State ex rel. Penland v. Dinkelacker

• Decision Date: 22 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2020-0027,2020-0027
• Citation: 162 Ohio St.3d 59,164 N.E.3d 336
• Parties: The STATE EX REL. PENLAND v. DINKELACKER, Judge.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

162 Ohio St.3d 59

164 N.E.3d 336

The STATE EX REL. PENLAND

v.DINKELACKER, Judge.

No. 2020-0027

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 10, 2020

Decided July 22, 2020

Alex Penland, pro se.

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. Heenan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.

DeWine, J. {¶ 1} Alex Penland filed two petitions for postconviction relief in the trial court. The court denied the petitions without making findings of fact and conclusions of law. Penland appealed the trial court's judgments, and they were affirmed on appeal.

{¶ 2} Penland then instituted this original mandamus action, asking this court to order the trial-court judge to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. He contends that under this court's decision in State ex rel. Ferrell v. Clark , 13 Ohio St.3d 3, 469 N.E.2d 843 (1984), the trial court's judgments did not constitute final, appealable orders because they lacked findings and that therefore, the court of appeals' decision is void for lack of jurisdiction and he is entitled to another appeal. See also State v. Mapson , 1 Ohio St.3d 217, 438 N.E.2d 910 (1982) (followed in Ferrell ). As we explain below, our decisions in Mapson and Ferrell do not support his claim. Because the trial court's judgments have already been reviewed on direct appeal, Penland had an adequate remedy at law to address the lack-of-findings issue, which precludes mandamus relief. We therefore deny the writ.

{¶ 3} Additionally, we take this opportunity to clarify that a trial court's failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to a judgment denying postconviction relief is an error that may be corrected through an appeal, not a defect depriving the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal. To the extent that Mapson and Ferrell hold that a petitioner seeking postconviction relief may not appeal an adverse judgment unless the judgment entry contains findings of fact and conclusions of law, those decisions are overruled.

Penland had an adequate remedy at law

{¶ 4} Penland is currently serving prison sentences for multiple crimes. He alleges that he timely filed two petitions for postconviction relief in September 2016 and that Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Judge Patrick Dinkelacker summarily overruled them without making findings of fact or conclusions of law, as required by R.C. 2953.21(H). Penland appealed the trial court's denials of his petitions. The First District Court of Appeals did not dismiss his appeals for lack of a final order; rather, it proceeded to consider the merits of his appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgments.¹ State v. Penland , 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-160820 and C-160797, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 880, *2 (Mar. 7, 2018). Penland took a further appeal to this court, and we declined to accept his case. 153 Ohio St.3d 1433, 2018-Ohio-2639, 101 N.E.3d 465.

{¶ 5} Penland subsequently filed this original mandamus action, asserting that the absence of findings means that the trial court's judgments were not final, appealable orders and the First District therefore lacked jurisdiction to decide his appeals. He asks us to issue a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Dinkelacker to issue a new judgment entry with findings of fact and conclusions of law, so as to enable him to take yet another appeal.

{¶ 6} On its face, this contention precludes mandamus relief. This court is barred from issuing a writ of mandamus when the relator has or had an adequate remedy at law to obtain the requested relief. R.C. 2731.05. Penland had an adequate remedy to challenge the trial court's failure to issue findings and conclusions: he could have raised the error in his direct appeals from the judgments denying postconviction relief.² Penland cannot now obtain another appeal simply because he subsequently became aware of an error in the prior proceedings.

Our precedent does not allow Penland to avoid the lack-of-adequate-remedy requirement

{¶ 7} Penland's argument that the First District lacked jurisdiction over his appeals is premised on this court's decisions in Mapson , 1 Ohio St.3d 217, 438 N.E.2d 910, and Ferrell , 13 Ohio St.3d 3, 469 N.E.2d 843. But as we will explain, those cases do not compel the result Penland seeks.

{¶ 8} In Mapson , this court was asked to determine the point at which the time to appeal a trial court's judgment denying postconviction relief began to run under App.R. 4. The question arose because the trial court had denied the motion in a judgment entry stating that it had separately filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, but in fact the trial court did not file the findings and conclusions until many months later. This court determined that the time for the petitioner to appeal had not commenced until the complete judgment had been entered on the docket—which included the court's separate entry containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

{¶ 9} That result could easily have been justified under the familiar rule that when a judgment entry contemplates further action by the trial court, the judgment is not final until the trial court takes those steps. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Keith v. McMonagle , 103 Ohio St.3d 430, 2004-Ohio-5580, 816 N.E.2d 597, ¶ 4 ; Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Union Terminal Co. , 27 Ohio Law Abs. 264, 31 N.E.2d 888 (1st Dist.1938). But the Mapson court didn't rely on this rule. Instead, it based its decision on policy considerations, opining that it would be inefficient to require a petitioner to institute an appeal without findings of fact because "it would guarantee two trips to the appellate court—one to force the findings and another to review the decision on the merits." Mapson at 219, 438 N.E.2d 910.

{¶ 10} It's not clear that the court in Mapson intended to create a new finality requirement. Mapson does not address R.C. 2953.23(B), the statute governing finality on decisions awarding or denying postconviction relief, nor does it consider R.C. 2505.02, the statute defining final orders generally. There is simply no mention at all of finality in Mapson .

{¶ 11} A couple of years after Mapson , though, this court decided Ferrell , 13 Ohio St.3d 3, 469 N.E.2d 843 —a per curiam opinion consisting of just six sentences. In Ferrell , the relator filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, seeking an order compelling the trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to its denial of his postconviction-relief petition. The court of appeals denied the writ on the rationale that the relator could raise the issue in a direct appeal from the trial court's judgment. This court reversed on the authority of Mapson , concluding that the relator did not have an adequate remedy by way of direct appeal because, under Mapson , he would not have been able to appeal from a nonfinal order.

{¶ 12} Like Mapson , Ferrell did not consider the relevant jurisdictional statutes. To the contrary, the decision is devoid of legal reasoning. This court issued a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, saying only that "[m]andamus will lie to compel a court to proceed to final judgment in an action for post-conviction relief." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 3, 469 N.E.2d 843, citing State ex rel. Turpin v. Court of Common Pleas , 8 Ohio St.2d 1, 220 N.E.2d 670 (1966). This language suggests that the court issued the writ so that the relator could take an appeal.

{¶ 13} Thus, Ferrell falls within our longstanding rule that writs of mandamus and procedendo are appropriate to direct a court to enter a judgment to enable an appeal to go forward. See State ex rel. Grove v. Nadel , 81 Ohio St.3d 325, 327, 691 N.E.2d 275 (1998) (writ of procedendo was available to order a court to journalize its judgment because "[a]bsent journalization of the judgment, [the relator] cannot appeal it"); State ex rel. Dehler v. Sutula , 74 Ohio St.3d 33, 35, 656 N.E.2d 332 (1995) (mandamus and procedendo will lie to compel a court to proceed to judgment), citing State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 72 Ohio St.3d 461, 462, 650 N.E.2d 899 (1995), and Ferrell . Had the First District dismissed Penland's appeal for lack of a final order, and had Judge Dinkelacker subsequently refused to issue a final order, one could cite Ferrell for the proposition that a writ of mandamus would then be appropriate to compel the judge to do so.

{¶ 14} But nothing in Ferrell requires that we issue a writ of mandamus compelling a trial court to put on a new final order when the first one already allowed the relator to appeal. Here, the First District, in reaching the merits of the action and affirming the trial court's judgments, implicitly decided that it had jurisdiction over Penland's appeals. Whether that decision was correct or incorrect is beside the point. Penland received what he was entitled to: the opportunity to present his challenge in the court of appeals.

{¶ 15} Indeed, the rule advocated by Penland would throw the doors wide open for seriatim appeals through the use of extraordinary writs. Imagine the number of inmates who might find a decades-old judgment denying a petition for postconviction relief that has already been appealed, discover that the trial court had failed to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, and seek mandamus relief and a second appeal on the basis that the first appeal was void for lack of jurisdiction. If we adopted Penland's view, they would all be entitled to new appeals.

{¶ 16} That approach would take us well beyond the holdings of Mapson and Ferrell , and it would still fail to address the clear adequate-remedy problem. Because Penland has already had an appeal, he has received an adequate remedy at law. We are therefore compelled to deny the writ.

It is time to overrule Mapson and Ferrell

{¶ 17} Correctly understood, Mapson and Ferrell do not support Penland's claim for relief, and ...