State ex rel. Riley v. Martin, 21105

• Decision Date: 04 January 1980
• Docket Number: No. 21105,21105
• Citation: 262 S.E.2d 404,274 S.C. 106
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of South Carolina ex relatione Richard W. RILEY, Governor of the State of South Carolina, and Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Plaintiffs, v. John A. MARTIN, Individually and in his official capacity as Chief Judge-elect of the South Carolina Court of Appeals; and Robert C. Lake, Jr., Theo Walker Mitchell, John P. Gardner, Sr., and Thomas L. Hughston, Jr., Individually and in their official capacities as Associate Judges-elect of the South Carolina Court of Appeals, Defendants.

Page 404

262 S.E.2d 404

274 S.C. 106

STATE of South Carolina ex relatione Richard W. RILEY,

Governor of the State of South Carolina, and

Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General of

the State of South Carolina, Plaintiffs, v. John A. MARTIN, Individually and in his official capacity as

Chief Judge-elect of the South Carolina Court of Appeals;

and Robert C. Lake, Jr., Theo Walker Mitchell, John P.

Gardner, Sr., and Thomas L. Hughston, Jr., Individually and

in their official capacities as Associate Judges-elect of

the South Carolina Court of Appeals, Defendants.

No. 21105.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Jan. 4, 1980.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Senior Asst. Atty. Gen. Karen LeCraft Henderson, Columbia, for plaintiffs.

James P. Fields, Jr., M. Elizabeth Crum, and Randall T. Bell, Columbia, for defendants.

PER CURIAM:

The General Assembly of South Carolina enacted at its 1979 Session Act No. 164 which, under Part IV-A thereof, created, effective July 1, 1980, a Court of Appeals for the State, consisting of five (5) members; and the defendants were elected by the General Assembly to serve as the members of the newly created court. Thereafter, this action was, by permission, brought in the original jurisdiction of the Court by the Governor and the Attorney General, challenging on several grounds the constitutionality of that portion of Act 164 creating the Court of Appeals.

Initially, the constitutionality of Part IV-A of Act No. 164 is challenged in its entirety upon the ground that the General Assembly was without authority to create the Court of Appeals by legislation, in view of the provisions of Article 5, Section 1 of the Constitution of this State.

We determine this issue in the light of the elementary principle that the General Assembly is vested with plenary legislative power (Article 3, Section 1, of the S. C. Constitution), unless limited by some provision of the Constitution. As stated in Clarke v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481:

The General Assembly has a right to pass such legislation as in its judgment may seem beneficial to the state, and to create such agencies of government as may be necessary to carry out its purpose, unless expressly prohibited by the Constitution.

It is contended that the plenary legislative power of the General Assembly to create a Court of Appeals is limited by Article 5, Section 1, of the Constitution. This constitutional provision states:

The judicial power shall be vested in a unified judicial system, which shall include a Supreme Court, a Circuit Court, and such other courts of uniform jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law.

Therefore, the power of the General Assembly to create "other courts" is limited by Article 5, Section 1 to the extent that any "other courts" created by statute (1) must be a part of a unified judicial system; (2) must have uniform jurisdiction, and (3) must be created by general law. It is contended that the Act in question is unconstitutional in that the Court of Appeals is not a court of "uniform jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 5, Section 1.

It is argued that the phrase "Courts of uniform jurisdiction", as used in Section 1 of Article 5, "does not include a single, one-of-a-kind type of court but, instead, contemplates multiple courts which exercise like jurisdiction." We find nothing in the language of the Constitution to sustain the foregoing conclusion. It provides for "a Supreme Court, a Circuit Court, and such other courts of uniform jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law." The argument is soundly made that the clear sense of the phrase is that the Supreme Court and the Circuit Court are themselves courts of uniform jurisdiction. If this was not so, the phrase "such other" would be unnecessary and meaningless. Uniform jurisdiction, therefore, clearly means that Other courts may be created by the General Assembly, if they possess the jurisdictional characteristics of either the Supreme Court or the Circuit Court.

The Court of Appeals possesses the same uniform jurisdictional characteristics as held by the Supreme Court and Circuit Court. The Act gives to the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all criminal proceedings in the circuit court, and all post conviction proceedings in any court, with the exception of death penalty cases which are appealable directly to the Supreme Court. Decisions of the Court of Appeals are reviewable in the Supreme Court by means of judicial writ. The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, within the area of its judicial authority, just as with the Supreme Court and Circuit Court, is the same Throughout the State. Since the subject-matter jurisdiction is the same throughout the State, it is a Court of "uniform jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 5, Section 1. We find no language in our prior decisions, when taken in context, that would justify a contrary conclusion.

We, therefore, conclude that Article 5, Section 1, does not deprive the General Assembly of the power to create the Court of Appeals by legislation.

The conclusion we reach, as to the authority of the General Assembly to create the Court of Appeals, is in keeping with the legislative history of the adoption of Article 5, Section 1.

The present judicial article (Article 5) was adopted after considerable study by at least two committees. The first of these was the West Committee. It concluded that an intermediate Court of Appeals was not needed and recommended against permitting the General Assembly to establish such a court. In furtherance of that objective, the West Committee recommended that Article 5, Section 1, be adopted in the following form:

The judicial power shall be vested in a unified judicial system, which shall include a Supreme Court, a circuit court, and such courts of Uniform limited jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law. (Emphasis added).

A subsequent committee (The Judicial Reform Committee) was created to also make a comprehensive study of the State's judicial system. After expressing concern that the aforementioned proposal of the West Committee would require a constitutional amendment to permit the creation of an intermediate appellate court, the Judicial Reform Committee recommended that the West Committee proposal be amended by deleting the term "limited", with the stated purpose to allow the General Assembly to create such a tribunal when needed. This proposal was adopted by the voters and presently comprises Article 5, Section 1, of our Constitution.

The clear and unambiguous language of Article 5, Section 1, therefore, expressed the intent of the framers of the Judicial Article to permit the General Assembly to create an intermediate Court of Appeals within the unified judicial system.

In addition to the general attack upon the constitutionality of the Court of Appeals, individual provisions of the statutory scheme have been challenged as constitutionally prohibited.

Section 14-8-80 of Part IV of Act No. 164 empowers the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals to "commission specially the requisite number of judges from the circuit judges of this State" to sit with the Court of Appeals in the event any of the judges thereof are disqualified or otherwise prevented from presiding in any cause. It is contended that this provision is unconstitutional in that it conflicts with Article 5, Section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, which empowers the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to:

. . . assign any judge to sit in any court within the unified judicial system. . . .

The Chief Justice regularly exercises this authority by assigning circuit court judges to hold terms of court throughout the State. The power granted to the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals to assign circuit judges to sit with that court in certain instances is a clear infringement upon the constitutional power of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to assign any judge to sit in any court within the unified judicial system and therefore, violates Article 5, Section 4, of the State Constitution.

It is next argued that Section 14-8-400 of Part IV-A of Act No. 164, which vests the Court of Appeals with the power to set additional terms of that court, violates Article 5, Section 4, of the Constitution which empowers the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as the administrative head of the unified judicial system to:

. . . set the terms of any court . . . within the unified judicial system. . . .

The Court of Appeals is a part of the unified judicial system and the express power of the Chief Justice to set terms of any court within the unified system applies to the Court of Appeals. The statutory vesting of the power to set terms of the Court of Appeals, therefore, infringes upon the constitutional authority of the Chief Justice to set the terms of any court within the unified system, and violates the provisions of Article 5, Section 4, of the Constitution.

The position is also taken that Section 14-8-130 of Part IV-A of Act No. 164, which adds to the duties of the Supreme Court Reporter the duty to report the opinions and decisions of the Court of Appeals, is an unconstitutional attempt to prescribe or add to the duties of the Supreme Court Reporter in violation of Article 5, Section 6, of the Constitution, which grants to the Justices of the Supreme Court the authority to appoint "a Reporter . . ., whose . . . duties shall be prescribed by the Court." Section 14-8-130 also provides that

An assistant reporter for the Court of Appeals shall be appointed by the judges of such Court to aid the reporter in his duties.

We do not interpret Section 14-8-130 as an infringement upon the authority of the Supreme Court to define the duties of the Court Reporter. Rather, the provision for the appointment by the Court of Appeals of an assistant reporter to aid the Supreme Court Reporter indicates an intent that the...