State ex rel. Schmill v. Carr
| Decision Date | 11 June 1947 |
| Citation | 203 S.W.2d 670,239 Mo.App. 939 |
| Parties | State of Missouri, ex rel., Sherwood Schmill, Clyde Bilyeu, Lee Sprowles, Guy L. Player, and I. R. Branson Realators v. Harry B. Carr, Mayor and Commissioner of Department of Safety and Public Affairs, Albert Ayer, Commissioner of Public Utilities, W. E. Handley, Commissioner of Health and Sanitation, Ruel N. Wommack, Commissioner of Revenue, and L. A. Weeks, Commissioner of Streets and Public Improvements, and all Members of City Council of the City of Springfield, Missouri, Respondents |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer Overruled June 30, 1947.
Original Proceeding in Mandamus.ALTERNATIVE WRIT MADE PERMANENT.
Farrington & Curtis and Jack S. Curtis for relators.
The Springfield Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus prayed for against members of the City Council of the City of Springfield. State of Missouri v. Corsuch, et al., 260 S.W. 455, 303 Mo. 295 (1924). State ex rel. Johnson v. Reagan, 76 S.W.2d 736, 229 Mo.App. 237 (1934). Village of Grandview v McElroy, 298 S.W. 760, 318 Mo. 135 (1934). State ex rel. Goldman v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, 32 S.W.2d 142, 225 Mo.App. 59 (1930). Missouri Constitution of 1945, Art. v., Secs. 3, 4 and 13. Houts, Missouri Pleading and Practice, Vol. 4, Sec. 1094. Ordinances passed by the City Council of a City of the second class are subject to a referendum vote. Sections 6625 and 6632 R. S. Mo., 1939. The declaration of an emergency by a legislative body is not conclusive but is subject to review by the courts. Edwards et al. v. City of St. Louis, 348 Mo. 1963, 156 S.W.2d 619; State ex rel Pollock v Becker, 289 Mo. 660, 233 S.W. 641 (1921); State ex rel. Astosky v. Reagan, 317 Mo. 1216, 298 S.W. 747; State ex rel. Westhues v. Sullivan 283 Mo. 546, 224 S.W. 327 (1920). In determining whether the ordinance is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace health and safety, the Court may consider facts surrounding its enactment. State ex rel. Goodman v. Stewart, 187 P. 641, 57 Mont. 144 (1920); Morgan v. City of Long Beach, 207 P. 53, 57 Cal.App. 134, (1922); State ex rel. Haynes v. District Court, 78 P.2d 937, Mont (1938); State ex rel. Rawlings v. Kansas City, 250 S.W. 927 (Mo. App. 1923); State ex rel. Veeder v. State Board of Education 33 P.2d 516 (Mont. 1934); City of St. Louis v. Pope 126 S.W.2d 1201 (Mo. 1938); State ex rel. Pollock v. Becker, 233 S.W. 641, 289 Mo. 660 (1921); Ordinance No. 425 is essentially a revenue measure and not a police regulation. Kansas City v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 87 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. 1935); Edmonds v. City of St. Louis 126 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1941); Viquasney v. Kansas City 266 S.W. 700 (Mo. 1924); Wilhoit v. City of Springfield 171 S.W.2d (Mo. App. 1943); State v. Parker Distilling Co. 139 S.W. 453 (Mo. 1911). Police regulation must be emergent to be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety and to be exempt from referendum and the mere fact that measure is a police measure does not warrant the passage of it with an emergency clause. State ex rel. Westhues v. Sullivan 224 S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546 (1920); Ex Parte Hoffman 99 P. 517 (Cal. Sup. 1909); State ex rel. Haynes v. District Court 78 P.2d 937 (Mont. 1938); State ex rel. Case v. Howell 147 P. 1162 (Wash. 1915); State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath 147 P. 11 (Wash. 1915) Sec. 6625 R. S. Mo. 1939. Statements of Respondents are competent as direct or original evidence as admissions against interest. 31 C. J. S. 1094, 1152, 1099; Brookfield v. Drury College, 123 S.W. 86 (Mo. App. 1909); Spoeneman v. Uhri 60 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1933); Partney v. Agers 187 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. App. 1945); Tappe v. Pohlmann, 79 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. App. 1935); Faulkner v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 13 S.W.2d 1088, (Mo. App. 1929); Fawkes v. National Refining Co., 108 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1937). A Witness may properly refresh her recollection from newspaper articles written by her. 70 Corpus Juris 577; Fagan v. Brock Motor Car Co., 282 S.W. 135 (Mo. App. 1926); State v. Patton, 164 S.W. 223 (Mo. 1914); Eberson v. Investment Co., 130 Mo.App. 296 (1908); Lay v. The Railroad, 157 Mo.App. 467 (1911); Thos. Cusack Co. v. Lubrite Refining Co., 261 S.W. 727 (1924). Respondents are confined to the statement of urgency contained in Ordinance No. 425 and evidence of the financial condition of the City of Springfield in 1946 is inadmissible. Section 6625 R. S. Mo. 1939; Ex. Parte Hoffman 99 P. 517 (Cal. 1909); Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 126 P. 594, 163 Cal. 621 (1912). Respondents Exhibit 7, being Resolution No. 2025 is not a part of and has no bearing on Ordinance No. 425 or the emergency clause thereof and should not be admitted in evidence. State ex. rel. Hunzicker v. Pulliam 37 P.2d 417 (Okla 1934); U.S. v. Smith 286 U.S. 6, 52 S.C. 475, 76 Law (Ed) 954 (1932). Respondents pleaded defense that the financial condition of the City on September 30, 1946 justified the emergency clause in Ordinance No. 425 is beyond the scope of the Ordinance as passed and is therefore an affirmative defense and Respondents have the burden of proof upon that issue if the Court deems it material. 31 C. J. S. 713, 714 (Sec. 104).
Miller & Fairman for respondents.
The burden of proof was upon Relators to affirmatively prove their case, and within the issues framed in their petitions, by the preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing proof and this they have failed to do. State ex rel. v. McIntosh, 205 Mo. 610, 103 S.W. 1078; State ex rel. v. City of St. Louis (Mo. App.) 136 S.W.2d 350; State ex rel. v. School District, 335 Mo. 803, 74 S.W.2d 30; State ex rel. v. Town School District, 136 S.W.2d 353; State ex rel. v. Kelly (Mo. App.) 142 S.W.2d 1091; State ex rel. v. Thomas et al., 203 Mo.App. 452, 220 S.W. 702; Adair Drainage Dist. v. Quincy, O., K. C. R. Co., 280 Mo. 244, 217 S.W. 70, 38 Corpus Juris 914. Relators fail to show themselves to have a clear and legal right to the remedy for which they pray upon the basis upon which they have asked it. The Commissioner in his report to the Court has overlooked and misconstrued the issues upon which he is passing as defined and limited by the pleadings and has given no heed to where the burden of proof rests. Ex parte Ashcraft 193 Mo.App. 486, 186 S.W. 532; State ex rel. v. Thomas et al., 203 Mo.App. 452, 220 S.W. 702; State ex rel. v. Aldermen of Pierce City 91 Mo. 445; 3 S.W. 849; State ex rel. v. Becker, 291 Mo. 409, 237 S.W. 117, 120; State ex rel. v. Boonville R. Bridge Co., 206 Mo. 74, 103 S.W. 1052; Adair Drainage Dist. v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R. Co., 280 Mo. 244, 217 S.W. 70; State ex rel. v. City of St. Louis (Mo. App.) 136 S.W.2d 350; 38 Corpus Juris 914. A writ of Mandamus will not issue in doubtful cases. State ex rel. v. Armstrong 9 S.W.2d 600; State ex rel. v. Kelly 142 S.W.2d 1091. A writ of Mandamus is not a writ of right. Its issuance lies in the sound judicial discretion of the Court, and such discretion should not be exercised unless the Relator proves by clear and convincing proof a clear, legal right to the relief demanded upon the issues and allegations on which he demands such relief. State ex rel. v. Smith, 330 Mo. 252, 48 S.W.2d 891, 81 A. L. R. 1066; State ex rel. v. Kansas City Gas Co., 254 Mo. 515, 163 S.W. 854; State ex rel. v. Hudson 226 Mo. 239, 126 S.W. 733; State ex rel. v. Stone, 269 Mo. 334, 190 S.W. 601; State ex rel. v. Dickey, 28 Mo. 536, 219 S.W. 363; Adair Drainage Dist. v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R. Co., 280 Mo. 244, 217 S.W. 70; State ex rel v. State Board of Embalmers, 297 Mo. 607, 250 S.W. 44; State ex rel. Mt. Pleasant Twp. v. Hall 304 Mo. 83, 262 S.W. 720; State ex rel. v. Thompson 316 Mo. 1169, 293 S.W. 391. The determination of the City Council in passing the cigarette ordinance that an emergency existed for the preservation of peace, health and safety is not binding upon the Court, but is prima facie true and to be given great weight. It should not be set aside unless the Court finds bad faith on the part of the City Council. The Court's Commissioner, in passing upon this case and making his recommendations, excepted to, has viewed the issues on the basis that it is for the City Council to sustain its position. Such is not true, but to the contrary the ordinance and the existence of the emergency declared is prima facie true and should be given great weight, which was entirely overlooked by the Court's Commissioner. State ex rel. v. Cave 180 S.W. 631; Potter v. City of Compton, 59 P.2d 537; England v. City of Long Beach, 158 P.2d 589; State ex rel Skillman v. City of Miami, 134 So. 541; Austin Western Road Machinery Company v. City of New Madrid, 185 S.W.2d 850; Geisendaffer v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 3 A.2d 860-Atl. (2d) 460; McQuillan's Sec. Add., Municipal Corporations Vol. 4, Page 121, Sec. 951; McQuillan's Sec. Add., Municipal Corporations, Vol. 2, Page 734, Sec. 702. The Commissioner erred in holding that the ordinance was a purely revenue raising ordinance. The ordinance is both a regulartory ordinance under the Police power of the City and a taxing or revenue measure. An ordinance can serve both purposes. Ploch v. City of St. Louis 138 S.W.2d 1020; Asotsky v. Regan, 317 Mo. 1216, 298 S.W. 747; Ex parte Asotsky 5 S.W.2d 22; Viquesney v. Kansas City, 266 S.W. 700, l. c. 702. The cigarette is recognized in Missouri as a harmful commodity pecularly subject to the regulatory police powers of cities. Ploch v. City of St. Louis, 138 S.W.2d 1020, 345 Mo. 1069; Section 7357, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939; Sections 4657 and 4658 Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939.
The parties in this case...
To continue reading
Request your trial