State ex rel. Richardson v. Clark County, 25999.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1936
• Docket Number: 25999.
• Citation: 186 Wash. 79,56 P.2d 1023
• Parties: STATE ex rel. RICHARDSON, Probation Officer, v. CLARK COUNTY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

56 P.2d 1023

186 Wash. 79

STATE ex rel. RICHARDSON, Probation Officer, v. CLARK COUNTY et al.

No. 25999.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 20, 1936

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Clark County; W. E. Campbell, Judge.

Mandamus proceedings by the State of Washington, on the relation of W B. Richardson, as Probation Officer of Clark County, against Clark County, a municipal corporation of the State of Washington, and George W. Callender, as the Auditor thereof. From a judgment directing the issue of a peremptory writ defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with direction to dismiss.

McMullen & Snider and Albert M. Nanney, all of Vancouver, for appellants.

Eugene G. Cushing, Pros. Atty., of Vancouver, for respondent.

GERAGHTY, Justice.

In this action, the relator, probation officer for Clark county sought a peremptory writ of mandate requiring the issue and delivery to him, by the respondent auditor of Clark county of a warrant in the sum of $61.75, alleged to be due him for the operation of his automobile, at the rate of 5 cents per mile, in the necessary performance of services as probation officer, during the month of August, 1935.

In his affidavit, the relator alleges that the county commissioners of Clark county appropriated, and set apart in the county budget for the year 1935, the sum of $600 to cover the transportation and mileage of the probation officer during the year 1935; that the whole sum so budgeted had been spent by the end of July, and that there were not sufficient funds remaining in the budget to pay the amount of his expenses incurred during the month of August, for which he sought the warrant. He alleges that, upon the exhaustion of the fund, it became necessary and proper to create an emergency for the purpose of providing additional funds from which to pay his claim, and such other and necessary claims as might be presented by him, for the mileage necessarily traveled in the performance of his official duties for the remainder of the year 1935; which circumstances creating the necessity for an emergency appropriation could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time of making the 1935 budget.

He alleges that on September 9, 1935, a written order for payment of his claim was issued by the judge of the Clark county juvenile court, directing the auditor to draw his warrant upon the treasurer for the amount of the specified expense; that the auditor 'unnecessarily, capriciously and without cause or reason therefor' presented the order of the judge to the board of county commissioners for approval, and that the board 'failed, neglected, and refused' to allow his claim for mileage and refused to recognize the order of the court and to pass an emergency therefor.

Relator alleges that he has been satisfactorily performing his duties for many years last past; that it is necessary for him to travel extensively in investigating and taking into custody invenile delinquents and dependents, and that it is impossible to predetermine or fix the amount of travel or mileage necessary and incident to the performance of such duties; that it is necessary for him to be provided with his reasonable and proper transportation to perform his duties; and that the respondent auditor has neglected and refused to draw a warrant upon the county treasurer for the month of August, 1935.

The auditor demurred to the affidavit, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or entitle relator to the relief sought therein. The demurrer was overruled by the trial court, and, the respondent declining to plead further, a judgment was entered, directing the issue of the peremptory writ as prayed for. This appeal follows.

The auditor contends that the court erred in issuing the writ because (1) the probation officer's claim for expenses was required to be allowed by the board of county commissioners; (2) the county budget law prohibited the drawing of warrants for payment of any expenditure in excess of the budget appropriation; and (3) the relator had not secured a valid order of a court of competent jurisdiction, authorizing and directing the drawing of a warrant for the payment of his claim.

Chapter 136, Laws of 1933, p. 477, § 6, provides: 'All county officers shall be entitled to their necessary reasonable traveling expenses in the performance of their official duties, bills therefor to be audited by the county commissioners: Provided, That when using their own cars, they shall be allowed not to exceed five cents (5¢) per mile for each mile of necessary travel.' Rem.Rev.Stat.Supp.1935 § 4200-5a.

The relator contends that he is not within the terms of this general law, because his office was created under a special act. Laws of 1913, p. 520, as amended by Laws of 1921, p. 148 and Laws of 1929, p. 437, now embodied in Rem.Rev.Stat. § 1987-1 to § 1987-18.

Section 1987-3 provides for the designation by the judge of the juvenile court of one or more discreet characters to serve as probation officers during the pleasure of the court, to receive no compensation from the public treasury. It is provided in the section, however, that 'In counties containing twenty thousand or more inhabitants when it shall appear that there is a necessity for such county officer, the court may appoint one or more persons to act as probation officers, and one or more persons who shall have charge of detention rooms or house of detention, all of whom shall be paid as compensation for their services, such sums as may be fixed by the board of county commissioners, and who shall be paid as other county officers are paid.' (Italics ours.)

Section 1987-4 provides: 'The probation officers, and assistant probation officers, and deputy...