State ex rel. Ryan Alt. Staffing, Inc. v. Moss
| Decision Date | 06 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2020-1545 |
| Citation | 166 Ohio St.3d 467,187 N.E.3d 493 |
| Parties | The STATE EX REL. RYAN ALTERNATIVE STAFFING, INC., Appellee, v. MOSS; Industrial Commission of Ohio, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Morrow & Meyer, L.L.C., and Mary E. Ulm, for appellee.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Douglas R. Unver, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Industrial Commission of Ohio, granted temporary-total-disability ("TTD") compensation to Bridget M. Moss. Moss's employer, appellee, Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. ("Ryan"), asked the Tenth District Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order and deny compensation because Moss had refused an offer of alternative employment within her medical restrictions. The Tenth District granted the writ.
{¶ 2} We vacate the Tenth District's judgment and issue a limited writ ordering the commission to reconsider the claim under the correct standard, as explained below.
{¶ 3} Moss sustained a work injury while employed by Ryan in a second-shift position, working 4:00 p.m. to midnight. Her workers’ compensation claim was allowed for a knee sprain
, and she requested TTD compensation. Ryan, a self-insuring employer, offered Moss work within her medical restrictions, but on the day shift. Moss refused the offer because she had to care for her granddaughter during the day while her daughter worked. Ryan denied Moss's TTD-compensation request because she had turned down the job offer.
{¶ 4} Moss asked the commission to order Ryan to approve compensation, asserting that Ryan knew she could not work the day shift, so its offer of light-duty work was not made in good faith. A district hearing officer ("DHO") denied the motion, finding that Ryan had not consciously crafted a position it knew Moss could not accept.
{¶ 5} Moss appealed, and a staff hearing officer ("SHO") vacated the DHO's order and granted Moss's request for TTD compensation, finding that while Ryan had made the offer in good faith, Moss had also refused it in good faith. Ryan appealed the SHO's decision; the commission declined to hear the appeal. Ryan moved for reconsideration, which the commission likewise denied.
{¶ 6} Ryan then filed this action in the Tenth District seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate the SHO's order and reinstate the DHO's order. The magistrate recommended denying the writ, but the court sustained Ryan's objections and granted it. 2020-Ohio-5197, ¶ 1, 8. The commission appealed.
{¶ 7} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Ryan must show that it has a clear legal right to the relief requested, that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide it, and that Ryan lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Omni Manor, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. , 162 Ohio St.3d 264, 2020-Ohio-4422, 165 N.E.3d 273, ¶ 9.
{¶ 8} R.C. 4123.56(A) provides that payment for TTD compensation "shall not be made" for periods "when work within the physical capabilities of the employee is made available by the employer." In State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. , 115 Ohio St.3d 224, 2007-Ohio-4920, 874 N.E.2d 780, ¶ 13, we held that R.C. 4123.56(A) must be read in pari materia with Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6), which provides, " ‘Job offer’ means a proposal, made in good faith, of suitable employment within a reasonable proximity of the injured worker's residence." "Suitable employment" simply means "work which is within the employee's physical capabilities." Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(3).
{¶ 9} There is no dispute that Ryan made an offer of suitable alternative employment, and no one claims it was not within a reasonable proximity of Moss's residence. The commission also found that the offer was made in good faith.
{¶ 10} The question presented is whether in such a situation the commission may nevertheless award TTD compensation if the employee refuses the offer in good faith based on family circumstances. R.C. 4123.56(A) answers this question in the negative: "payment shall not be made for the period * * * when work within the physical capabilities of the employee is made available by the employer or another employer." (Emphasis added.) The statute grants the commission no discretion to award TTD compensation if the employer makes an offer complying with R.C. 4123.56(A) and Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6).
{¶ 11} Despite the statute's clear directive, the parties, commission, and court of appeals all analyzed this case under Ellis , the facts of which were similar to those in this case. In Ellis , an injury prevented Susan Hudgel from returning to her former day-shift position, but her employer, Ellis Super Valu, Inc. ("ESV"), offered her a light-duty position on the evening shift. 115 Ohio St.3d 224, 2007-Ohio-4920, 874 N.E.2d 780, at ¶ 1-3. Hudgel rejected the offer because her husband also worked in the evenings and she did not want to leave her two teenaged children home alone. Id. The DHO treated the matter as a case of voluntary abandonment of employment and denied TTD compensation, but the SHO reversed that decision and awarded compensation, finding that Hudgel had a good reason for declining the light-duty offer and therefore did not voluntarily abandon her employment. The Tenth District declined to issue a writ of mandamus, and ESV appealed.
{¶ 12} In Ellis , we first explained that the case did not involve a voluntary abandonment of employment but rather implicated a different defense to the obligation to pay TTD compensation: refusal of an offer of suitable alternative employment. Id. at ¶ 6, citing R.C. 4123.56(A). We then explained: Id. at ¶ 9. Finally, we concluded:
Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6) defines "job offer" in this context as a proposal "made in good faith." The parties debate whether good faith existed, but contrary to their suggestion, the commission has not addressed this issue. Whether Hudgel exercised good faith in refusing the job offer does not answer whether ESV exercised good faith in extending it, which must be addressed. If ESV consciously crafted a job offer with work shifts that it knew Hudgel could not cover—as Hudgel alleges and ESV denies—then good faith may not exist. That, however, is a factual determination for the commission.
Id. at ¶ 13. We returned the matter to the commission to further consider the claim. Id. at ¶ 14.
{¶ 13} In this case, the commission focuses on the language in our Ellis decision that states that the "relevant inquiry in this situation is why the claimant has rejected an offer" and that the inquiry "can involve considerations of, for example , employment suitability, the legitimacy of the job offer, or whether the position was offered in good faith" (emphasis added), Ellis at ¶ 9. Based on this, the commission asserts that the existence of a good-faith offer is only one of several factors it may consider and that it properly exercised its discretion by determining that Moss's good-faith rejection of the job offer meant that she could receive TTD compensation.
{¶ 14} However, nothing in R.C. 4123.56(A) or Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6) permits an injured worker to receive TTD compensation after refusing a good-faith offer of suitable alternative employment, even if the injured worker exercised good faith in refusing the offer. And we did not create an exception in Ellis for situations in which familial obligations prevent an injured worker from accepting a legitimate, good-faith offer of suitable alternative employment—nor could we have, as this court cannot create a duty enforceable in mandamus, State ex rel. Manor Care, Inc. v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp. , 163 Ohio St.3d 87, 2020-Ohio-5373, 168 N.E.3d 434, ¶ 19.
{¶ 15} Ryan's knowledge of Moss's daytime obligations was relevant to the commission's determination of Ryan's good faith in making the offer. But Moss's familial obligations were not an independent reason that could justify an award of TTD compensation in spite of a job offer complying with R.C. 4123.56(A) and Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6).
{¶ 16} That conclusion raises the question whether the matter should be returned to the commission for further consideration, rather than for the issuance of an order denying compensation, as the Tenth District directed. The commission is the exclusive finder of fact in workers’ compensation matters. State ex rel. Navistar, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. , 160 Ohio St.3d 7, 2020-Ohio-712, 153 N.E.3d 7, ¶ 21. And the existence of good faith is "a factual determination for the commission." Ellis , 115 Ohio St.3d 224, 2007-Ohio-4920, 874 N.E.2d 780, at ¶ 13.
{¶ 17} Ryan argues that because the commission already found that it made the job offer in good faith, the matter is settled. However, the orders of the commission's hearing officers exhibit confusion about the correct standard under which Ryan's good faith is to be determined.
{¶ 18} Both the DHO's and the SHO's orders evince confusion about what facts can establish bad faith on the part of an employer. The DHO focused on our statement in Ellis that "good faith may not exist" if the employer consciously crafts a job offer with work shifts that it knows the injured worker cannot cover, id. at ¶ 13. The DHO stated, (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 19} But our discussion in Ellis was driven by the specific...
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