State ex rel. Pike v. City of Bellingham, 25676.

• Decision Date: 04 September 1935
• Docket Number: 25676.
• Citation: 48 P.2d 602,183 Wash. 439
• Parties: STATE ex rel. PIKE et al. v. CITY OF BELLINGHAM et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

48 P.2d 602

183 Wash. 439

STATE ex rel. PIKE et al. v. CITY OF BELLINGHAM et al.

No. 25676.

Supreme Court of Washington

September 4, 1935

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Whatcom County; Ed Hardin, Judge.

Mandamus by the State of Washington, on the relation of Roy Pike and others, against the City of Bellingham, a municipal corporation, B. E. Hanning, as Mayor thereof, and others, to compel defendants to issue certain salary warrants. From a judgment granting the writ, defendants appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

Hobart S. Dawson, Glenn R. Madison, and Abrams & McCush, all of Bellingham, for appellants.

Lester Whitmore, of Bellingham, and Colvin & Rhodes, of Seattle, for respondents.

GERAGHTY, Justice.

This is an appeal by the city of Bellingham and certain of its officers from a judgment granting a writ of mandamus directing them to issue salary warrants to respondents members of the police and fire departments of the city.

The city, by Ordinance No. 4802, passed in December, 1927 established the salaries to be paid the members of the police and fire departments of the city, effective as of January 1 1928. In December, 1928, the voters adopted Initiative Ordinance No. 4941, as follows:

'Section 1. That the salary rates in effect September 1, 1928 of each and every civil service employee in the police department and each and every civil service employee in the fire department, of the City of Bellingham, be and the same are hereby increased in the sum of Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) per month; provided, however, that such increase of rates shall not become effective until the first day of January, 1930.

'Section 2. The city council of the City of Bellingham, shall from time to time, pass the necessary and/or ordinances to make such increase effective.'

The monthly increase in salaries provided for in the initiative ordinance was paid by the city during the years 1930 and 1931, and provision was made in the annual budget for the year 1932 for like salaries.

In the early part of 1932, members of the police and fire departments, including respondents, signed written waivers or donation agreements of a part of their salaries for the year 1932. The agreements recited that, owing to the fact that some of the members of the departments would have to be released from service during the year unless the men themselves donated a portion of their salaries into the general fund of the city, and desiring that no further reductions in the departments be made, the entire personnel of the departments was willing to donate to the city total aggregate wages of approximately $4,558.32 for the police department, and $6,535.85 for the fire department. The instruments recited that the signers thereof '* * * now sell, transfer, set over and assign unto the City of Bellingham all monies in excess of the salaries paid during the year 1926 to the various and respective offices now held, or to be held, by each and every of the undersigned during the current year, 1932.'

The city comptroller was directed to pay all surplus above the 1926 rate of salaries into the general fund of the city during the year 1932 only. In March, 1932, and after the execution of this agreement by the men, the city passed Ordinance No. 5298, fixing the salaries of the members of the two departments in conformity to the figures recited in the agreement.

In December, 1932, the voters of the city adopted an amendment to the city charter, by the terms of which the tax levy for city purposes was fixed at 15 mills. It was provided in the amendment that this limit should include certain specific levies theretofore authorized to be made to assist in the payment of salaries of civil service employees in the police and fire departments. Salary ordinances were passed for the years 1933 and 1934, providing for the reduced salaries; the reductions being part of the bank pay sued for in this action.

In August, 1934, the city council adopted Ordinance No. 5426 for reference to the voters. The ordinance provided for the repeal of Initiative Ordinance No. 4941 'from and after January 1, 1930,' and recited that it was the voters' intention in the adoption of the charter amendment of December 3, 1932 (section 346) to repeal Initiative Ordinance No. 4941, and that therefore 'this ordinance shall be and is hereby made retroactive to effectuate that purpose and intent.' The ordinance was ratified by the voters December 1, 1934.

The trial court held that Ordinance No. 5426 became effective upon the salaries of respondents January 1, 1935, and that they were entitled to the full salaries provided by Initiative Ordinance No. 4941 until that date, and by its mandate required the appellants to issue salary warrants to respondents for the difference between the salary schedule that ordinance and the sums that had been paid them.

In argument, the appellants group their assignments of error under four heads. We shall consider these heads in their order.

Under the first head, it is contended that Initiative Ordinance No. 4941 never became a valid enactment of the city, for several reasons. It is first argued that the ordinance is not complete in itself, but requires reference, for its construction, to the salary ordinance existing September 1, 1928.

Upon this point, the case of Knez v. Seattle, 176 Wash. 283, 28 P.2d 1020, 1023, 33 P.2d 905, would seem to be decisive.

The initiative ordinance of the city of Seattle upon which Knez sued in that case was in this respect almost identical with Ordinance No. 4941.

Ordinance No. 4941 is complete in itself, and while reference will have to be made to the pre-existing salary ordinance in order to determine the salary to be paid, this necessity does not make the ordinance obnoxious to article 2,§ 37, of the Constitution or section 82 of the City Charter, cited by appellants. As was said by Judge Rudkin in Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 109 P. 316, 319, after the citation and discussion of authorities: 'It seems to us the foregoing authorities demonstrate that the act in question is not violative of the constitutional provision under consideration. Nearly every legislative act of a general nature changes or modifies some existing statute, either directly or by implication, and as said by the court in Ex parte Pollard, supra : 'Whether an amendatory or an original act should be employed is a matter of legislative judgment and discretion which the courts cannot control' The purpose of the constitutional provision was to protect the members of the Legislature and the public against fraud and deception, not to trammel or hamper the Legislature in the enactment of laws. If the act in question were entitled and act to amend the lien laws of the state by proper reference, its validity could not be called in question, yet what additional information would such a title to such an act bring home to either the Legislature or the public? True, such an amendment would direct attention to the existing laws on the subject, but such was not the object or purpose of the framers of the Constitution. So long as a legislative act is complete in itself, and has a sufficient title, it satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, whether it contains much or little. The Legislature may embody all legislation relating to a given subject in a single act, or it may cover the subject by a succession of acts. This is entirely a matter of legislative discretion over which we can assume no control.'

The second objection urged against the ordinance under this head is that the fixing of salaries is an administrative function of the city council, and not a matter for legislation within the purview of section 75 of the City Charter, reserving to the people the right to enact legislation. Section 75 reserves to the people themselves 'the power to propose any ordinance dealing with any matter within the realm of local affairs or municipal business and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the mayor and city council.' Broader language than this could hardly be used.

Rem. Rev. Stat. § 8949, in relation to cities of the first class, provides: 'Any such city may provide in its charter for direct legislation by the people upon any matter within the scope of such powers, functions or duties of any such city by the initiative and referendum.'

While we think the provisions of the charter are sufficiently broad to enable the voters of the city, through initiative, to deal with any matter within the realm of local affairs or municipal business, whether strictly legislative or not, as that term is generally used, it is obvious that the fixing of salaries is always at some stage in the process a legislative function. Of course, the legislative authority could, unless restrained by constitutional or charter provision, make an appropriation in lump for specified governmental purposes, leaving it to administrative officers to fix the salaries. But the legislative authority is not required to do so, and may itself establish the salaries to be paid. We know that this is almost universally so in practice and that no other incident of municipal government engages more legislative attention.

The next objection to Ordinance No. 4941 is that it is in conflict with Rem. Rev. Stat. § 9000-1 et seq., being the budget law for cities of less than 300,000 population. This objection is disposed of by Knez v. Seattle, supra, where the court said: 'Appellants speak in their brief of the Budget Law, Rem. Rev. Stat. § 9000-13 et seq., which, it is argued, requires the city council 'to provide for salaries by tax levy every year and make appropriations therefor.' True, that law requires, for consideration the assembling of estimates,...