State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson

• Decision Date: 08 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 44059,44059
• Citation: 298 Minn. 438,216 N.W.2d 140
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Katherine A. NELSON, By Herbert Nelson, Her Guardian Ad Litem, Respondent, v. Gerald Allen NELSON, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 140

216 N.W.2d 140

298 Minn. 438

STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Katherine A. NELSON, By Herbert

Nelson, Her Guardian Ad Litem, Respondent, v. Gerald Allen NELSON, Appellant.

No. 44059.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 8, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

A nonresident putative father of an illegitimate child born to a resident mother, the act of conception having allegedly occurred in this state, may be subjected, pursuant to Minn.St. 543.19, to the jurisdiction of a court in this state upon a complaint of fathering and failing to support the child.

Thornton & Thornton, and J. G. Thornton, Alexandria, for appellant.

Harlan L. Nelson, County Atty., Bernard L. Bodien, Asst. County Atty., Fergus Falls, for respondent.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and OTIS, PETERSON, and MULALLY, JJ., and considered and decided by the court.

PETERSON, Justice.

The issue for decision is whether a nonresident putative father of an illegitimate child born to a resident mother, the act of conception having allegedly occurred in this state, may be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court in this state upon a complaint of fathering and failing to support the child. ¹ The more precise issue is whether this paternity complaint alleges a 'tort' within the meaning of our long-arm statute, Minn.St. 543.19, ² for defendant does not otherwise assert that such application of the statute would be a denial of due process. We hold that the long-arm statute does apply and accordingly affirm the order of the district court denying defendant's motion to quash the return of service and to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The thesis of defendant is that jurisdiction in paternity proceedings was not contemplated by the long-arm statute because no such cause of action was recognized as a 'tort' at common law and because no 'injury or property damage' is involved. The question, however, is not so much whether the alleged conduct is technically a tort but, rather, whether it was of a tortious nature involving sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to allow the long-arm statute to be constitutionally applied. As we have before stated, 'the most basic interest of our legislature in enacting § 543.19 was to afford maximum protection to this state's residents injured by acts of nonresidents; that is, to extend the extra-territorial jurisdiction of our courts to the maximum limits consistent with constitutional limitations.' Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 96, 172 N.W.2d 292, 304 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010, 90 S.Ct. 1239, 25 L.Ed.2d 423 (1970); reiterated in Mid-Continent Freight Lines, Inc. v. Highway Trailer Industries, Inc., 291 Minn. 251, 190 N.W.2d 670 (1971).

The precedent of other jurisdictions supports our rejection of defendant's contentions. The Supreme Court of Illinois, although construing a long-arm statute using the words 'tortious act' rather than the word, 'tort,' in two cases declined to give technical meaning to such words, holding that the statute of that state was intended to assert jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the constitutional limitations of due process. In Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 392, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680 (1957), the court said:

'* * * The word 'tortious' can, of course, be used to describe conduct that subjects the actor to tort liability. For its own purposes the Restatement so uses it. Restatement, Torts, § 6. It does not follow, however, that the words must have that meaning in a statute that is concerned with jurisdictional limits.'

And in Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 436, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961), it said:

'* * * In determining legislative intention courts will read words in their ordinary and popularly understood sense. (Citations omitted.) We think the intent should be determined less from technicalities of definition than from considerations of general purpose and effect. * * * (T)he test should be concerned more with those substantial elements of convenience and justice presumably contemplated by the legislature. As we observed in Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, (143 N.E.2d 673) the statute contemplates the exertion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-process clause.'

The action to establish paternity and to compel support of a child is civil in nature. State v. Tolberg, 273 Minn. 221, 222, 140 N.W.2d 845, 846 (1966). The doing of an act prohibited by law or the neglect to perform a duty imposed by law, resulting in damages to another, creates a legal liability, Baxter v. Coughlin, 70 Minn. 1, 72 N.W. 797 (1897), any may be denominated a tort within the scope of the longarm statute. By failing to perform his statutory duties of support, defendant has caused foreseeable damages to complainant. Contrary to defendant's contention, complainant mother has indeed suffered injury, for, quite apart from the physical and emotional trauma of bearing the child and rearing it alone, she is faced with the financial burdens of medical and hospital bills. She is also confronted with the expense of rearing their child and possible impairment of her earning power. For similar reasons, paternity actions such as this were held subject to state long-arm statutes in Poindexter v. Willis, 87 Ill.App.2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1 (1967); and Neill v. Ridner, 286 N.E.2d 427 (Ind.App.1972).

We address a concluding observation to the discretion of the trial court in the exercise of the jurisdiction we hold it to have under the long-arm st...