State ex rel. Roberts v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 22 June 1923 |
| Docket Number | 35284 |
| Citation | 194 N.W. 202,196 Iowa 300 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA ex rel. NEWTON W. ROBERTS, Appellee, v. CHARLES JOHNSON, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Wapello District Court.--F. M. HUNTER, Judge.
DEFENDANT was tried without demand for a jury before a district judge sitting as a juvenile court on an information charging him with delinquency and incorrigibility in conformity to Chapter 5-B, Title III, of the Supplement to the Code, 1913. He was found guilty and sentenced to the industrial school for boys until he reached his majority. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Heindell & Hunt, for appellant.
Newton W. Roberts, County Attorney, and Ben J. Gibson. Attorney-general, for appellee.
DE GRAFF, J.
On February 11, 1922 the state of Iowa on the relation of the county attorney of Wapello County filed an information in the juvenile division of the district court of Iowa in and for Wapello County accusing one Charles Johnson, a boy under 16 years of age, to be an incorrigible and delinquent child. The information also specified the delinquency involved, to wit "being armed with a deadly weapon," and "having made threatening remarks against persons contrary," etc.
Summons was duly issued and on February 25, 1922 the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and on said date, no demand for jury having been made by him or his parents, trial was had before District Judge F. M. Hunter sitting as a juvenile court. Upon the conclusion of the testimony the defendant was found guilty and ordered committed to the State Industrial School for Boys at Eldora "there to remain until he is 21 years of age."
Appellant challenges the jurisdiction of the district judge sitting as a juvenile court to try the defendant on the filed information. It is contended that the defendant is charged with an indictable offense which is not triable without the intervention of a jury. The limitation of our inquiry is only to the form or manner of the trial, but the proposition advanced impeaches the very theory of juvenile legislation in this state. It is not a judicial function to question the wisdom of the legislature in the enactment of a statute. It is our duty to construe and uphold a statute unless it is violative of a constitutional provision.
In the instant case its constitutionality is not involved. The question is one of statutory construction. It is not our thought to express an opinion on the comparative merits of a trial by jury and a trial by the court in cases of this character. Juvenile legislation is a response to the modern spirit of social justice. It is not punitive in character. Probation is the fundamental idea, and it is the intent to remove the juvenile from the environs of the criminal court and save him from the stigma of being charged or treated as a criminal. Under the common law the king was considered parens patriae, and under the theory of the modern state we have preserved that idea. The state is the guardian of social interests and is charged with the duty of protecting public and social interests limited by the maxims of the common law and by the law of the land. In solving the problems of social concern in our modern life the legislatures of the different commonwealths have seen fit to prescribe the manner and method of procedure in relation to child welfare, and this includes the various phases of corrective measures written into our juvenile law. With these ends in view and that the purpose of juvenile legislation may be carried out a liberal construction must be given to the statutes in order "that the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents." Section 254-a28 Supplement Code 1913.
The information in this case charges the defendant with being "a delinquent child" and under the provisions of our law it cannot be doubted that the district court sitting as a juvenile court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the defendant. A delinquent child includes "any child under the age of 16 years, who violates any law of this state, or any city or village ordinance; or who is incorrigible." Section 254-a14 ibid. The defendant was so charged and in addition thereto the informant particularized as to the manner of delinquency. These added words are verba descriptionis.
It is not necessary that an information under the juvenile statute shall conform to the essential requirements of an indictment or criminal information. The summons required by the statute was legally issued. The defendant and his parent duly appeared. Trial proceeded in conformity to law. There was no demand for a jury.
Let it be conceded that the information charged an indictable offense, does this fact make it mandatory on the part of the court to act as a committing magistrate, admit the accused to bail, and refer the cause to a grand jury? Or does the...
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