State ex rel. Parker v. Sullivan
| Decision Date | 15 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-0709,93-0709 |
| Citation | 517 N.W.2d 449,184 Wis.2d 668 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, ex rel. Elnora PARKER, Petitioner-Appellant, Carol Arendt, Petitioner, v. Michael J. SULLIVAN, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Corrections of the State of Wisconsin, Respondent-Respondent, Gerald Miles Turner, Jr., Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. STATE of Wisconsin, ex rel. E. Michael McCANN, District Attorney, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, and Frederick G. Gordon, Alderman of the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Petitioners-Appellants, v. Michael J. SULLIVAN, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Corrections of the State of Wisconsin, Respondent-Respondent, Gerald Miles Turner, Jr., Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For respondent-respondent there was a brief by Edward S. Marion and Murphy & Desmond, S.C., Madison.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Walter Dickey and Legal Assistance Program, Madison for Prof. Walter Dickey and LAIP.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard D. Martin and Office of the State Public Defender, Madison for the State Public Defender.
This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State of Wisconsin, ex rel. Elnora Parker v. Patrick J. Fiedler, 180 Wis.2d 438, 509 N.W.2d 440 (1993), reversing a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county, Robert W. Landry, circuit judge. The circuit court dismissed the petitions for writs of certiorari, concluding that the Department of Corrections had correctly computed Gerald Turner's mandatory release date. Examining the same statute, the court of appeals concluded that the Department of Corrections had erred.
The court of appeals justifies its computation of the mandatory release date on two grounds, first, that the statute is unambiguous, and second, that the legislative history supports its interpretation. Because neither ground withstands analysis, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. By no interpretation of the statutory language or the legislative history can this court conclude that the Department has been misinterpreting the statute for 70 years. We therefore conclude, as did the circuit court, that the Department of Corrections computed Gerald Turner's mandatory release date correctly under the applicable statute. 1
From a detached legal perspective this case presents an oft-recurring question of law--what does the statute mean and how should it be applied? However, this case also evokes powerful emotions. Gerald Turner is described in the record as an "unrepentant, apparently homicidal pedophile." This court affirmed Turner's conviction in 1977, and we know well the facts of his appalling crime. We understand the fears of the community that this man, untreated after 18 years behind bars, may hurt another child. We can find no explanation in the record for the Department of Corrections' decision to place Turner in a half-way house in close proximity to an elementary school. This aspect of the Department's decision, while troubling, is not before the court.
In interpreting statutes, we weigh many considerations. The needs of the public and common sense always rank high among them. However, though to many it may appear that public safety and common sense will be served by keeping Turner in prison, the law dictates otherwise in this case. This case illustrates the hard fact that judges sometimes reach decisions that they do not like. We make these decisions "because they are right, right in the sense that the law ... compel[s] the result." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2548, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
This is not an easy case for judges. We are also parents and grandparents. We live alongside the other citizens of this state. But in this country judges cannot tailor their interpretation of the law to fit a particular individual, no matter how heinous his crimes. The integrity of our criminal justice system and of the law itself depends on the courts' consistent application of the same rules to everyone. These principles of the rule of law must guide the decision in this case, as they do all others.
On Halloween night in 1973, nine-year-old Lisa Ann French went trick or treating in a hobo costume in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin. A week later a farmer found her body in a plastic bag. Gerald Turner was convicted of sexually molesting and murdering Lisa Ann. Sections 940.02 (second degree murder), 944.11(1) (indecent behavior with a child), 944.12 (enticing a child for immoral purposes), and 944.17(1) (sexual perversion), Stats.1973. Turner was sentenced to the Wisconsin State Prisons for an indeterminate term of not more than thirty-eight and one-half years. 2 The Department of Corrections gave him a proposed mandatory release date, which was modified several times over the years because of his misconduct. On October 14, 1992, after serving almost eighteen years, Turner was released from prison and placed in a half-way house in the city of Milwaukee.
Turner was repeatedly denied discretionary parole. He was paroled on October 14, 1992, only because the Department determined that he had reached his mandatory release date. The Department computed Turner's mandatory release date in accordance with its consistent practice of more than 70 years of computing "good time" under sec. 53.11(1), Stats.1973. 3
The Department's computation of good time, Turner's mandatory release date, and Turner's release were challenged in the circuit court for Milwaukee county by three citizen relators (one of whom later withdrew) and two public officials. We shall refer to the remaining four as the relators. Although the Department of Corrections contested the relators' action in the circuit court and court of appeals, the Department withdrew from participation after filing a brief in this court opposing the decision of the court of appeals. 4 The relators proceeded in circuit court by writ of certiorari. 5
Elnora Parker, one of the citizen relators, lives "within blocks" of the half-way house facility to which Turner was released; Carol A. Arendt, the other citizen relator, has a daughter who attends the school which is "adjacent to the back door of" the half-way house. Their petition complains that Turner's release "at a time prior to his rehabilitation and prior to his Mandatory Release date, constitutes substantial damage [to them], who as citizens of the State of Wisconsin are entitled to protection from unreformed criminals until they are required by law to be released from imprisonment."
The other two relators are E. Michael McCann, the elected district attorney for Milwaukee county whose function is to "prosecute all criminal actions" within his jurisdiction, sec. 978.05(1), Stats.1991-92, and Frederick G. Gordon, an elected alderman of the Milwaukee city council, who represents the area in which Turner's half-way house is located. 6
The primary issue presented in this case is one of statutory interpretation. The court must determine how good time is computed under sec. 53.11, Stats.1973. 7 This 1973 statute was in effect when Turner was sentenced, and it remained relatively unchanged until 1983. 8 The 1983 law is not at issue in this case.
All the parties agree that for several decades, at least for more than 70 years, the Department of Corrections has consistently construed sec. 53.11 in the same way. The court of appeals concluded, however, that the Department's interpretation contravenes the unambiguous words of the statute.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law which this court decides, benefitting from the decisions of the circuit court and the court of appeals. The principal objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Green Bay Redevelopment Authority v. Bee Frank, Inc., 120 Wis.2d 402, 409, 355 N.W.2d 240 (1984).
Our first step is, of course, to examine the statutory language itself. Section 53.11, Stats.1973, provides that the warden shall keep a record of an inmate's conduct and that each inmate who comports with the statute is entitled to good time or diminution of sentence as follows: First year, 1 month; second year, 2 months; third year, 3 months; fourth year, 4 months; fifth year, 5 months; every year thereafter, 6 months. Section 53.11(1), Stats.1973, reads as follows:
Reading sec. 53.11(1) with SECS. 53.11(6) AND (7)(A)9 10, the court of appeals' opinion steadfastly maintains that the statute is unambiguous and can be interpreted in only one way. 11 This contention does not withstand analytical scrutiny.
First, the key statutory provision at issue, sec. 53.11(1), is on its face flawed. Although this provision refers the reader to a computation of good time set forth in a "table," no graphic representation in tabular form exists. Albeit on the surface it seems a minor issue, this obvious infirmity raises doubts about the clarity of the statute. The significance of the table will become apparent when we discuss the legislative history.
Furthermore, no matter how sec. 53.11(1) or sec. 53.11(6) and (7) are parsed, they do not describe how to compute good time. It is fair to say that sec. 53.11 poses something of an interpretive riddle. Comments about the difficulty in interpreting and applying sec. 53.11 appeared in the legal literature long before this case...
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