State ex rel. Schendel v. Dist. Court of Lyon Cnty.

• Citation: 194 N.W. 780,156 Minn. 380
• Decision Date: 27 July 1923
• Docket Number: No. 23659.,23659.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SCHENDEL v. DISTRICT COURT OF LYON COUNTY.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

156 Minn. 380

194 N.W. 780

STATE ex rel. SCHENDEL

v.DISTRICT COURT OF LYON COUNTY.

No. 23659.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 27, 1923.

Mandamus by the State, on the relation of A. D. Schendel, special administrator, against the District Court of Lyon County, to compel the court to proceed with an action. Writ allowed.

Syllabus by the Court

The amendment of April 5, 1910, to the Employers' Liability Act, 36 Stat. 291, c. 143 (U. S. Comp. St. § 8662), provides that an action under it may be brought in the federal court in the district ‘in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action,’ and that the jurisdiction of such federal court ‘shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states, and no case arising under this act and brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.’ The plaintiff's intestate sustained the injury from which he died in Wisconsin, which was the state of his residence. The action is based upon the Liability Act. It is claimed by the defendant that its trial in Lyon county, where brought, and where the defendant does business, will interfere with interstate commerce. It is held, that the action was properly brought in the state court in Lyon county, and that the trial should proceed. Davis & Michel, of Minneapolis, for relator.

James H. Hall, of Marshall, and Brown, Somsen & Sawyer, of Winona, for respondent.

DIBELL, J.

Writ of mandamus, original in this court, on the relation of A. D. Schendel, special administrator of Thomas Kopczynski, to compel the district court of Lyon county to proceed with an action pending therein in which the relator is the plaintiff and the Chicago & North Western Railway Company is the defendant.

The case was at issue and on the celendar for the June, 1923, term. The court, on motion of the defendant, declined to proceed with the trial, and dismissed the action, upon the ground that its trial in Lyon county, or elsewhere in the state, would unduly interfere with and burden and unreasonably obstruct interstate commerce.

The action was brought under the federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665). The injury resulting in the death of the decedent occurred in defendant's railroad yards in Milwaukee, Wis. The plaintiff was appointed administrator by the probate court of Hennepin county, Minn. The relator claims that the deceased was a resident of Minnesota. The respondent claims that he was a resident of Wisconsin. For the purposes of this proceeding we assume that he resided in Wisconsin. The North Western is not incorporated under the laws of Minnesota. It owns and operates lines in Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. It has more than 650 miles of trackage in southern Minnesota. It has lines and stations in Lyon county, is doing business there, and service can be made there in accordance with the general laws of the state.

That it is the duty of a state court to exercise jurisdiction of a cause of action arising under the federal Employers' Liability Act, when its jurisdiction as prescribed by local law is adequate to the occasion and is properly invoked, admits of no doubt. In Hoxie v. N. Y., etc., Ry. Co., 82 Conn. 352, 73 Atl. 754,17 Ann. Cas. 324, the state court declined jurisdiction, though not because of a supposed interference with interstate commerce. It reaffirmed its holding in Mondou v. N. Y., etc., Ry. Co., 82 Conn. 373, 73 Atl. 762. The latter case was one of those under review in Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44. There the court, at page 56 of 223 U. S., at page 177 of 32 Sup. Ct. (56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. [N. S.] 44), speaking of the duty of the state court to exercise jurisdiction, said:

‘We are quite unable to assent to the view that the enforcement of the rights which the congressional act creates was originally intended to be restricted to the federal courts. The act contains nothing which is suggestive of such a restriction, and in this situation the intention of Congress was reflected by the provision in the general jurisdictional act, ‘That the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $2,000, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.’ August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, c. 866, § 1.'

And in closing a lengthy consideration of the questions involved, it said:

‘We conclude that rights arising under the act in question may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the states when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion.’

The same principle is held under the bankrupt act. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 23 L. Ed. 833.

The Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65, c. 149, in force when jurisdiction was invoked in the Mondou Case, contained no provision as to the jurisdiction of courts in actions arising under it. The general federal Jurisdiction Act (25 St. 433, c. 866, § 1), as noted in the Second Employers' Liability Cases, provided that the circuit, now district, courts of the United States should have original cognizance concurrent with the courts of the several states of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. By section 6 of the amendment of April 5, 1910 (36 St. 291, c. 143; U. S. Comp. St. § 8662), to the Employers' Liability Act, it is provided as follows:

‘Under this act an action may be brought in a circuit [now district] court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this act shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states, and no case arising under this act and brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.’

In Trapp v. B. & O. R. Co. (D. C.) 283 Fed. 655, the injuries for which the action was brought were sustained in Indiana. The plaintiff was a citizen of Indiana. The defendant was a railway corporation under the laws of Maryland and a citizen and inhabitant of that state. The action was brought in Ohio in a district in which the defendant maintained a system of interstate and intrastate steam railroads and did business. There was a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The court, referring to section 6 of the 1910 amendment, said:

‘By this amendment, an action arising under that act may be brought in any one of four places: (1) In the district of the residence of the defendant; (2) in the district in which the cause of action arose; (3) in the district in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action; (4) in any state court which by the laws of the state has cognizance of the cause of action and may acquire jurisdiction of the parties. The language of the first sentence of the amendment is clear and explicit. It confers upon an injured employé the privilege of bringing his action in any one of three districts of the United States. The privilege thus conferred is not controlled by nor dependent upon the jurisdiction conferred by a state upon its local courts.’

And referring to the provisions of an amendment, apparently Laws 1921, p. 81, to the Ohio General Code, § 11273, relative to actions against railroads, which was assumed to exclude concurrent jurisdiction in the state court because the injured employé did not reside and the cause of action did not arise in a county of the state, and so state jurisdiction could not be invoked, said:

‘Defendant's argument appears to be that this court cannot take jurisdiction unless the state courts of this district had concurrent jurisdiction, and since, by a recent amendment to section 11273, G. C. of Ohio, the concurrent jurisdiction formerly exercised by the state courts is tken away, then plaintiff's right to resort to this court likewise no longer exists. This contention, in my opinion, is not tenable. Neither section 6 as a whole, nor the last sentence thereof, permits of any such construction.

‘The purposes of the 1910 amendment are clearly set forth in the Senate Judiciary Committee's report recommending its enactment. An examination thereof will disclose its purposes to a lawyer familiar with the existing law, particularly the purpose of the last sentence. As appears from the authorities already cited, an injured employé basing his right of action upon the federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, even if diversity of citizenship existed, could have brought his action only in the district of which the defendant was an inhabitant. Consequently Congress intended an enlargement of the provisions of section 51, Judicial Code, so as to permit the suit to be brought in any one of the four places provided by the amendment.

‘The provisions of the last sentence of the amendment were not intended to limit the provisions of the first sentence, but were added for another and different purpose. It had been held by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, in Hoxie v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 82 Conn. 352, 73 Atl. 754,17 Ann. Cas. 324, that, inasmuch as Congress had by legislation assumed the control of the subject-matter of injuries to employés of interstate carriers while engaged in interstate commerce, no state court could take jurisdiction when such an employé's action was thus governed by the federal Employers' Liability Act. This holding was undoubtedly wrong, as is forcibly pointed out in the report, and as is shown by...