State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Thomas
| Decision Date | 19 December 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 4073,4073 |
| Citation | 1995 OK 145,911 P.2d 907 |
| Parties | STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. John Gregory THOMAS, Respondent. SCBD |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Janis Hubbard, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, for Complainant.
No appearance for Respondent.
Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against respondent, John Gregory Thomas, by complainant, the Oklahoma Bar Association pursuant to Rule 6 (Formal Proceedings Before Supreme Court and Professional Responsibility Tribunal) of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP), 5 O.S.1991, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, as amended. In substance respondent was charged with neglecting a client's workers' compensation case--said neglect resulting in the running of an applicable time limit barring the compensation matter; misrepresenting the status of the case to the client over an extended time period; forging an order of this Court; failing to timely answer a grievance lodged against him; and negotiating a settlement with the client that included, at respondent's insistence, having the client agree not to complain to the Oklahoma Bar Association about his misconduct. Complainant seeks enhanced discipline because only last year respondent was previously disciplined by this Court for neglect of client matters and failing to respond to an order of this Court. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Thomas, 886 P.2d 477 (Okla.1994). After a hearing, the Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT) found respondent guilty of all misconduct charged. The PRT and complainant recommend disbarment. We, likewise, find misconduct warranting disbarment.
In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Todd, 833 P.2d 260 (Okla.1992), we set out the standard of review in attorney disciplinary proceedings. We said:
In attorney disciplinary proceedings this Court's determinations are made de novo. The ultimate responsibility for deciding whether misconduct has occurred and what discipline is warranted if misconduct is found rests with us in the exercise of our exclusive original jurisdiction in bar disciplinary matters. Accordingly, neither the findings of fact of a Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT) nor its view of the evidence or credibility of witnesses are binding on us and recommendations of a PRT are merely advisory. (citations omitted)
Id. at 262. Further, to warrant a finding against a lawyer in a contested case the charges must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Rule 6.12(c) of the RGDP. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Miskovsky, 824 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Okla.1991). With these principles in mind we turn to a discussion of the misconduct charged.
Complainant and respondent entered into written stipulations concerning the misconduct charged. The stipulations were approved by the PRT. Except for one matter, which we will detail, respondent essentially admitted the allegations of misconduct via the written stipulations and through his testimony, given both by deposition (March 23, 1995) and at the PRT hearing of June 15, 1995. The following recitation of the facts is taken from the written stipulations, as agreed and modified at the PRT hearing, respondent's deposition and from the evidence submitted at the PRT hearing.
Respondent is a member of the Oklahoma Bar Association licensed to practice law by this Court and he was so licensed at all times relevant to the charged misconduct. Respondent's official Oklahoma Bar Association roster address is John Gregory Thomas, OBA # 8938, P.O. Box 1276, Muskogee, OK 74402.
Carol Ann Rice (hereafter Rice) suffered a back and neck injury at her job some time in 1986. Although respondent apparently was not the first attorney to handle Rice's case, he took over the matter after a proceeding After realizing the five (5) year time limit had run, instead of telling his client the truth when she inquired about the status of her workers' compensation case, respondent told Rice that the case had been won and that the employer had appealed to this Court, which was a fabrication. This fabrication (or ones similar to it) were told to Rice by respondent on more than one occasion over an extended period of time (about two years) and the misrepresentation(s) continued up to some time in November or December 1994--a time when respondent was requesting leniency from this Court in his previous disciplinary matter via a petition for rehearing in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Thomas, supra.
had been filed at the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court. Respondent failed to timely file a Form 9 (Motion to Set for Trial) within the appropriate five (5) year period, the same failing and neglect which partially caused us to discipline him in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Thomas, supra. 1
As part of his misrepresentation(s) to Rice, respondent prepared a false (i.e. forged or fabricated) Oklahoma Supreme Court order by photocopying the file stamp of the Clerk of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in an unrelated case, altering pertinent parts of this order in the unrelated case to make it appear applicable to an appeal in Rice's case and by touching up a past Chief Justice's signature (i.e. darkening spots of the signature that did not photocopy well) on this false, fraudulent order. Respondent admits to all of the above misconduct, including falsification of the order at some time in November 1994. The only matter he contests is his denial of actually giving the forged order to Rice. Respondent essentially testified as follows concerning the forged order.
After forging the order on a Saturday at his office he went home, had a change of heart and realized the wrongfulness of his misrepresentation(s). He decided at such time he was going to rectify the situation by coming clean and admitting his negligence as to the workers' compensation case to Rice. Rice, however, somehow obtained the order before he had a chance to admit his misrepresentation(s) to her. Respondent asserts the order must have been given to Rice by his secretary (an ex-secretary at the time of the PRT hearing) in his absence. Respondent further essentially testified this secretary must have retrieved the forged order from his office, an order he says he must have left in his office on his credenza. Respondent also seemed to testify that he threw away any copies of the forged order he had made and he really was not sure how his secretary got the order. He also testified if he had given the order to Rice he would admit it.
Like the PRT we credit the testimony of Rice and discredit the testimony of respondent as to whether it was respondent who gave her a copy of the forged order. In the first instance, although Rice testified respondent's secretary was present, she was unequivocal that it was respondent who actually handed her a copy of the forged order at his office. Secondly, we can discern no reason that Rice would fabricate this part of her testimony, while respondent would have a motive to have a faulty memory in such regard. Thus, we conclude the evidence clearly and convincingly showed respondent Even if we are mistaken and respondent did not actually hand the order to Rice (i.e. it was the ex-secretary who did so without respondent's actual knowledge) this would not change our view of the appropriate discipline to be imposed in this matter or drastically alter our opinion as to the seriousness of respondent's misconduct. This is so for the reason that it was respondent who admittedly began the chain of events that led to Rice receiving the forged order. Even taking the evidence most favorable to respondent it is obvious the forged order respondent admits preparing was not permanently destroyed by him and was left in his office at a place accessible to his secretary, without any direction. This is obvious because no one disputes Rice did, indeed, receive a copy of the forged order, a copy of which was admitted in evidence as an exhibit at the PRT hearing and is part of the record before us. Furthermore, the simple fact is that respondent did not take any steps to rectify the situation or begin to come clean until he was confronted with his misdeed(s) by another attorney who was hired by Rice to look into the matter after she came to believe that something was not quite right about what respondent had been telling her. Only after he was so confronted did respondent appear to acknowledge his negligence as to failure to properly proceed in the workers' compensation case. He then admittedly still conducted himself in an inappropriate manner by negotiating a settlement agreement which included as part of its terms (at respondent's insistence) Rice agreeing not to file any complaint or grievance with the Oklahoma Bar Association concerning any of the misrepresentations. 3
was the one who actually gave a copy of the forged order to Rice. 2
In addition to their stipulations regarding the above factual matters, the parties agreed that the above conduct on the part of respondent violated the following Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (ORPC), 5 O.S.1991, Ch. 1, App. 3-A, as amended, to wit: Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, and 8.4(a)-(d), and Rule 1.3 of the RGDP. Rule 1.1 provides: Rule 1.3 of the ORPC states that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." Rule 1.4 sets forth that:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Helton
.... Boone , see note 25, supra at 19; State ex rel. Okla . Bar Ass'n v. Taylor , see note 28, supra; State ex rel. Okla . Bar Ass'n v. Thomas , 1995 OK 145, 911 P.2d 907.1 The appropriateness of assessing costs in an attorney disciplinary proceeding hinges on whether the professional miscondu......
-
State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Minter
...as a tribunal of first instance with original and exclusive cognizance of the case."). 25. Bolusky, supra, note 23; State ex rel. Okl. Bar Ass'n v. Thomas, 1995 OK 145, ¶ 2, 911 P.2d 907, 909; State ex rel. Okl. Bar Ass'n v. Busch, 1996 OK 38, ¶ 14, 919 P.2d 1114, 1116; State ex rel. Okl. B......
-
State v. Wilcox
...Mitigating circumstances are also often considered when assessing the appropriate measure of discipline. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Thomas, 1995 OK 145, 911 P.2d 907, 913. Also, although discipline should be administered fairly (i.e., evenhandedly), this Court has recognized that t......
-
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Boone
...may also be considered in gauging the proper measure of discipline. Taylor, 2003 OK 56, 22, 71 P.3d 18 ; State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Thomas, 1995 OK 145, 17, 911 P.2d 907.A. Prior Misconduct¶ 20 Respondent has come to display a disturbing pattern of failing to communicate with clients ......