State ex rel. Ohio Motorists Ass'n v. Masten

Decision Date22 December 1982
Citation8 Ohio App.3d 123,8 OBR 179,456 N.E.2d 567
Parties, 8 O.B.R. 179 The STATE, ex rel. OHIO MOTORISTS ASSOCIATION, v. MASTEN, Mayor, et al.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. R.C. 4511.09 and 4511.11, which create a uniform system of traffic control devices within the state of Ohio, are "general laws" for purposes of Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, and a municipality therefore lacks constitutional authority to erect traffic control devices which do not conform to the uniform system created by state statute.

2. Where a village council enacts an ordinance causing a traffic control device to be erected in a location which does not comply with the statewide uniform standard established by statute, the council is subject to a writ of mandamus ordering it to conform the traffic control device to the uniform standard, because R.C. 4511.11 expressly requires local legislative bodies to erect traffic control devices in accordance with the uniform standard.

3. An Ohio corporation may be considered to be a "citizen" of the state of Ohio, entitled to maintain an action in mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty.

John D. Leech, Richard P. Goddard and Mitchell G. Blair, Cleveland, for relator.

Richard D. Martinez, Law Director, and Ronald M. Mottl, Cleveland, for respondents.

JACKSON, Judge.

This is an original action in mandamus brought by relator, Ohio Motorists Association, and the intervenor-relator, Olen E. Reger, against the Mayor of the village of Linndale (in his capacity as President of the Linndale Council), the members of the Council of Linndale, and the Linndale Chief of Police. It is alleged in the relator's petition that the village of Linndale has erected a "Stop Here on Red" sign and a stop line on the surface of the road requiring motorists to stop more than one hundred twenty feet before reaching an intersection, when the traffic light at the intersection is red. Relators claim that this sign and stop line are in conflict with the general laws of Ohio, and that the aforementioned public officials are subject to an order of mandamus requiring any such traffic control device erected by them to conform with state law.

The Ohio Motorists Association, the relator, is an Ohio nonprofit corporation, with a membership of approximately four hundred thirty thousand persons. One of the purposes of the organization is to promote the interests of motorists. Reger, the intervenor-relator, is a member of the Ohio Motorists Association who successfully defended himself against a charge of violating the Linndale ordinance in question.

R.C. 4511.11 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"(A) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall place and maintain traffic control devices in accordance with the department of transportation manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic control devices, adopted under section 4511.09 of the Revised Code upon highways under their jurisdiction as are necessary to indicate and to carry out sections 4511.01 to 4511.76 and 4511.99 of the Revised Code, local traffic ordinances, or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic.

" * * *

"(D) All traffic control devices erected on a public road, street, or alley, shall conform to the state manual and specifications."

The terms "local authorities," "highway," and "traffic control devices," as used in the foregoing statute, are defined in R.C. 4511.01 as follows:

"(AA) 'Local authorities' means every county, municipal, and other local board or body having authority to adopt police regulations under the constitution and laws of this state.

"(BB) 'Street' or 'highway' means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way open to the use of the public as a thoroughfare for purposes of vehicular travel.

" * * *

"(QQ) 'Traffic control devices' means all signs, signals, markings, and devices placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic, including signs denoting names of streets and highways."

The Department of Transportation has adopted a Manual and Specifications for a Uniform System of Traffic Control Devices, pursuant to its statutory duty under R.C. 4511.09. 1 Section 6D-10(d) and (i) of this manual state:

"(d) Except where the width of the intersecting street or other conditions make it physically impractical, at least one and preferably both of the signal faces [of the traffic light] required by paragraph (a) above shall be located not less than 40 feet nor more than 120 feet beyond the stop line. * * *

" * * *

"(i) When the nearest signal face is more than 120 feet beyond the stop line, a supplemental near side signal indication shall be provided."

The parties have stipulated that the "Stop Here on Red" sign and stop line are located two hundred eighty-four feet away from the traffic light at the intersection of West 117th Street and Bellaire Road. It is also stipulated that the village of Linndale has neglected to place a supplemental near side traffic light next to the "Stop Here on Red" sign and stop line. Accordingly, this court must conclude that the sign and stop line are positioned in violation of the Manual and Specifications for a Uniform System of Traffic Control Devices, and that this also represents a violation of R.C. 4511.11(A) and (D), quoted supra.

The only issue in dispute is whether the Linndale Village Council is subject to a writ of mandamus, ordering it to conform the unlawfully positioned "Stop Here on Red" sign and stop line to statewide specifications.

In response to relator's complaint, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss in which they contended: (1) that mandamus does not lie in the case at bar because mandamus may not be used to force a legislature to act, (2) that the village of Linndale does not have a clear legal duty to take action to correct the improper placement of the "Stop Here on Red" sign and stop line, and (3) that the relator Ohio Motorists Association lacks standing to sue. This court overruled respondents' motion to dismiss. In their brief on the merits, respondents raise only one argument in opposition to relator's petition; respondents reiterate their contention that the village of Linndale does not have a clear legal duty to act.

The respondents' three contentions, raised in their motion to dismiss and brief on the merits, are separately discussed below.

I

Respondents' Proposition No. 1:

"Mandamus does not lie to force a legislative body to exercise a discretionary function in a particular fashion."

The respondents contend that mandamus does not lie to control the discretion of legislative bodies, citing, inter alia, the case of Cleveland, ex rel. Neelon, v. Locher (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 49 , 266 N.E.2d 831. In that case the Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus against the Cleveland City Council, ordering it to enact legislation setting maximum hours for workers of eight hours a day and forty-eight hours per week. The court stated at page 52, 266 N.E.2d 831:

"Although it is ordinarily stated that mandamus does not lie to compel a legislative body to enact legislation on the basis that this would infringe on the doctrine of separation of powers, there are instances in which such a rule cannot apply. Thus, a court may determine that an act or statute is invalid because it is contrary to the Constitution and compel its amendment. Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663. Similarly, where a constitution or a charter imposes a mandatory duty upon a legislative body to enact legislation to give life to a constitutional provision, a court may compel the legislative body to act. Under such circumstances, a court may compel the legislative body to act, but it cannot direct the course of action. [Emphasis added.]

"Where a city charter requires that city council shall enact ordinances to provide for the enforcement or execution of a particular provision of the charter, a mandatory duty is placed upon city council to comply with that requirement of the charter, and mandamus will lie to compel the council to act. State, ex rel. Scott, v. Masterson (1962), 173 Ohio St. 402 , 183 N.E.2d 376. See, also, State, ex rel. Foster, v. Bd. of County Commrs. (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 89 , 242 N.E.2d 884. [Emphasis sic.]

"If the members of a legislative body can ignore, with impunity, the mandates of a constitution or a city charter, then it is certain that the faith of the people in constitutional government will be undermined and eventually eroded completely."

Similarly, in the case of State, ex rel. Campanella, v. Kucinich (1977), 59 Ohio App.2d 278 394 N.E.2d 318, this court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Cleveland City Council to pass legislation levying taxes in the amount authorized by the Cuyahoga County Budget Commission, pursuant to its statutory duty under R.C. 5705.34. This court held at page 282, 394 N.E.2d 318:

"Mandamus lies to compel the performance of an act which is clearly enjoined by law upon a respondent. State, ex rel. Pistillo, v. Shaker Heights (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 85 ; State, ex rel. Freeman, v. Valentine (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 183 . This principle applies whether the source of the duty involved is a city charter provision, Cleveland, ex rel. Neelon, v. Locher (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 49 , or a state statute, State, ex rel. Tulley, v. Brown (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 235 .

"The Ohio Supreme Court has held that where a plain and unmistakeably clear provision in a city charter is not self-executing, but is followed by a provision that council shall, by ordinance, provide for the enforcement of such provision, mandamus lies to compel the council to enact such an ordinance. Cleveland, ex rel. Neelon, v. Locher, supra.

"Likewise in the present case, where the state statute requires that the taxing authority of the city by...

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