State ex rel. Morrisey v. Diocese of Wheeling-Charleston
| Decision Date | 16 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-1056,19-1056 |
| Citation | 851 S.E.2d 755 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia EX REL. Patrick MORRISEY, Attorney General, Petitioner v. DIOCESE OF WHEELING-CHARLESTON, and Michael J. Bransfield, in his capacity as former Bishop of the Diocese of Wheeling-Charleston, Respondents |
Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Lindsay S. See, Esq., Solicitor General, Douglas P. Buffington, II, Esq., Senior Deputy Attorney General, Douglas L. Davis, Esq., Abby G. Cunningham, Esq., Assistant Attorneys General, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for Petitioner.
James C. Gardill, Esq., Richard N. Beaver, Esq., Edward M. George, III, Esq., Phillips, Gardill, Kaiser & Altmeyer, PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia, Christopher A. Brumley, Esq., Flaherty Sensabaugh Bonasso, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for Respondents.
The Attorney General of West Virginia (the Attorney General) sued the Diocese of Wheeling-Charleston and Michael J. Bransfield in his capacity as Former Bishop of the Diocese of Wheeling-Charleston (the Diocese). The Attorney General alleged that the Diocese knowingly employed persons who admitted to sexually abusing others or who were credibly accused of sexual abuse at its schools and camps for decades. By hiding that danger or misrepresenting it, the Attorney General alleged that the Diocese violated the deceptive practices provisions of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. Upon the Diocese's motion, the circuit court dismissed the Attorney General's claims. But, the court stayed its order and certified the following question of law to this Court: "Do the deceptive practices provisions of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, West Virginia Code §§ 46A-6-101 to 106 (2015), apply to educational and recreational services offered by a religious institution?"1 For the reasons discussed below, we answer "No."
The Attorney General sued the Diocese in March 2019 for alleged violations of the deceptive practices provisions of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (CCPA), West Virginia Code §§ 46A-6-101 to 106 (2015).2 Generally, the Attorney General claimed that the Diocese had violated the deceptive practices provisions when it knowingly employed admitted and credibly-accused sexual abusers in its schools and camps but neither disclosed that material information to consumers nor warned them of the alleged dangers inherent to the educational and recreational services it provided.3 The Attorney General also claimed that the Diocese had made material misrepresentations regarding the safety of those services. The Complaint asserted two causes of action under the deceptive practices provisions: Advertised Services Not Delivered4 and Failure to Warn of Dangerous Services.5
The circuit court granted the Attorney General leave to file the Amended Complaint in June 2019, which included slight expansions on the factual allegations of the original Complaint. In the Amended Complaint, the Attorney General asserted the same two causes of action found in the original Complaint. He added, however, a third claim: that the Diocese had obtained an unfair competitive advantage over other schools and camps when it had misrepresented and omitted material information about the safety of its own schools and camps.6
The Diocese moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Two issues predominated the parties’ briefing on the motion and their September 2019 argument to the court: whether the educational and recreational services offered by the Diocese were subject to the deceptive practices provisions of the CCPA and, if they were, whether the Attorney General's attempt to enforce those provisions impinged on the Diocese's constitutional rights. The circuit court granted the Diocese's motion in November 2019, stayed the case, and certified two questions of law to this Court.7
"The appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court is de novo. "8 Likewise, "[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review."9 to the certified question before us.10
The questions certified by the circuit court, and its answers, are:
But, we are not bound to answer the exact question certified by the circuit court; this Court always retains the power to reformulate certified questions:
When a certified question is not framed so that this Court is able to fully address the law which is involved in the question, then this Court retains the power to reformulate questions certified to it under both the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act found in W.Va. Code , 51-1A-1, et seq. and W.Va. Code , 58-5-2 [1967], the statute relating to certified questions from a circuit court of this State to this Court.[11 ]
So, we reformulate the circuit court's first question as follows: Do the deceptive practices provisions of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, West Virginia Code §§ 46A-6-101 to - 106 (2015), apply to educational and recreational services offered by a religious institution?12
We briefly review the precepts of statutory interpretation before turning to the statutes at issue in this case. As always, the Legislature's intent is both our guide and our goal in construing a statute; thus, our mantra: "[t]he primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature."13 The way is clear when the Legislature has plainly expressed its intent in the language of a statute. "When a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute."14 In doing so, "the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and familiar significance and meaning, and regard is to be had for their general and proper use."15 Conversely, "[a] statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be applied."16 An ambiguous statute engenders "doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning or indistinctness or uncertainty of an expression ...."17
With these principles in mind, we first consider the deceptive practices provisions and then turn to West Virginia Code §§ 18-28-1 to 7.
The Attorney General pleaded causes of action arising under the deceptive practices provisions of the CCPA in his Amended Complaint. He alleged that education and recreation are "services," as that term is defined in the CCPA. Consequently, he reasoned, he may bring deceptive practices claims to regulate the educational and recreational services supplied by a religious institution.
West Virginia Code § 46A-6-104 states: "Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."18 " ‘Trade’ or ‘commerce’ " is "the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any goods or services and shall include any trade or commerce, directly or indirectly, affecting the people of this state."19 " ‘Services’ include[ ] ... ‘privileges with respect to ... education[ and] recreation.’ "20
On appeal, the Attorney General posits that because "services" include "privileges with respect to ... education[ and] recreation," then, services—for purposes of the CCPA, at least—include education and recreation. Our review of this issue is de novo and brief. We find that the common and ordinary meaning of "privileges" aligns with those dictionary definitions offered by the Attorney General: "a right or immunity granted as a peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor."21 Numerous dictionary definitions track this meaning, including the first definition of the word in Black's Law Dictionary : "A special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons; an exception to a duty."22 Considered in the context of the CCPA, we see that a "service" includes a peculiar23 legal right with respect to education or recreation.24
We disagree with the Diocese that the phrase "privileges with respect to" limits application of the deceptive practices provisions of Article 6 to the consumer credit context. Had the Legislature intended that limit, it would have said so by using terms already defined in Article 1, such as "credit,"25 or "consumer credit sale."26 Instead, the Legislature chose to use an undefined phrase, "privileges with respect to," communicating that (1) something other than credit or a consumer credit sale of education or recreation is a service, and (2) the common, every day meaning of "privilege" controls.
While it may be clear that "services," for purposes of the CCPA, include education or recreation, the next step—whether the deceptive practices provisions can regulate those services when a religious institution offers them—is not. That is because a conflict arises when the deceptive practices provisions are applied to a religious institution's educational and...
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