State ex rel. Ohio Motorists Ass'n v. Masten
Decision Date | 22 December 1982 |
Citation | 8 Ohio App.3d 123,8 OBR 179,456 N.E.2d 567 |
Parties | , 8 O.B.R. 179 The STATE, ex rel. OHIO MOTORISTS ASSOCIATION, v. MASTEN, Mayor, et al. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. R.C. 4511.09 and 4511.11, which create a uniform system of traffic control devices within the state of Ohio, are "general laws" for purposes of Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, and a municipality therefore lacks constitutional authority to erect traffic control devices which do not conform to the uniform system created by state statute.
2. Where a village council enacts an ordinance causing a traffic control device to be erected in a location which does not comply with the statewide uniform standard established by statute, the council is subject to a writ of mandamus ordering it to conform the traffic control device to the uniform standard, because R.C. 4511.11 expressly requires local legislative bodies to erect traffic control devices in accordance with the uniform standard.
3. An Ohio corporation may be considered to be a "citizen" of the state of Ohio, entitled to maintain an action in mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty.
John D. Leech, Richard P. Goddard and Mitchell G. Blair, Cleveland, for relator.
Richard D. Martinez, Law Director, and Ronald M. Mottl, Cleveland, for respondents.
This is an original action in mandamus brought by relator, Ohio Motorists Association, and the intervenor-relator, Olen E. Reger, against the Mayor of the village of Linndale (in his capacity as President of the Linndale Council), the members of the Council of Linndale, and the Linndale Chief of Police. It is alleged in the relator's petition that the village of Linndale has erected a "Stop Here on Red" sign and a stop line on the surface of the road requiring motorists to stop more than one hundred twenty feet before reaching an intersection, when the traffic light at the intersection is red. Relators claim that this sign and stop line are in conflict with the general laws of Ohio, and that the aforementioned public officials are subject to an order of mandamus requiring any such traffic control device erected by them to conform with state law.
The Ohio Motorists Association, the relator, is an Ohio nonprofit corporation, with a membership of approximately four hundred thirty thousand persons. One of the purposes of the organization is to promote the interests of motorists. Reger, the intervenor-relator, is a member of the Ohio Motorists Association who successfully defended himself against a charge of violating the Linndale ordinance in question.
R.C. 4511.11 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The terms "local authorities," "highway," and "traffic control devices," as used in the foregoing statute, are defined in R.C. 4511.01 as follows:
The Department of Transportation has adopted a Manual and Specifications for a Uniform System of Traffic Control Devices, pursuant to its statutory duty under R.C. 4511.09. 1 Section 6D-10(d) and (i) of this manual state:
The parties have stipulated that the "Stop Here on Red" sign and stop line are located two hundred eighty-four feet away from the traffic light at the intersection of West 117th Street and Bellaire Road. It is also stipulated that the village of Linndale has neglected to place a supplemental near side traffic light next to the "Stop Here on Red" sign and stop line. Accordingly, this court must conclude that the sign and stop line are positioned in violation of the Manual and Specifications for a Uniform System of Traffic Control Devices, and that this also represents a violation of R.C. 4511.11(A) and (D), quoted supra.
The only issue in dispute is whether the Linndale Village Council is subject to a writ of mandamus, ordering it to conform the unlawfully positioned "Stop Here on Red" sign and stop line to statewide specifications.
In response to relator's complaint, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss in which they contended: (1) that mandamus does not lie in the case at bar because mandamus may not be used to force a legislature to act, (2) that the village of Linndale does not have a clear legal duty to take action to correct the improper placement of the "Stop Here on Red" sign and stop line, and (3) that the relator Ohio Motorists Association lacks standing to sue. This court overruled respondents' motion to dismiss. In their brief on the merits, respondents raise only one argument in opposition to relator's petition; respondents reiterate their contention that the village of Linndale does not have a clear legal duty to act.
The respondents' three contentions, raised in their motion to dismiss and brief on the merits, are separately discussed below.
Respondents' Proposition No. 1:
"Mandamus does not lie to force a legislative body to exercise a discretionary function in a particular fashion."
The respondents contend that mandamus does not lie to control the discretion of legislative bodies, citing, inter alia, the case of Cleveland, ex rel. Neelon, v. Locher (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 49 , 266 N.E.2d 831. In that case the Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus against the Cleveland City Council, ordering it to enact legislation setting maximum hours for workers of eight hours a day and forty-eight hours per week. The court stated at page 52, 266 N.E.2d 831:
Similarly, in the case of State, ex rel. Campanella, v. Kucinich (1977), 59 Ohio App.2d 278 394 N.E.2d 318, this court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Cleveland City Council to pass legislation levying taxes in the amount authorized by the Cuyahoga County Budget Commission, pursuant to its statutory duty under R.C. 5705.34. This court held at page 282, 394 N.E.2d 318:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst.
...entities should be as free as natural persons to litigate in the public interest."); State ex rel. Ohio Motorists Ass'n v. Masten, 8 Ohio App.3d 123, 129, 456 N.E.2d 567, 573 n. 4 (1982) ("We are persuaded that an Ohio corporation may have as great an interest as a natural person in seeking......
-
730 Chickens, In re
...State Apple Advertising Comm. (1977), 432 U.S. 333, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383, and State ex rel. Ohio Motorists Assn. v. Masten (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 123, 8 OBR 179, 456 N.E.2d 567, where the court held that in an action in mandamus where the relator seeks to enforce a public right, an ......
-
State ex rel. Stevenson v. Mayor of E. Cleveland
...Ohio St.2d 49, or a state statute, State, ex rel. Tulley, v. Brown (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 235.State ex rel. Ohio Motorists Assn. v. Masten, 8 Ohio App.3d 123, 126, 456 N.E.2d 567 (8th Dist.1982). {¶ 13} The claims in Stevenson's complaint are before this court on cross-motions for summary ju......
-
Oapse/Afscme Local 4 v. Berdine
...duty involved is a city charter provision or a state statute.'" (Internal citations omitted.) State ex rel. Ohio Motorists Assn. v. Masten (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 123, 126, 8 OBR 179, 456 N.E.2d 567, quoting State ex rel. Campanella v. Kucinich (1977), 59 Ohio. App.2d 278, 13 O.O.3d 278, 394 ......