State ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Commission v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company
| Decision Date | 18 March 1889 |
| Citation | 41 N.W. 1047,40 Minn. 267 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Commission v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Moses E. Clapp, Attorney General, for relator.
James H. Howe, for respondent.
Mandamus.
This is a proceeding by mandamus, to compel this respondent to comply with an order of the railroad and warehouse commission of this state, prescribing rates for the transportation of freight over the respondent's line of road from the city of Duluth to the city of Mankato, both of which are within this state. The only question now presented for decision is as to the jurisdiction of our railroad and warehouse commission to make this order, in view of the circumstances to which we now refer. The line of railroad operated by the respondent, and over which its business of transportation between the cities above named is carried on is as follows: That part of the line within the city of Duluth, and which extends to the boundary line between Minnesota and Wisconsin, is owned by the Superior Short-Line Railway Company of Minnesota, a corporation of this state. Connecting with this at the boundary line, and extending into the village of Superior, in Wisconsin, is a road owned by the Superior Short-Line Railway Company, incorporated under the laws of the latter state. Connecting with this, at the village of Superior, commences the railroad of this respondent, which runs from thence to the city of Hudson, in Wisconsin, a distance of 148 miles. At that point it crosses the boundary line into Minnesota, and from that point, by way of St. Paul, the line runs within this state 105 miles to Mankato, and beyond. The two short-line railways above mentioned are operated by this respondent as a part of its line of road, and we attach no importance to the fact that they are owned by other corporations. So far as it concerns the question here involved, the entire line from Duluth to Mankato is to be deemed as under the control of this respondent, and as though the whole were a part of its own line of road.
By section 8, of article 1, of the constitution of the United States, congress is empowered "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states." The transportation of property by a common carrier, including the rates to be charged therefor, is embraced within the meaning of the word "commerce," as here used. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23; Case of State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232, 15 Wall. 232, 21 L.Ed. 146; Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U.S. 541, 26 L.Ed. 224; Wabash, etc., Ry. Co. v Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, (7 S.Ct. 4, 30 L.Ed. 244;) Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, (7 S.Ct. 1118, 30 L.Ed. 1200;) Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230, (7 S.Ct. 857, 30 L.Ed. 888;) Carton v. Illinois Central R. Co., 59 Iowa 148, (13 N.W. 67.) Since the decision in Wabash, etc., Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, (7 S.Ct. 4, 30 L.Ed. 244,) it must be regarded as settled, whatever doubts may have been previously entertained, that the regulation, as by prescribing rates, of such transportation as is to be deemed interstate as distinguished from wholly domestic carriage is exclusively given to congress. The only question upon which there can be any doubt is whether the transportation to which this order of the commission relates is to be deemed commerce or transportation between different states, within the meaning of the constitutional provision above quoted, or as being in its nature merely domestic commerce or transportation, to be governed wholly by our state laws, and over which congress has no control. The order prescribing rates, and to enforce the observance of which is the object of this proceeding, applies to the entire route from Duluth to Mankato, a large part of which -- indeed, the greater part of which -- lies beyond the boundaries of our state, and within the territory of another sovereignty. These rates are for the continuous carriage of freight over the entire route, including the transit of 148 miles through the state of Wisconsin. The order is as applicable to that part of the line as to that which is within our own state, and can only be sustained upon the theory that the railroad and warehouse commission of the state of Minnesota has authority to determine what charges may be made for the transportation of freight by a common carrier through the state of Wisconsin, provided only that the carrier receives the property within this state, and is to carry it through the foreign state to a destination within our own borders.
In view of the above decisions of the supreme court of the United States, that the transportation of freight by a common carrier, apart from considerations of contract concerning the property as between the shipper and the consignee, is a subject of "commerce," to which the constitution applies, it is not a matter of controlling importance that the consignor and consignee, or place of shipment and destination, be within the same state, if the transportation is through a foreign state. Assuming that the constitution places within the exclusive control of congress the subject of transportation among the several states, let us suppose that a shipment is made from Duluth to Winona -- both cities being within our state, but upon the borders of Wisconsin -- by a route wholly within the latter state excepting the inconsiderable distance of the depot grounds in those cities from the state line. Can it be said that this carriage of perhaps 200 miles through the state of Wisconsin, and of a mile or two within our own borders, is domestic transportation and commerce, as distinguished from that which, under the constitution, is to be deemed as being "among the several states?" The constitution, as interpreted by the court whose decisions upon this subject are final, has placed under the exclusive regulation of congress the subject of transportation among the states, so far, among other things, as relates to the matter of charges, in order that it may be protected from conflicting and adversely discriminating state legislation. See authorities above cited. Is not a case such as we have supposed, or the case now before us, transportation among the states, within this purpose of the constitution, as really as would be a shipment and transportation of goods from New York, Chicago, or Milwaukee to Minnesota, as to which unquestionably, under the decisions above cited, congress, and not the several states, would have the power to regulate? We are unable to state any principle which supports...
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