State ex rel. National Bond & Security Company v. Krahmer
| Decision Date | 18 September 1908 |
| Docket Number | 15,581 - (146) |
| Citation | 117 N.W. 780,105 Minn. 422 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. NATIONAL BOND & SECURITY COMPANY v. EDWARD G. KRAHMER |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Application to the district court for Ramsey county upon the relation of the National Bond & Security Company for a writ of mandamus against Edward G. Krahmer, auditor of Ramsey county, to compel him to issue a notice of the expiration of the time for redemption from a tax sale of a certain lot bid in by the state in 1898. The sole question involved was whether Laws 1905, c. 271, requiring notice of expiration of redemption from tax sales to be issued within six years from the date of said sale, was valid and constitutional. From a judgment entered pursuant to the order of Brill, J dismissing the proceeding and the alternative writ, relator appealed. Affirmed.
Constitution -- Obligation of Contract.
A law does not impair the obligation of a contract within the meaning of the constitution, if neither party is relieved thereby from performing anything of that which he obligated himself to do. But, if either party is absolved from performing any of these things, such obligation is impaired, whether the absolution is effected directly and expressly or indirectly, and only as the result of some modification of the legal proceedings for enforcement.
Tax Certificate.
The validity of a tax certificate and the rights of the holder thereof are to be determined by the laws in force at the time the certificate is acquired. Any statute which impairs any of the substantial rights secured to the holder by the existing laws is unconstitutional.
Tax Certificate -- What Law Governs.
The rule that the rights of parties in tax proceedings are to be determined by the law in force at the time of the tax sale and the issuance of the certificate does not prevent the legislature from making changes in the manner of enforcing the lien which do not substantially impair any of the obligations of the contract.
Notice of Time to Redeem.
The holder of a certificate has a lien upon the land which ripens into a title in fee upon the expiration of the time for redemption and the failure of the landowner to redeem after the giving of the statutory notice of the expiration of the redemption period. Prior to the enactment of chapter 271, Laws 1905, the holder of a tax certificate could not perfect his title without causing a notice of expiration of the time of redemption to be given. The notice might be given at any time after the expiration of the statutory period. This statute required the notice to be given within six years after the entry of the tax judgment. Held, that the statute does not impair any of the obligations of the contract.
Right to Refundment.
Chapter 271, Laws 1905, does not deprive the holder of a tax certificate of the right to refundment secured to him under the prior law.
Service of Notice.
The statute makes no change in respect to service of notice upon persons under disability. The law in this respect remains the same as before the enactment of chapter 271, Laws 1905.
Reasonable Time.
The period of eight months and thirteen days allowed by chapter 271, Laws 1905, within which the holders of existing tax certificates may cause notices of expiration of redemption to be given, is a reasonable time for the purpose.
Act Constitutional.
Chapter 271, Laws 1905, is constitutional.
William G. White, for appellant.
Richard D. O'Brien and Patrick J. Ryan, for respondent.
This appeal involves the constitutionality of chapter 271, p. 407, Laws 1905. The general tax for the year 1896 upon lot 11, block 2, Macalester View addition, city of St. Paul, was duly levied and assessed. The lot was thereafter sold under a judgment and bid in by the state. On November 27, 1899, a state assignment certificate was issued to the National Bond & Security Company, the relator herein. No redemption was made from the sale, and on September 25, 1907, the company presented the certificate to the auditor of Ramsey county, and requested that a notice of expiration of the time for redemption issue. As more than six years had elapsed from the date of the sale, the auditor refused to issue the notice. The trial court dismissed the alternative writ of mandamus, and ordered judgment for the respondent. The appeal is from the judgment entered on this order.
1. Chapter 271, p. 407, Laws 1905, approved April 18, 1905, went into effect on January 1, 1906. It provided that
The appellant concedes that the statute is constitutional as applied to tax judgment sales made after it went into effect, but contends that, as applied to a certificate issued before its enactment, it is unconstitutional because it impairs the obligation of the contract in that it (a) compels the holder to abandon his right to hold the certificate as a lien on the land until the tax is paid; (b) compels him to demand payment and thus create a default; (c) destroys his right to refundment; (d) compels him to bring an action to determine the validity of his certificate; (e) destroys his right to the possession of the land with the rents and profits thereof; (f) makes no provision for the issuance of the notice of redemption when the land is held by persons under disability; and (g) does not afford him a reasonable time within which to have his rights under the certificate adjudicated.
2. Prior to 1877 a tax deed issued in accordance with the general tax law of 1874 (Laws 1874, p. 17, c. 1) conveyed a title which became absolute at the expiration of the period for redemption. No notice of the expiration of the time was required to be given to the owner. But section 37, c. 6, p. 42, Laws 1877, provided that before the owner should be deprived of his land he must be given notice, and the effect was to make the lapse of time depend upon the service of this notice and the right to redeem remained irrespective of the lapse of time until the notice was given. As said in Merrill v. Dearing, 32 Minn. 479, 21 N.W. 721, the statute meant that the owner's right to redeem should continue until and for a specified number of days after the service of the notice, provided "that this redemption period shall not in all be less than three years from the date of sale." A party asserting title in fee by virtue of a tax certificate had the burden of proving that the notice had been duly given. Nelson v. Central Land Co., 35 Minn. 408, 29 N.W. 121; Mueller v. Jackson, 39 Minn. 431, 40 N.W. 565.
Laws 1881, p. 32, c. 10, § 22, attempted to repeal this requirement of notice, but this section of the act was held unconstitutional because the subject-matter was not expressed in the title. The act of 1877 applied to assignees of the interest of the state before forfeiture (Nelson v. Central Land Co., supra; Mueller v. Jackson, supra), but not to an assignee or grantee acquiring such interest after forfeiture (State v. Smith, 36 Minn. 456, 32 N.W. 174). By section 1, c. 198, p. 311, Laws 1889, it was provided that the title to all land sold to purchasers "under and by virtue of the provisions of section one hundred and one (101), chapter eleven (11), general statutes of eighteen hundred and seventy-eight (1878), [G.S. 1894, § 1616] * * * shall not expire until the notice contemplated by this act shall have been given by said purchaser." Since 1889 the right of redemption could not in any case be eliminated without giving the notice provided for by the statute. Powell v. King, 78 Minn. 83, 80 N.W. 850; State v. Halden, 62 Minn. 246, 64 N.W. 568. The act of 1905 did not go into effect for eight months and thirteen days after its passage. It required the holder of an existing certificate to do within a designated time what before its enactment he was required to do in order to perfect his title, but which he might do at such time as suited his convenience. Did this provision impair any of the substantial rights of the holder of such a certificate?
The respondent contends that the statute affects the remedy only and such was the view taken by the learned trial court. It is conceded that no one has a vested right in any particular remedy, and that the legislature may change or modify the existing remedies for the enforcement and protection of contract rights so long as an adequate remedy remains. Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) 361; Kipp v. Johnson, 31 Minn. 360, 17 N.W. 957; Whitney v. Wegler, 54 Minn. 235, 55 N.W. 927. This doctrine was applied in Archambau v. Green, 21 Minn. 520, where it was held that the legislature might properly shorten the time within which a mortgage must be foreclosed from twenty years, as provided by statute when the mortgage was executed, to ten years. Of this legislation the court said: ...
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