State ex rel. School Dist. No. 92 of Clark County v. State Finance Committee of Washington, 25223.
| Decision Date | 18 August 1934 |
| Docket Number | 25223. |
| Citation | 178 Wash. 565,35 P.2d 500 |
| Parties | STATE et rel. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 92 OF CLARK COUNTY et al. v. STATE FINANCE COMMITTEE OF WASHINGTON et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Original proceeding in mandamus by the State of Washington, on the relation of School District No. 92 of Clark County Washington, and others, against the State Finance Committee of the State of Washington and the State Auditor.
Writ of mandate denied.
G. W Hamilton and W. A. Toner, both of Olympia, for respondents.
Relators by this proceeding seek the issuance of a writ of mandate directed to the respondents requiring them, in accordance with the bid of the state finance committee, to consummate the purchase of a certain issue of bonds, to accept the bonds as tendered by the school district, and to issue a warrant in payment therefor.
The material facts are undisputed. It appears that the school district, a duly organized school district of Clark county proceeding under the law as it then existed and at a session of its directors held on April 3, 1934, adopted a resolution providing for the construction and equipment of an addition to the high school building in that district and for the issuance of the bonds of the school district in the aggregate amount of $8,000 for the purpose of providing funds to meet the cost of such improvement; that on the same date a notice of a special school district bond election was prepared and signed by the clerk of the school district, giving notice of a special bond election to be held under the resolution on May 5, 1934. All of this occurred Before chapter 29 of the Session Laws of the Extraordinary Session of 1933 (page 76) became effective. That act, however, under the Constitution did become effective on or about the 12th day of April, 1934. Thereafter, disregarding that act, the clerk of the school district caused copies of such election notice to be posted on April 18, 1934, and thereafter, in pursuance of such notice, a special election was held at the place appointed on the day named in the notice and, proceeding under the old law, from among the voters first appearing at the polls election officers were selected who duly qualified. The election was held, and the election board so constituted certified returns showing that the bonds had been authorized by the voters, and thereafter on May 7, 1934, the directors of the district certified such election returns to the county treasurer of the county. Proper proceedings were had calling for bids, and the state finance committee submitted a bid which was accepted by the directors of the school district as being in their opinion the best bid submitted for the bonds. Thereafter a transcript of all of such proceedings was furnished to the state finance committee and the bonds were apparently tendered to it in accordance with its bid. The state finance committee refused to consummate the purchase of the bonds because of noncompliance by the school district with chapter 29 of the Extraordinary Session of 1933.
The question here presented is, therefore, whether chapter 29 affects the present situation and, if so, to what extent?
Relators seem to contend, first, that the proceedings having been initiated Before chapter 29 became effective, they were at liberty to proceed under the old law; second, that chapter 29 is not applicable to school elections in any event; and, third, that chapter 29 is so incomplete, ambiguous, and uncertain as to be wholly unworkable and is therefore invalid and of no force and effect whatsoever.
The first question seems simple. There is no saving clause in chapter 29 and, even if we consider that the adoption of the resolution calling an election was the initial point of the proceedings, still the directors of the district were bound to take notice of the enactment of chapter 29 and of the fact that it would go into effect ninety days after the adjournment of the Legislature and to so time their action as to complete the proceedings Before the old law ceased to be, or else to delay the initiatory action until the new law became effective. We are, however, inclined to the view that the proceedings, so far as obtaining authority from the voters is concerned, were initiated by the posting of the notices of the election and those notices were clearly posted after chapter 29 became effective.
The second question also seems simple when our various statutory provisions preceding the enactment of chapter 29 are understood.
Chapter 29 reads:
The language 'shall constitute the election board for all elections' is sweepingly broad, and we find nothing in the act or in previous legislation upon the subject which warrants us in any wise narrowing the effect of the broad language used.
By the second section of the act (page 77), section 5 of chapter 61 of the Laws of 1921 (page 181), section 1 of chapter 79 of the Laws of 1933 (page 373), and section 3 of chapter 170 of the Laws of 1921 (page 666), section 2 of chapter 279 of the Laws of 1927 (page 675), are all repealed as well as all other acts or parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of chapter 29. Looking to these prior acts, we find that section 5 of chapter 61 of the Laws of 1921 as amended became section 5147, Rem. Rev. Stat., and that it provides for an election board consisting of the chairman of the board of county commissioners, the county auditor, and prosecuting attorney in class A counties and counties of the first class. Likewise, section 3 of chapter 170 of the Laws of 1921 as amended, now section 5152, Rem. Rev. Stat., provided for a like constituted board as an election board in counties other than class A and first-class counties. Therefore, heretofore under these separate acts just such an election board, as is created by chapter 29, has functioned throughout the state in all counties and all elections save only as other provisions of the law created exceptions.
Section 1 of chapter 279 of the Laws of 1927 (page 673), among other things, provides: 'Provided further, That this act shall not apply to general or special elections for any purpose in second or third class school districts, but all such elections of second and third class school districts in other than class A or first class counties, in any port district containing a school district of the first class, shall be held and the school district officers of such districts shall be elected and qualified, for the term, at the time and in the manner provided for school districts of the same class by chapters XX, XXI, XXXIII, XXXVII, and XXXVIII, of Title XXVIII, Remington's Compiled Statutes.'
Therefore, prior to the taking effect of chapter 29, elections in second and third class school districts in certain counties, and situated as is the school district here involved, were specifically exempted from coming under the county election board and were permitted to hold elections by virtue of other laws.
The Legislature, of course, well understood this situation and, with the plain intent and purpose of bringing all elections of every kind under the control and direction of a county election board, enacted chapter 29 with its broad language relating to all elections and repealed all acts or parts of acts in conflict therewith, among which by the plainest implication was section 1 of chapter 279 of the Laws of 1927.
Hence, it necessarily follows that from and after the taking effect of chapter 29 no election could legally be held except under the direction and control of the county election board as established by that chapter.
The third question presented is somewhat difficult to answer intelligently without proceeding to lay down a set of advisory rules for the government of all interested, which, of course, is not within our province.
Since for a considerable number of years all elections in the various counties of the state, save only elections in second and third class school districts, have been successfully carried on without resulting in litigation which has reached this court, we can only assume that the election boards have found the law workable.
As we...
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