State ex rel. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Iroquois Conservancy Dist. Court of Ind.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1956
• Docket Number: No. 29299,29299
• Citation: 133 N.E.2d 848,235 Ind. 353
• Parties: STATE of Indiana, on relation of The PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville Railway Company, The New York Central Railroad Company, Relators, v. IROQUOIS CONSERVANCY DISTRICT COURT OF INDIANA: Jasper Circuit Court; Moses Leopold, as Judge of Jasper Circuit Court, 30th Judicial Circuit; Moses Leopold; Moses Leopold as Judge of Iroquois Conservancy District Court of Indiana; Newton Circuit Court, Newell A. Lamb, as Judge of Newton Circuit Court, 79th Judicial Circuit; Newell A. Lamb; Newell A. Lamb, as judge of Iroquois Conservancy District Court of Indiana, Respondents
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 848

133 N.E.2d 848

235 Ind. 353

STATE of Indiana, on relation of The PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville Railway Company, The New York Central Railroad Company, Relators, v. IROQUOIS CONSERVANCY DISTRICT COURT OF INDIANA: Jasper Circuit Court; Moses Leopold, as Judge of Jasper Circuit Court, 30th Judicial Circuit; Moses Leopold; Moses Leopold as Judge of Iroquois Conservancy District Court of Indiana Newton Circuit Court, Newell A. Lamb, as Judge of Newton Circuit Court, 79th Judicial Circuit; Newell A. Lamb; Newell A. Lamb, as judge of Iroquois Conservancy District Court of Indiana, Respondents

No. 29299.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 20, 1956.

Russell Harker of Harker & Irwin, Frankfort, Cope J. Hanley, Rensselaer, Crumpacker & Schroer, Hammond, Robert H. Bierma, Albert S. Long, Jr., Marvin A. Jersild, Chicago, Ill., of counsel, for relators.

Ralph Bower, Kentland, Thomas B. Dumas, Rensselaer, for respondents.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Addison M. Dowling, Judson L. Stark, Deputy Attys. Gen., Ross, McCord, Ice & Miller, Robert D. McCord, Harry T. Ice, David N. Brewer, Robert D. Risch, Indianapolis, of counsel, amici curiae.

BOBBITT, Chief Justice.

On May 26, 1955, relators filed with the clerk of this court their petition for a writ of prohibition wherein they sought to prohibit respondents from proceeding further with the establishment of a Conservancy District as provided by Acts 1947, ch. 239, [235 Ind. 356] p. 902, being § 27-1201, and subsequent sections, Burns' 1948 Replacement.

The petition alleged that respondents were without jurisdiction in said proceedings because the Conservancy Act is unconstitutional. We issued a temporary writ. ¹

We are aware of the well established rules (1) that the constitutionality of a statute will not be determined if there is any other logical basis on which the appeal can be decided; (2) that the constitutionality of a statute will be upheld if it is reasonably possible to do so; and (3) that if a statute is of doubtful construction, all doubt will be resolved in favor of its validity.

However, since the litigation here involved cannot be terminated upon any other basis, we will consider the constitutional questions presented.

First: Relators advance several grounds of unconstitutionality. However, we deem it necessary to consider only one, viz., that the Conservancy Act violates Art. 4, Section 19 of the Constitution of Indiana, which provides, in part, as follows:

'Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title.'

Several pages of relators' brief are devoted to pointing out and discussing numerous provisions of the Act which they assert are not properly embraced in the title thereof.

We shall, however, first consider the contention that the Conservancy Court, which is created by the provisions of § 6 of the Act, is not embraced in the title.

Section 6 provides as follows:

'Upon the determination of the judge of the court in which may such petition shall have been filed that the petition is sufficient, he shall cause notice thereof to be given to the judge of the circuit court, serving each county included in whole or in part within the proposed conservancy district. Thereafter the judges of each such circuit court shall sit together as a trial court to determine whether or not the conservancy district prayed for in such petition shall be established. In case of the inability to serve of the judge of any circuit, the chief justice of the supreme Court, upon application of any interested person and proper showing of need, shall assign a judge of any superior court from a county located within sich circuit. However, if there is no such superior court, the judge or judges hearing the petition shall represent such circuit.

'The court thus established shall have power and authority to establish conservancy districts when the conditions stated in section 4 of this act are found to exist. Except as otherwise hereinafter provided, such court shall have for all purposes of this act, original and exclusive jurisdiction co-extensive with the boundaries and limits of the district or proposed district and of the lands and other property included in, or proposed to be included in, such district or affected by such district, without regard to the usual limits of its jurisdiction, and the issues involved in such petition shall be tried and the decision of the court thereon shall be subject to appeal as in other civil causes. Each judge when sitting as a member of the court shall receive his usual salary and eight cents per mile for travel from his own court to the place of trial, but no per diem. The mileage shall be taxed as cost in the cause being tried.

'The court shall adopt rules of practice and procedure not inconsistent with the provisions of this act and the general laws of the state. In case the court consists of more than three judges, it may designate three of its members from three different circuits to preside ove the court, hear matters coming before the court, and make determinations and decisions or findings and recommendations, as the rules of the court provide, with respect to any matters authorized by such rules, the disposition of which is vested in the court, except the making of final decisions and orders as to: (1) the establishment, dissolution or merger of the district or of subdistricts thereof; (2) the adoption, rejection or amendment of the official plan; (3) the appointment and removal of directors and appraisers; (4) the confirmation of the appraisers' report of benefits, damages, and appraisals of property; (5) the authorization of maintenance assessments in excess of one per cent of benefits; (6) the authorization of a readjustment of the appraisal of benefits in accordance with section 55 of this act; (7) the approval of the method of financing improvements and activities under section 28; (8) the determination of rates of compensation for water under section 27 and section 61; and (9) the examination of the annual report of the board of directors as provided under section 64. The concurrence of two of the three judges so designated shall be necessary for any action or determination thereby and it shall have, if so provided by the rules of the court, the same force and effect as though taken or made by the full court. All actions and determinations by the full court shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of the judges constituting the court. In all cases in which the judges are evenly divided that side with which the presiding judge votes shall prevail, except that in the event the court consists of two judges and they find themselves unable to agree on any question left to their decision, a judge of the circuit or superior court of some other county shall be designated by the chief justice of the supreme court of the state to sit and vote as a third member of the court until such question is decided.'

The title of the act is as follows:

'An Act to prevent floods, to protect cities, towns, farms and highways from inundation, to conserve water for beneficial uses, and to authorize the organization of drainage and conservancy districts, and declaring an emergency.'

In considering the application of that part of Section 19, Art. 4 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides that the subject shall be expressed in the title, we recognize that it is designed only for titles narrower than the enactment. Ule v. State, 1935, 208 Ind. 255, 266, 194 N.E. 140, 101 A.L.R. 903; Moore-Mansfield, etc., Co. v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. 1913, 179 Ind. 356, 358, 101 N.E. 296, 44 L.R.A.N.S., 816; In re Talbot, 1915, 58 Ind.App. 426, 431, 108 N.E. 240.

We are also mindful of the well established rule that if a title expresses the general purpose of the Act, everything contained in the Act which is germane to the purpose or properly connected therewith as a means of making the Act effective is covered by the title. It is not necessary that the title should contain a complete abstract of the contents of the Act or enumerate all its provision in detail. Sarlls v. State ex rel. Trimble, 1929, 201 Ind. 88, 102, 166 N.E. 270, 67 A.L.R. 718. This rule, however, has application only when the title is broader than the enactment, ² and for reasons which hereafter appear, does not apply to the title here under consideration.

Respondents rely upon State ex rel. Taylor v. Greene Circuit Court, 1945, 223 Ind. 562, 63 N.E.2d 287, and Ule v. State, supra, 1935, 208 Ind. 255, 194 N.E. 140, as authority for their contention that the title of the Conservancy Act is sufficiently broad to include the establishment of a new court.

The title of the Act involved in State ex rel. Taylor v. Greene Circuit Court, supra [223 Ind. 562, 63 N.E.2d 288], was "An Act concerning children born out of wedlock." Burns' Ann.St. § 3-623 et seq. This is a broad general title in contrast to the one here in question.

In State ex rel. Taylor v. Geene Circuit Court, supra, at page 568 of 223 Ind., at page 289 of 63 N.E.2d, this court said:

'Legislation that the General Assembly believes necessary to accomplish the purposes that may be logically inferred from the title may be contained in the act without violating the constitutional provision of Art. 4, § 19 of the Constitution of Indiana.'

Here, again, the court was speaking of a broad general title and not one that was narrower than the enactment.

Ule v. State, supra, 1935, 208 Ind. 255, 194 N.E. 140, also relied upon by respondents, involved the question of whether or not the title there in question ³ embraced more than one subject. At page 266 of 208 Ind., at page 144 of 194 N.E., this court said:

'The subject expressed in an act should be reasonably specific so as to indicate some particular branch of legislation as a head under which the particular provisions of the act might reasonably be...