State ex rel. Moore v. Julian, 41183.
| Decision Date | 11 July 1949 |
| Docket Number | No. 41183.,41183. |
| Citation | 222 S.W.2d 720 |
| Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. E.E. MOORE and L.G. DECAMP, Individually and for and on Behalf of all Members of Division 691 of Springfield, Missouri, of the AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAYS AND MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, Relators, v. VANCE JULIAN, C.W. BOUTIN, CARL C. MITCHELL, G.H. FRIELING, and JOHN A. WHITE, Members of and Constituting the STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
William A. Moon for relators.
(1) Policy of the State of Missouri regarding labor relations affecting public utilities. Sec. 10178.101 Mo. R.S.A. (2) The Legislature clearly, definitely and expressly included utilities operating under governmental ownership within the scope of the act establishing the State Board of Mediation, commonly known as the King-Thompson Act. Secs. 10178.101, 10178.102 Mo. R.S.A. (3) Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous it is the duty of the court to enforce the same as written. The statute may not be restricted, constricted, qualified, narrowed, or abridged. 50 Am. Jur., p. 217; 50 Am. Jur., pp. 204-207; State ex rel. McKinley Publishing Co. v. Hackmann, 314 Mo. 33, 282 S.W. 1007; State ex rel. Chaney v. Grimstead, 314 Mo. 55, 282 S.W. 715; Sutherland, Statutory Construction, sec. 367, p. 702; Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 4, p. 6; 25 R.C.L. 957, sec. 213; 25 R.C.L. 962, 963, sec. 217; 36 Cyc., pp. 1107, 1115. (4) In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. Spicer v. Spicer, 249 Mo. 582, 155 S.W. 832; 2 Sutherland, Stat. Construction (2d Ed.), sec. 498; Funkhouser v. Landfried, 124 W. Va. 654, 22 S.E. (2d) 353; Hausen v. Raleigh, 63 N.E. (2d) 851, 163 A.L.R. 1425; Rushville v. Rushville Natural Gas Co., 132 Ind. 575, 28 N.E. 853, 15 L.R.A. 321; 50 Am. Jur., sec. 357. (5) Where an act passed by the legislature embodies a definition, it is binding on the courts. Nichols v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 314 Mass. 285, 50 N.E. (2d) 76, 147 A.L.R. 830; St. Louis v. Nash, 266 Mo. 523, 181 S.W. 1145; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. State Unemployment Compensation Comm., 193 P. (2d) 708, 116 P. (2d) 744, 138 A.L.R. 1398; 50 Am. Jur., sec. 262. (6) Analysis of act establishing the State Board of Mediation. The Act provides for the complete settlement and/or arbitration involving any controversy as to hours, wages and working conditions between employees and the management of any utility throughout the State. Secs. 10178.108, 10178.114, 10178.115, 10178.116, 10178.118, 10178.118a Mo. R.S.A. (7) The Act requires all collective bargaining agreements entered into between the management of a utility and its employees or any craft or class of employees to be reduced to writing. Sec. 10178.110. (8) Relators have complied with the requirements on their part to bring themselves within the scope of the Act so that the State Board of Mediation should accept jurisdiction in the labor controversy in question. (9) The assumption of jurisdiction by respondents of the labor dispute between relators and the management of the bus transportation system in Springfield is not discretionary. A statutory provision is generally regarded as mandatory where the power or duty to which it relates is for the public benefit, good, interest or protection, for the security of public rights or for the advancement of public justice. In such case, although the words of the statute are merely permissive, directory or enabling, they may nevertheless have the force of words of command. This is true of the word "may." Kansas City v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W. (2d) 195; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. v. Lee, 303 Mo. 641, 262 S.W. 344; State ex rel. Wendling Bros. Co. v. Board of Education, 127 Ohio St. 336, 188 N.E. 566; Buell v. Toppenish, 174 Wash. 79, 24 P. (2d) 431; Larson v. Marsh, 144 Neb. 644, 14 N.W. (2d) 189, 153 A.L.R. 101; 50 Am. Jur., sec. 34. (10) Some discretion is given relators as to the means it deems expedient to settle a dispute, but the assumption of jurisdiction to proceed to exercise the powers entrusted to them is mandatory and mandamus is the appropriate remedy. State ex rel. Kirby v. Civil Service Comm. of St. Louis, 163 S.W. (2d) 964; 34 Am. Jur., pp. 126, 127; U.S. ex rel. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 294 U.S. 50, 55 S. Ct. 326, 79 L. Ed. 752; Local Union No. 876, International Bro. Elec. Wrks., v. State of Michigan Labor Mediation Board, 293 N.W. 809. (11) Analysis of Article 3 of Chapter 38 — Cities of the Second Class — Board of Public Utilities. The language of Sections 6610.1 to and including 6610.9 Mo. R.S.A. interpreted according to its natural and ordinary meaning clearly separates corporate functions, and employees engaged therein, and provides for their operation and management in a manner distinctly apart from other city functions. Secs. 6610.1, 6610.2, 6610.3, 6610.4, 6610.5, 6610.6, 6610.7, 6610.8, 6610.9 Mo. R.S.A. (12) Comparison of status of regular city employees and utility employees of public utilities in cities of the second class. Secs. 6613, 6614, 6615, 6617, 6652, 6659, 6671, R.S. 1939; City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W. (2d) 539; Chap. 12A, Title 16, U.S.C.A. (13) Governmental or legislative powers and business powers. 5 McQuillin. Mun. Corps., p. 55 (2d Ed.), sec. 1938; Vol. 6, sec. 2792 (2d Ed.); Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 147 Fed. 1; Riley v. Independence, 258 Mo. 671, 167 S.W. 1022, Ann Cas. 1915 D 748; South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 50 L. Ed. 261: Public Service Comm. of Mo. v. City of Kirkwood, 4 S.W. (2d) 773; Lober v. Kansas City, 74 S.W. (2d) 815. (14) All utility employees of utilities operated by Boards of Public Utilities in Cities of the Second Class are exempt from the terms of the civil service statutes relative to such cities which consist of Sections 6678 to 6688, both inclusive, R.S. Mo. 1939. Secs. 6678-6688, R.S. 1939; City of Flat River v. Mackley, 212 S.W. (2d) 462; State v. Mangiaracina, 344 Mo. 99, 125 S.W. (2d) 58; State ex rel. City of Springfield v. Smith, 344 Mo. 150, 125 S.W. (2d) 883. (15) The case of City of Springfield v. Clouse, et al. is not controlling in this action as contended by respondents.
J.E. Taylor. Attorney General, John R. Baty and Arthur M. O'Keefe. Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent.
(1) The State Board of Mediation has no jurisdiction because public employment is not a matter of collective bargaining. Sec. 10178.114, Mo. R.S.A.; City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W. (2d) 539; Laws 1947, secs. 1, 2, p. 358. (2) The General Assembly has not separated corporate functions and employees engaged therein, so as to confer the right of collective bargaining by the establishment of the Board of Public Utilities. Sec. 6213, R.S. 1939; Secs. 6610.1, 6610.4, Mo. R.S.A.; City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W. (2d) 539: Laws 1945, p. 1270: Secs. 6610.1-6610.10, Mo. R.S.A.: 5 McQuillin Mun. Corps., sec. 1928, p. 23: Son Printing & Pub. Assn. v. New York, 152 N.Y. 257 46 N.E. 499: Menderson v. City of Phoenix, 51 Ariz. 280, 76 Pac. (2d) 321. (3) Writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of Mediation to do something which is left to its discretion. State ex rel. Whitehead v. Wenom. 326 Mo. 352, 32 S.W. (2d) 59; Sec. 10178.108. Mo. R.S.A.: Lansdown v. Faris, 66 Fed. (2d) 939; State ex inf. McKittrick v. Wymore, 343 Mo. 98, 119 S.W. (2d) 941, 119 A.L.R. 710; Bowers v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 328 Mo. 770, 41 S.W. (2d) 810: Sec. 10178.119, Mo. R.S.A.
Original proceeding in mandamus to compel the State Board of Mediation to take jurisdiction of an alleged labor dispute between the employees of the municipally owned and operated bus transportation system of Springfield and the Board of Public Utilities of that city. Relators Moore and DeCamp are president and secretary, respectively, of Division 691 of Springfield, Missouri, of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railways and Motor Coach Employees of America, a voluntary, unincorporated association commonly known as a labor union, whose members constitute all of the bus operators and bus garage and shop employees, together with the cashier and all clerks of the city's bus transportation system. Relators bring this action both in their individual capacities and as representatives of all other members of the union. Respondents are members of, and constitute the State Board of Mediation.
The facts are not in dispute, and the issues are issues of law. As to the facts, it is sufficient to say that the bus transportation system in the city of Springfield is and has been municipally owned since 1945. It is operated by and under the control of the Board of Public Utilities of that city. It appears that the union had what would ordinarily be recognized as collective bargaining agreements for the years 1946 and 1947 affecting wages, hours and working conditions. (Respondents concede the execution and existence of these writings, but they deny their legal effect as collective bargaining agreements.) The union, through its secretary, gave timely notice of its desire to make certain changes in its contract, and requested a meeting. Subsequently several conferences were held between relators and the Board of Public Utilities and its manager, but these were fruitless, and the parties were unable to agree upon a final settlement...
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