State ex rel. Renick v. Cnty. Court of St. Louis Cnty.

• Citation: 38 Mo. 402
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. R. M. RENICK, Petitioner, v. COUNTY COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 31 July 1866
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

38 Mo. 402

STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. R. M. RENICK, Petitioner,

v.COUNTY COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1866.

Petition for Mandamus.

Glover & Shepley, for petitioner.

I. The jurisdiction exercised by the County Court over the person and estate of Rannells was in the first instance exercised, as will be seen by reference to the following considerations.

1. The jurisdiction upon cases of incapacity arising from drunkenness is a new jurisdiction in this State, and not conferred upon any court until it was done by the act approved February 19, 1866. Therefore, wherever that jurisdiction is by that act conferred, there it must rest. It may refer to proceedings, in cases in some respects similar, previously existing and adopt them in terms; but unless the jurisdiction is expressly in terms given to the particular tribunal exercising the jurisdiction in cases somewhat analagous, that court does not take it.

2. The Probate Court of St. Louis county can take only such power and jurisdiction as are expressly conferred by statute.

3. When the same is granted to it by statute, unless the statute itself conferring the jurisdiction makes it exclusive in terms in the Probate Court, it does not take it away from any other court having the same jurisdiction, either by statute, common law, or in equity.

4. The act by its terms limits this new jurisdiction to the County Court, and by its conferring the jurisdiction existing previously in the other class of cases to the Probate Court or County Court, conclusively shows that it was the intention to limit the new jurisdiction to the County Court alone. There are in this act provided two classes of cases whose status is to be adjudged by the County or Probate Court, to-wit, idiots and lunatics; and the act goes on, after conferring the jurisdiction, to provide in what manner that jurisdiction shall be exercised, and the extent and limits of it, and gives in detail all the forms of proceedings in connection therewith; and after this is all done and finally concluded, for the first time it speaks of another class of cases. which had never been embraced in any previous law, and in terms confers upon the County Court jurisdiction in those cases. However much we might desire to give another interpretation to it, this act, so worded, gives no room for any other interpretation than that which is plainly written in the context. We cannot suppose that the Legislature used the terms “County Court” in this connection as meaning the County Court in those counties where it existed, and the Probate Court in those counties where the Probate Courts had been created, because in the very act itself it had shown that the distinction was recognized, and the law adapted to meet it, by conferring the jurisdiction, in the first section, on the Probate or County Court. After so specifically recognizing the two courts, and carefully conferring upon both the jurisdiction conferred by the first section, it must be taken that the Legislature, in the fifty-second section, intended to limit the other jurisdiction by that section conferred to the County Court alone.

5. The act of March 19, 1866, conferring upon the St. Louis Probate Court jurisdiction of all cases arising under the act of February 19, 1866, is a legislative interpretation that no jurisdiction was conferred upon it in some of the cases mentioned in the act of February 19. 1866. This must be so; otherwise there was no necessity for the act itself. If the act as it stood did of itself confer jurisdiction upon the St. Louis Probate Court in all matters contemplated to be adjudicated under that act, there was clearly no necessity for this last act. Neither can it be said that it was passed to remove a doubt whether, by the use of the words “County Court,” in the fifty-second section, ““Probate Court,” in the counties where they existed, were not intended to be included, because they limit it to the St. Louis Probate Court, and do not extend it to Probate Courts, existing in other counties.

The act of March 19, 1866, giving jurisdiction to the St. Louis Probate Court in all cases, does not take away from the St. Louis County Court any jurisdiction which might be conferred upon it by the act of February 19; for--

1. The jurisdiction which is given to the County Courts by the fifty-second section is co-extensive with the State, in all counties; and if it is to be taken away in a particular county, the act must show that such is the intention of the Legislature, and must use words that show that the jurisdiction thus conferred is intended to be exclusive. Clearly, no such intention is here manifested. In all the acts heretofore passed by which jurisdiction (exclusive) is given, it is specifically stated that it shall have exclusive jurisdiction.

2. To take away a jurisdiction from one court, where it has already existed, and confer it upon another court, the words used must show that the jurisdiction is exclusive; otherwise, it will be held to be concurrent in the two courts. In the case of Gould v. Hays et al., 19 Ala. 450, the court say: “We apprehend the rule is undeniable that the rightful jurisdiction originally exercised by courts of equity is not impaired by legislation conferring similar jurisdiction on other courts, unless exclusive words are used.” So in the case of Commonwealth v. Hudson, 11 Gray, 64-5, when, where one court had jurisdiction of a matter, and the Legislature passed an act giving the same jurisdiction to another court without stating that it was concurrent, the court held that in all such cases the jurisdiction was concurrent. See also Sto. Eq. Juris. § 80.

III. The County Court having alone jurisdiction at the time of the commencement of proceedings, and the judgment having been rendered prior to the passage of the act of March 19, 1866, the County Court retains jurisdiction of all subsequent proceedings in the case. When different courts have jurisdiction, the one before which the first proceedings are had obtains paramount authority--16 Ohio, 404-5; 16 Mass. 170; 2 Munf. 34; 2 Md. Ch. 54; 9 Wheat. 537; 1 Barb. 449; in which case it was held that where there was jurisdiction when the case was commenced, it was not ousted by any...