State ex rel. Moorehead v. Indus. Comm., 2005 Ohio 2667 (OH 5/31/2005)
| Decision Date | 31 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 04AP-404. |
| Citation | 2005 Ohio 2667 |
| Parties | State of Ohio ex rel., Sandra J. Moorehead, Relator, v. Industrial Commission of Ohio and P.F. Nolan, Inc., Respondents. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Law Office of M. Scott Kidd and M. Scott Kidd, for relator.
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and William J. McDonald, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
DECISION
ON OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
{¶1} Relator, Sandra J. Moorehead, has filed this original action requesting this court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order denying her request for payment of compensation accrued at the time of death of her decedent-husband, William Moorehead, for scheduled loss of use of both arms and legs, pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B), and to enter a new order granting said compensation.
{¶2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Attached as Appendix A.) In the decision, the magistrate concluded the commission abused its discretion in denying the requested compensation; however, the magistrate held that relief was inappropriate under State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 315. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended that this court issue a writ of mandamus directing the commission to vacate its order, review the submitted medical evidence, and determine whether relator met her burden of proving that decedent sustained the loss of use of both arms and legs as a result of the industrial injury.
{¶3} Both relator and the commission have filed objections to the magistrate's conclusions of law. Relator argues that, instead of recommending that the case be returned to the commission for further consideration, the magistrate should have recommended that this court order the commission to grant the requested relief pursuant to Gay, supra. The commission urges that the magistrate erred in finding that it abused its discretion in denying the requested compensation.
{¶4} As indicated in the magistrate's findings of fact, at 12:02 p.m. on October 20, 1997, decedent fell approximately 16 feet off a scaffold lift and landed head first on the concrete pavement below the lift. Decedent was non-responsive following the fall; he died at 1:37 p.m. the same day without regaining consciousness.
{¶5} After receiving death benefits, relator filed an "application for payment of compensation accrued at time of death," alleging that for the 95 minutes between the accident and decedent's death, decedent was a quadriplegic entitled to R.C. 4123.57(B) benefits for his loss of use of both arms and both legs. In support of her application, relator submitted the medical reports of three physicians who opined that, had decedent survived his injuries, he would have been a quadriplegic.
{¶6} Scheduled awards pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) provide compensation for the "loss" of enumerated body parts. The Ohio Supreme Court originally defined a scheduled "loss" as loss by severance only and not the loss of use of such body parts. See State ex rel. Bohan v. Indus. Comm. (1946), 146 Ohio St. 618. However, in State ex rel. Gassman v. Indus. Comm. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 64, a case involving a paraplegic, the court expanded the meaning of the term "loss" as used in R.C. 4123.58, which governs permanent total disability compensation, to include "loss of use" and not merely "loss by severance." The court reasoned that "[f]or all practical purposes, [the employee had] lost his legs to the same effect and extent as if they had been amputated or otherwise physically removed." Id. at 67. In a subsequent case also involving a paraplegic, State ex rel. Walker v. Indus. Comm. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 402, the court applied the holding of Gassman to R.C. 4123.57(C), now R.C. 4123.57(B), and overruled Bohan.
{¶7} R.C. 4123.57(B) benefits are akin to general damages and are awarded irrespective of earning capacity. State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 418, 2002-Ohio-6664, at ¶12. Such benefits are payable at a specified level for a stated number of weeks, depending upon the injury. State ex rel. Hammond v. Indus. Comm. (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 237, 239. An injured worker is entitled to compensation for 225 weeks for the loss of an arm and 200 weeks for the loss of a leg. R.C. 4123.57(B) further provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]hen an employee has sustained the loss of a member by severance, but no award has been made on account thereof prior to the employee's death, the administrator shall make an award in accordance with this division for the loss which shall be payable to the surviving spouse[.]"
{¶8} In denying relator's application, the commission discussed the purpose of a scheduled loss of use award under R.C. 4123.57(B). The commission construed the statute as affording compensation to offset the handicap an injured worker might suffer due to the severance, or loss of use, of a body part. In other words, according to the commission, an R.C. 4123.57(B) award compensates an injured worker who survives an injury and must endure the loss of a body part on a daily basis. Based upon this interpretation of the statute, the commission determined that scheduled loss benefits may be awarded only when the injured worker experiences the physical suffering and hardship caused by the loss of a body part. Applying this rationale to the facts before it, the commission found that relator was not entitled to a scheduled loss award because decedent did not sustain an actual loss of use of his extremities, as decedent was comatose and, thus, completely unaware of the extent of injuries for the brief period between the time he sustained the injury and his death.
{¶9} The commission further found that an award for loss of use requires an actual sustained loss of use. Accordingly, the commission found that "a loss that may have occurred had an injured worker survived is not compensable [under] R.C. 4123.57(B)."
{¶10} The commission concluded that the medical evidence submitted by relator did not establish that decedent sustained an actual loss of use. The commission noted that all three of the medical reports submitted by relator ultimately concluded that decedent would have been a quadriplegic had he survived the accident. "The fact of survival was an assumed fact critical to each opinion and to the actual loss of use."
{¶11} The commission is vested with authority to determine all rights of claimants under the workers' compensation laws, and this authority includes interpreting statutes governing eligibility for benefits. "[I]t is well-settled that courts, when interpreting statutes, must give due deference to an administrative interpretation formulated by an agency which has accumulated substantial expertise, and to which the legislature has delegated the responsibility of implementing the legislative command." State ex rel. McLean v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 90, 95. Here, the commission exercised this authority in construing R.C. 4123.57(B) to deny compensation for loss of use under circumstances where the injured worker never regains consciousness after the injury, dies shortly after the injury, and, thus, has no capacity to actually suffer a loss of use of the injured body parts. This court cannot conclude that the commission abused its discretion in so finding. It could not have been the intent of the General Assembly in promulgating R.C. 4123.57(B), or the intent of the Ohio Supreme Court in deciding Gassman and Walker, to sanction an award of 850 weeks (more than 16 years) of workers' compensation benefits due to an alleged loss of use where the injured worker survived the industrial injury in an unconscious state for only a brief period and never actually experienced the disabling effects of quadriplegia.
{¶12} Accordingly, we conclude that the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying relator a scheduled loss award under R.C. 4123.57(B). We specifically decline to substitute our judgment for that of the commission by defining a loss of use to include situations where the injured worker survives an industrial injury in an unconscious state for only a brief period and never actually experiences the disabling effects of the injury. Rather, we afford the administrative decision in this case the deference due it under Ohio law.
{¶13} Following independent review pursuant to Civ.R. 53, we adopt the magistrate's findings of fact, but reject the magistrate's conclusions of law. Having found that the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying relator's request for scheduled loss benefits, we sustain the commission's objections and overrule relator's objections. Accordingly, the requested writ of mandamus is denied.
Relator's objections overruled; respondent Industrial Commission's objections sustained; writ denied.
MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
Law Office of M. Scott Kidd and M. Scott...
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