesign. In February of 1982, Kansas City made known its access plans, and in February of 1983, the Commission completed a revised design for the I-435 project. To accomplish the redesign, the Commission undertook to reappraise the affected properties.

Then on March 8, 1983, the Highway Commission moved for trial dates as to six of the exceptions, and on May 18, 1983, moved for trial dates as to the other nine exceptions. The evidence already recounted was adduced, and the court dismissed the fifteen exceptions for want of prosecution. The record discloses that these separate actions were dormant for periods which ranged from six years and eight months to eight years and six months. There was no activity of any kind in any of these cases from the report of the commissioners and payment of the awards to the motions for trial dates. In that interim, however, numerous other tracts taken in those condemnation proceedings were concluded by settlement--before and after trial settings--and by jury verdicts.

The appeal contends that the state as sovereign enjoys immunity from a termination of any right or interest from mere delay--whether from laches, general limitations, prescription, adverse user, or negligence--so that the judgments of dismissal for want of diligent prosecution were unlawful. To sustain contention, the Highway Commission advances numerous aphorisms: that laches does not apply against the public right [State ex rel. Taylor v. Blair, 357 Mo. 586, 210 S.W.2d 1 (banc 1948) ], that statutes of limitation do not affect the sovereign unless made expressly applicable to the State [State ex rel. Robb v. Poelker, 515 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. banc 1974) ], and that a judgment may not rest upon the negligent lapse of the sovereign without its consent [Bartley v. Special School District of St. Louis County, 649 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. banc 1983) ].

These principles appertain to litigants inter sese, not to courts. They ensure that as between suitors, the public right not go by lapse of time or default. The judgments of dismissal for want of diligent prosecution stand on a different ground. They were not exercises by the court in favor of any party, but vindications of its own process. It is a power which inheres in the quintessential function of a court: to administer justice. The power of a court " 'to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice'--in order that it may preserve its existence and function as a court [are] powers [which] exist and inhere merely because it is a court and irrespective of legislative or constitutional grant." State ex rel. Gentry v. Becker, 174 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Mo.1943). Thus, the duty of a court to preserve the integrity of its process antecedes legislative or even constitutional grant and so--contrary to contention--depends on neither. Loftus v. Lee, 308 S.W.2d 654, 660 (Mo.1958); 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 79 (1965). In cognate terms, an attempt by the legislative department to impose an undue delay or other burden upon the administration of justice [as a peremptory entitlement to a continuance in a judicial proceeding by the fact that the party or attorney is a member of the general assembly then in session] encroaches upon the inherent function of the judicial department to administer justice, and so is unconstitutional. Kyger v. Koerper, 355 Mo. 772, 207 S.W.2d 46, 49[5, 6] (banc 1947). The nondelegable duty of the court to administer justice evenly as to all parties is embodied in our state constitution [Article I, § 14]: "That the courts of justice shall be open to every person ... and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Kyger v. Koerper, supra, 207 S.W.2d l.c. 49[5, 6]; Loftus v. Lee, supra, l.c.660. The power to prescribe rules of procedure to facilitate the administration of justice also inheres in the court function. In re Sparrow, 338 Mo. 203, 90 S.W.2d 401, 403 (banc 1935); 20 Am.Jur.2d, Courts § 82 (1965). That power [also embodied in our constitution--Article V, § 5], when exercised to dismiss a pendent cause of action for neglect to prosecute, prevents an abuse of process, and so subserves the essential duty of a court to administer justice. State ex rel. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission v. Kersey, 663 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Mo.App.1983).

The...