State ex rel. Rootstown Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Portage County Court of Common Pleas
| Decision Date | 28 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-233,97-233 |
| Citation | 678 N.E.2d 1365,78 Ohio St.3d 489 |
| Parties | , 157 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2891 . Supreme Court of Ohio |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Johnson, Balazs & Angelo, Michael J. Angelo, Thomas L. Colaluca, Cleveland and Gina A. Kuhlman, Cleveland, for relators.
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Denise L. Smith, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Portage County Court of Common Pleas.
Buckley, King & Bluso and James E. Melle, Columbus, for intervening respondents.
Livorno & Arnett Co., L.P.A., and Henry A. Arnett, Columbus, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Professional Fire Fighters.
Herman S. Whitter, Columbus, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae, Ohio Civil Service Employees Association, AFSCME Local 11, AFL-CIO.
Stewart Jaffy & Assoc. Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, Columbus, urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae, Ohio AFL-CIO.
In their propositions of law, relators assert that they are entitled to a writ of prohibition because the common pleas court lacks jurisdiction over the claims in the underlying action.
In order for a writ of prohibition to issue, relators must establish that (1) the common pleas court is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 655 N.E.2d 1303, 1305. Here, it appears uncontroverted that unless prevented, the common pleas court will conduct further proceedings in the underlying action. Therefore, the pertinent issues are whether the common pleas court's intended exercise of judicial authority is unauthorized and whether denying the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.
Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a tribunal having general subject-matter jurisdiction of a case possesses authority to determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging its jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by postjudgment appeal from its holding that it has the requisite jurisdiction. Whitehall ex rel. Wolfe v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 120, 123-124, 656 N.E.2d 684, 688.
Conversely, appeal does not constitute an adequate remedy and does not bar extraordinary relief if the tribunal patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the case. State ex rel. Lewis v. Moser (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 25, 28, 647 N.E.2d 155, 157. Relators contend that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the various claims raised by the intervening respondents. In addressing relators' argument, we need not expressly rule on these jurisdictional issues, since our review is limited to whether the common pleas court's jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking. State ex rel. Willacy v. Smith (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 47, 52, 676 N.E.2d 109, 113.
Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction:
Particular Claims
The intervening respondents alleged claims in mandamus, injunction, and declaratory judgment in the common pleas court that are premised on R.C. 3319.081, the Ohio Constitution, and Section 4(A) of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 (140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 336, 337). Relators do not deny that the common pleas court possesses basic statutory jurisdiction over actions in mandamus, injunction, and declaratory judgment. R.C. 2731.02, 2727.03, and 2721.02.
Instead, relators contend that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the intervening respondents' action because their claims are within SERB's exclusive jurisdiction. If a party asserts claims that arise from or are dependent on the collective bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117, SERB possesses exclusive jurisdiction over the claims. Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 167, 572 N.E.2d 87, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. Therefore, a writ of prohibition will issue to prevent a common pleas court from exercising jurisdiction over a case which is patently and unambiguously within SERB's exclusive jurisdiction. State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 287, 289-290, 667 N.E.2d 929, 931.
Relators rely on Fraternal Order of Police (1996) and Vandalia-Butler City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (Aug. 15, 1991), Montgomery App. No. 12517, unreported, 1991 WL 355161, to support their contention that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the R.C. 3319.081 contract claims. In Fraternal Order of Police, the court granted a writ of prohibition to prevent a common pleas court from proceeding because the case involved claims arising from and dependent on existing collective bargaining agreements and conduct allegedly constituting unfair labor practices under R.C 4117.11. In Vandalia-Butler, the court of appeals affirmed a common pleas court's affirmance of a SERB order finding a board of education guilty of committing an unfair labor practice for implementing a final offer before an impasse had occurred.
Relators' reliance on these cases is misplaced. In Fraternal Order of Police, 76 Ohio St.3d 287, 667 N.E.2d 929, the claims arose from an existing collective bargaining agreement. The agreement here, however, has expired. Similarly, despite relators' contentions to the contrary, Vandalia-Butler did not hold that an employer's validly implemented final offer following impasse constitutes a collective bargaining agreement "as a matter of law." As the intervening respondents and the amici curiae note, a collective bargaining agreement must be approved by the employee organization, reduced to writing, and executed by the parties. R.C. 4117.09(A) and 4117.10(C).
Relators also assert that the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the intervening respondents' main claims of entitlement to employment contracts with the board pursuant to R.C. 3319.081 because the terms and conditions of employment were addressed in the expired collective bargaining agreement, negotiated to ultimate impasse, and specified in relators' implemented final offer.
This assertion likewise lacks merit. R.C. 4117.10(A) provides that "[w]here no agreement exists * * *, the public employer and public employees are subject to all applicable state or local laws or ordinances pertaining to the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment for public employees." Therefore, it is arguable that R.C. 3319.081 prevails where no collective bargaining agreement exists. State ex rel. Internatl. Union of Operating Engineers v. Cleveland (1992), 62 Ohio...
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