State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 32851

Decision Date04 November 1954
Docket NumberNo. 32851,32851
Citation45 Wn.2d 492,275 P.2d 899
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesThe STATE of Washington, on the Relation of C. M. OGDEN, Appellant, v. The CITY OF BELLEVUE, a municipal corporation, Evan Peterson, as City Manager of the City of Bellevue, Charles W. Bovee, as Mayor and Chairman of the City Council, Melvin v. Love, George Kardong, Thomas Dann, Philip Bessor, Albert Prince and Alden Hanson, as members of the City Council of the City of Bellevue, Omar Mithun, as Chairman of the Planning Commission of the City of Bellevue, Philip Reilly, Joshua Vogel, Fred Herman, Frank Krepelka, Philip Toman, Wallace Hibbard, John Anderson, James Littlefield, Alden Hanson, Albert Prince and Charles W. Bovee, as members of the Planning Commission of the City of Bellevue, Respondents. John L. HAGEN, Elenore C. Hagen, and C. M. Ogden, Appellants, v. The CITY OF BELLEVUE, a municipal corporation, and Evan C. Peterson, the City Manager of said City, Respondents. C. M. OGDEN, Appellant, v. The CITY OF BELLEVUE, a municipal corporation, and Evan C. Peterson, the City Manager of said City, Respondents.

Peyser, Cartano, Botzer & Chapman, Robert A. O'Neill, Seattle, for appellants.

Hall, Cole & Lawrence, Melvin Buol, Seattle, for respondents.

MALLERY, Justice.

Appellant, plaintiff below, wanted a site for a fruit and produce market. He found and brought a suitable location in King county on the east side of secondary state highway 2-A, which ran to Kirkland in a north-south direction through the unincorporated town of Bellevue. The property runs two hundred feet along the highway and is one hundred fifty feet deep. The easterly seventy-five feet was zoned B-1 (business, and the westerly seventy-five feet as A-1 (agriculture).

Bellevue was incorporated as a city of the third class shortly after appellant bought the property. It immediately created a planning commission and adopted the existing King county land use zoning ordinance.

Appellant made formal application for a permit to construct a combination residence and business building on the portion of his land zoned as B-1 (business). The application was denied upon the ground that he had not made any provision for off-street business parking as required by section 19A, subd. 9, of the city ordinance, which reads:

'Building Permits. Before the granting of a building permit for any new building or structure, or for any enlargement thereof, or change of use in any building hereafter constructed involved in any of the aforementioned uses, the applicant for said building permit shall present evidence in writing that arrangements have been made to provide off-street parking to be Zoned B-P (Business Parking) in accordance with the above provisions, or that the required amount of parking facilities classified as a business parking area on the County zoning maps has been provided by a satisfactory written contract, or present evidence of participation in an association which is providing adequate public off-street parking so classified.'

The ordinance fixes the following standards for a parking facility. It must be within one thousand feet of the front entrance to the building; it must provide one parking space of two hundred square feet for every four hundred square feet of gross floor area of business buildings between two thousand and five thousand square feet in size; and it must have access from a public thoroughfare.

Appellant proceeded to cure the deficiency pointed out by respondents in refusing his permit, by leasing a tract of land zoned as B-1 (business) to the north of and contiguous with his building site for the required off-street business parking facility.

The respondents exercised their discretion as to the desirability of this tract for off-street business parking notwithstanding it met the requirements of the ordinance, and objected to it upon the grounds that off-street business parking did not represent the highest and best use to which it could be put, and that such use of it would be bad city planning. Respondent then refused to issue the building permit because appellant did not have an approved off-street business parking facility. Thereupon, appellant sought a writ of mandate compelling the issuance of the building permit.

The respondents countermoved by attempting to rezone the tract proposed for off-street business parking from B-1 (business) to A-1 (agriculture). Appellant forthwith brought an action to enjoin this rezoning action from taking effect.

Appellant then reapplied for a building permit, and proposed to satisfy the off-street business parking requirements by using a tract of his own land of the proper size within one thousand feet of the entrance of the proposed building, which was zoned as B-1 (business). Again the respondents exercised their discretion and rejected his application upon the same ground as before. In the council meeting that same evening, the respondents attempted to rezone to A-1 (agriculture) all of the land of the appellant then zoned as B-1 (business). Appellant thereupon sought another injunction against the second attempted rezoning ordinance.

The mandamus action was amended and consolidated with the two injunction actions for trial. An appeal was taken from the judgments that denied the writ of mandamus and dissolved the restraining orders.

Appellant paid about fifteen thousand dollars for his property which...

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54 cases
  • Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 6 Dicembre 1968
    ...A.2d 661 (1946); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Park Ridge, 16 Ill.App.2d 555, 149 N.E.2d 344 (1958); State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash.2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954); Annot: 169 A.L.R. 584; 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.155, pp. 495-496 (1965). In the instant case......
  • Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 24 Luglio 1998
    ...the appropriate fee tendered by the applicant, the building department must issue the building permit."); State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash.2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954): rights are effectively denied by Departmental delay."), aff'd. in part, rev'd in part by 937 F.2d 498 (10th......
  • Snohomish Cnty. v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 29 Dicembre 2016
    ...states:Washington State has adhered to the current vested rights doctrine since the Supreme Court case of State ex rel. [City of ] Ogden v. Bellevue , 45 Wash.2d 492 (1954). The doctrine provides that a party filing a timely and sufficiently complete building permit application obtains a ve......
  • Hayes v. City of Seattle
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 17 Aprile 1997
    ...and common law the right to a building permit vests at the date of application. RCW 19.27.095(1); State ex. rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash.2d 492, 495-96, 275 P.2d 899 (1954). An application for a Master Use Permit is therefore not a vested right pursuant to Nevertheless, even thou......
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