State ex rel Roy v. Tahash, 40611

• Decision Date: 14 July 1967
• Docket Number: No. 40611,40611
• Citation: 277 Minn. 238,152 N.W.2d 301
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Clifton E. ROY, Appellant, v. Ralph H. TAHASH, Warden, Minnesota State Prison, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 301

152 N.W.2d 301

277 Minn. 238

STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Clifton E. ROY, Appellant, v. Ralph H. TAHASH, Warden, Minnesota State Prison Respondent.

No. 40611.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 14, 1967.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A plenary evidentiary hearing in a postconviction proceeding is required whenever material facts are in dispute which have not been resolved in the proceedings resulting in conviction and which must be resolved in order to determine petitioner's claims of denial of constitutional rights on the merits. In all other cases, the holding of such a hearing is discretionary with the trial court.

2. An evidentiary hearing is not required upon a petition for relief instituted either in a habeas proceeding, as transitionally enlarged in scope, or under Minn.St. 590.01, et seq., L.1967, c. 336, our supervening postconviction-remedy statute, unless the petition alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle petitioner to relief.

3. Where a petition alleges any facts which, if proved, would entitle petitioner to relief, a summary dismissal of the petition is not warranted unless, during the proceedings resulting in the conviction, the sentencing court has, after a full and fair hearing, resolved and reliably found the relevant facts underlying petitioner's claims.

4. Although the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this case alleges two claims of denial of constitutional rights which, if proved, would entitle petitioner to relief, the sentencing court prior to petitioner's plea afforded petitioner evidentiary hearings on each claim and found the facts essential to a determination of petitioner's claims on the merits. A summary denial of the writ of habeas corpus was, therefore, proper.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Ronald L. Haskvitz, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Douglas M. Head, Atty., Gen., David C. Weinberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gerard W. Snell, Acting Sol. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.

OPINION

ROGOSHESKE, Justice.

This case and four other cases decided today ¹ all raise the question of the necessity of a plenary evidentiary hearing in a habeas corpus proceedings which under our recent decisions has been enlarged in scope and made available to state prisoners as a transitional postconviction remedy for the hearing of alleged violations of fundamental rights.

In all of the cases reviewed the petitions for the writ were filed after the time to appeal from the judgment of conviction had lapsed. In all save one--where there was a trial--the judgments of conviction followed pleas of guilty.

All of the petitions for the writ alleged deprivation of constitutional rights and were prepared, signed, and filed by the assistant public defender on behalf of the prisoner. Each was served upon respondent and filed in Washington County District Court prior to the enactment of Minn.St. 590.01, et seq., L.1967, c. 336, the postconviction-remedy statute which became effective May 12, 1967.

In this case, petitioner, on June 14, 1965, was sentenced to imprisonment by the District Court of Hennepin County to an indeterminate term of up to 4 years upon his plea of guilty to burglary. The acts constituting the offense were the burglarious theft of a safe and its contents from the Warner Hardware Company in Minneapolis. The petition for the writ was filed August 2, 1966. It alleged that petitioner's plea was not voluntary because of 'threats' of prosecuting officials that his girl friend would be put on the stand; that he was placed twice in jeopardy because he was charged, then released by the municipal court upon a finding of no probable cause, rearrested, and charged again with the same crime; and that the search of a garage, petitioner's automobile, and his person and the seizure of a safe dial and other items were illegal because the search and seizure were without a warrant or his consent and were not incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause.

On October 18, 1966, the court denied the petition without affording petitioner an evidentiary hearing to prove his claims. As explained in a memorandum accompanying the order, the trial court found and determined that by his plea petitioner waived 'each of his claims with respect to illegal detention except the claim of illegal search and seizure'; that a hearing based upon a stipulation of facts on a motion to suppress was afforded petitioner by the sentencing court, and the motion was properly denied; and that allegations with respect to 'threats' and of being twice placed in jeopardy are 'conclusions which are in no way supported by any statement of facts.'

Petitioner argues that since Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837, and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770, an evidentiary hearing 'must be granted where the Petition alleges deprivation of constitutional rights.' Respondent contends that in habeas proceedings an evidentiary hearing is discretionary with the trial court, and where the allegations of the petition, examined in the light of the record, do not establish a denial of any substantial or constitutional rights, the writ may summarily be denied.

The considerations which should govern whether a convicted prisoner, deprived of his liberty, must be granted an evidentiary hearing on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be properly applied unless we recognize and accept, as we did in State ex rel. Holm v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 466, 139 N.W.2d 161, the necessity of affording state prisoners some effective type of post final-judgment review for the hearing and determination of claims of violations of Federal constitutional guarantees. In the Holm case we held that, pending the hoped-for enactment of c. 336, habeas corpus was to be the procedure available for such post-conviction review. Because historical limitations on the scope and availability of habeas corpus would render such use of the writ wholly inadequate, it must also be accepted that these limitations must be modified or often disregarded in order to dispose of petitions for the writ on the merits rather than on procedural grounds. To effectively employ habeas corpus as an adequate post-conviction remedy thus required an enlargement of the writ's scope and availability.

The main reasons compelling our transitional enlargement of our habeas proceedings are outlined in the Holm case and need not be repeated. It is sufficient that we remind ourselves that the necessity for some process of post final-judgment review was created by the impact of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court substantially revising basic standards of criminal justice applicable to prisoners convicted and sentenced under state law. The inevitable consequence was that those who had been convicted under procedures no longer constitutionally permissible applied for relief to the state courts where the conviction occurred. Any refusal to make available adequate state corrective procedures to hear and dispose of claimed denials of Federal rights made it further inevitable that state prisoners, after exhausting state remedies, would seek relief in the Federal courts under Federal habeas corpus. ² For it was made clear by the Supreme Court on March 18, 1963, in Fay v. Noia, supra, that the Federal courts under Federal law have plenary power to grant relief to state prisoners who failed to obtain adequate hearings in the state courts. At the same time it was expressly held in Townsend v. Sain, supra, that 'where an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief,' the Federal court has discretionary power 'to receive evidence and try the facts anew.' Further, '(w)here the facts are in dispute,' the Federal trial court has the mandatory duty to 'hold an evidentiary hearing' unless the habeas applicant received 'a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the time of trial or in a collateral proceeding.' 372 U.S. 312, 83 S.Ct. 757, 9 L.Ed.2d 785.

In the final analysis, either through judicial adaptation of existing state procedures so as to provide an adequate post-conviction review or, preferably, legislative enactment of a comprehensive postconviction-remedy statute (as has now been done), the state is simply performing its duty to insure that, not only current state prosecutions, but also past convictions meet present Federal constitutional standards. The existence of an adequate postconviction review, therefore, has become and remains essential to retain primary control and responsibility for the proper administration of criminal justice in this state. Case v. State of Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 85 S.Ct. 1486, 14 L.Ed.2d 422. ³

When proceeding either under habeas as transitionally enlarged or under our new statute, it would appear desirable, if not indeed necessary, that the rules governing the grant or denial of an evidentiary hearing be substantially comparable to those which afford to a state prisoner a trial-type hearing in the Federal courts in Federal habeas corpus proceedings. Apart from strong intimations in Case v. State of Nebraska, supra, that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the states afford an adequate collateral review, practical considerations alone dictate that there be no unjustified deviations from Federal standards. Surely, even those who take issue with the new developments in the criminal law must agree that in guaranteeing fundamental rights there should be no double standards of justice--one for the Federal courts and another for the state courts. Moreover, to the extent that our standards substantially equate those required of the Federal trial courts, a state prisoner will be less inclined to pursue his Federal habeas remedy and Federal courts will find it unnecessary to grant evidentiary hearings where any disputed facts underlying a prisoner's claims have been fully heard and fairly determined by our trial...