State ex rel. Rucker v. Hoffman

• Decision Date: 09 April 1926
• Citation: 288 S.W. 16,313 Mo. 667
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. ROY W. RUCKER, Prosecuting Attorney of Pettis County, Appellant, v. DIMMITT HOFFMAN, Judge of Thirtieth Judicial Circuit
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

288 S.W. 16

313 Mo. 667

THE STATE ex rel. ROY W. RUCKER, Prosecuting Attorney of Pettis County, Appellant, v. DIMMITT HOFFMAN, Judge of Thirtieth Judicial Circuit

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 9, 1926

Appeal from Pettis Circuit Court; Hon. Robert M. Reynolds Special Judge.

Transferred to Kansas City Court of Appeals.

Roy W. Rucker for appellant.

H B. Shain and Paul Barnett for respondent.

North T. Gentry, Attorney-General, amicus curiae.

(1) Sec. 12670, R. S. 1919, provides for the salary of an official reporter in cities or counties which now have a population of 60,000 or more, and also in counties having a population of 45,000, or less. For the purpose of determining the population, and for the purpose of determining the salary, the votes cast at the general election for any office shall be multiplied by five, and the same taken as the correct population of the county. R. S. 1919, sec. 11016. (2) The giving of the ballot to women does not do away with the necessity of multiplying this total by five, as our courts have held. State v. Brockelman, 240 S.W. 209; O'Brien v. Randolph County, 274 S.W. 356. (3) A court reporter is a state officer, distinguished from a county officer, for in circuits having more than one county his compensation is derived from different counties. (4) It is respectfully submitted that the case should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of the relator, according to the prayer of relator.

Blair C. J. All concur, except Graves, J., who dissents, and Otto, J., not sitting.

OPINION

BLAIR

This is an action instituted in the Circuit Court of Pettis County, whereby the prosecuting attorney of that county sought to enjoin the judge of the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit, comprising said county, from approving the monthly salary voucher of his official court reporter in an amount exceeding the rate of $ 2,000 per annum. Hon. Robert M. Reynolds, regular judge of an adjoining circuit, was called in as special judge and tried the case. Judgment went for defendant denying such injunction, and plaintiff was granted an appeal to this court.

An agreed statement of facts was filed in the trial court as follows:

"It is stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto:

"That plaintiff is the duly elected, qualified and acting Prosecuting Attorney of Pettis County, Missouri.

"That defendant is the duly elected, qualified and acting Judge of the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, and that defendant has been judge of said circuit since the 1st day of January, 1923.

"That the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit of Missouri consists of the County of Pettis.

"That the population of the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, as disclosed by the Federal decennial census of 1920, is 35,813.

"That there were cast at the last general election in Pettis County, Missouri, more than 15,000 votes.

"That Roy Snyder was duly appointed by Hon. Dimmitt Hoffman, Judge, as the official Court Reporter of the Thirtieth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, in January, 1923.

"That, since the appointment of said Roy Snyder as official Court Reporter of said circuit, Hon. Dimmitt Hoffman, Judge, has been issuing certificates each month as said judge, directing the Treasurer of Pettis County, Missouri, to pay the said Roy Snyder, as his salary as official reporter of said circuit, the sum of $ 208.33 monthly, or on the basis of an annual salary of $ 2,500.

"That Hon. Dimmitt Hoffman, Judge, has continued to issue certificates each month, as said judge, directing the Treasurer of Pettis County, Missouri, to pay the said Roy Snyder, as his salary as official reporter of said court, the sum of $ 208.33 monthly since the institution of this suit; and that, unless restrained from so doing, the Hon. Dimmitt Hoffman, Judge, will continue to issue said certificates in the sum of $ 208.33 each month."

Although neither appellant nor respondent has challenged our appellate jurisdiction in this case, it is our duty to determine that question for ourselves. [Bennett v. Bennett, 243 S.W. (Mo. Sup.) 769; In re Letcher, 269 Mo. 140, l. c. 147.]

The appellate jurisdiction of this court is limited to the classes of cases specified in Articles VI, Section 12, of the Constitution. In all other cases where appeals are taken from judgments of circuit courts, appellate jurisdiction is lodged in the court of appeals. The only possible ground upon which we could retain appellate jurisdiction of the case now before us is to hold that respondent judge of the circuit court is a state officer within the meaning of said Article VI, Section 12.

In State ex rel. Holmes v. Dillon, 90 Mo. 229, at page 233, this court held that, "we are of the opinion that the words 'state officer,' as used in the Constitution, are to be understood as having been used by the framers of the Constitution in their popular sense, and were intended only to refer to such officers whose official duties and functions are co-extensive with the boundaries of the State."

This ruling has ever since been consistently approved and followed by this court in a number of decisions, although in none of them was a circuit judge a party to the suit. [See State ex rel. Bender v. Spencer, 91 Mo. 206; State ex rel. Frisby v. Hill, 152 Mo. 234, l. c. 239; State ex rel. Blakemore v. Rombauer, 101 Mo. 499, l. c. 502; Nickelson v. City of Hardin, 282 Mo. 198, l. c. 201; State ex rel. Foerstel v. Higgins, 144 Mo. 410; State ex rel. Conway v. Hiller, 266 Mo. 242, l. c. 262.]

In State ex rel. v. Higgins, supra, the members of the Board of Election Commissioners of the City of St. Louis were parties. The case came here on appeal, and we transferred same to the St. Louis Court of Appeals because the members of that board were not state officers within the meaning of Article VI, Section 12. The members of that board were appointed by state authority, and in that sense were state officers to the same extent as circuit judges are.

The only case we have found where the circuit judge was held to be...