State ex rel. Moreland v. Whitford

• Decision Date: 10 January 1882
• Citation: 54 Wis. 150,11 N.W. 424
• Parties: STATE OF WISCONSIN EX REL. MORELAND AND OTHERS v. WHITFORD.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

54 Wis. 150

11 N.W. 424

STATE OF WISCONSIN EX REL. MORELAND AND OTHERS

v.WHITFORD.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Filed January 10, 1882.

Certiorari.

D. Dunwiddie, for plaintiffs in error.

P. J. Clawson, for defendant in error.

ORTON, J.

This is a common-law certiorari to bring before this court the record and proceedings of the defendant in error, as state superintendent having the supervision of public instruction, in deciding upon the question of the division of school-district No. 8, of the town of Clarno, in Green county, upon an appeal from the order of the town board of said town making such division. The question first to be disposed of is the true province of the court addressed to such a quasi judicial tribunal. In ordinary cases, where the writ goes to inferior courts or tribunals, the record only can be inspected to ascertain whether such court acted within its jurisdiction; but in respect to an officer having only quasi judical power to act in proceedings of a summary character, and out of the course of the common law, the proceedings will be reviewed, to also ascertain whether such person having jurisdiction has kept within it and acted strictly according to law. To this end, errors or irregularities may be corrected. This we understand to be the effect of the decision of this court in Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Schubel Town Clerk, etc., 29 Wis. 444.

But the office of this writ, although so enlarged in such cases, will yet not warrant a review of mere questions of fact where there is any contention as to the proof or the reversal of the judgment or determination of the officer upon the merits of the case. Errors of law and not errors of judgment merely will be corrected in such a case. In accordance with this view of our jurisdiction in the present case we may look into the record to ascertain (1) whether the defendant acted in this matter on appeal within his jurisdiction as state superintendent; (2) whether he acted according to law; and (3) whether he made his determination of the facts upon any evidence which would warrant it. The constitutional question as to whether such a jurisdiction could be constitutionally conferred upon this officer is virtually disposed of by the above ruling that he is authorized only to act in a quasi judicial capacity. If, as the learned counsel of the plaintiff in error contends, he is made by the law a judicial tribunal or inferior court in the ordinary sense, then his jurisdiction only can be inquired into; but it is decided that his questions are only quasi judicial, and that is sufficient. Joint Schooldist. No. 7, etc., v. Wolfe, 12 Wis. 685. In that case, although the question was not directly raised as to the authority of the state superintendent, but only as to a clerk in his office acting in a similar matter, yet it was so vital to the proceeding it must be construed as passed without question, sub silentio.

The question is directly met and decided as to the superintendent of public instruction of the state of New York, whose powers and duties on such appeals are substantially as in this state, and whose determination is final. People v. Collins, 34 How. 336. But it is sufficient that the state superintendent, on appeal from the decision of the town board altering or changing the boundaries of a school-district, passes upon the matter as an original question, and has the same power and discretion in deciding whether such district should be changed, altered, or divided as the town board had in making its decision. If the state superintendent in this has judical power conferred upon him in violation of the constitution, so has the town board; and yet no one has thought of questioning the constitutional power of such a body in such a proceeding. The state superintendent is not a court of appeals or of errors, to sit in review of the errors of the town board, but on appeal he acts in the whole matter as the board should have acted, and his decision is final. The legislature might have made the decision of the town board final if it had seen fit so to do, but it provided for a hearing of the same matter before another officer on appeal, and has made that final.

We think it was eminently proper for the legislature to confer this power of final disposition of changes in school-districts on this officer. It is especially within the appropriate functions of his office, and considering the eminent ability and impartiality of the incumbent of this office in the past, as at the present time, experience has proved that such matter may well be left with him as a finality. To what extent his jurisdiction might be upheld under the constitution, on questions involving grave property and personal rights, is an important question, which we do not now decide; for in this matter, when his decision maintains the district intact, and its affairs in statu quo, no mischief of this sort has been done. But we are satisfied that this supervision of the state superintendent over the affairs of schools and school-districts, commonly very fruitful sources of litigation, has been most wisely conferred upon him for the public interest, as well as for the peace and prosperity of the schools and districts themselves; and there could be no better vindication of this policy of the state, and no higher commendation of the distinguished gentlemen who have filled the office, than the fact...