State ex rel. School Dist. No. 29, Flathead County, v. Cooney

• Decision Date: 26 June 1936
• Docket Number: 7514.
• Citation: 59 P.2d 48,102 Mont. 521
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 29, FLATHEAD COUNTY, et al. v. COONEY, Governor, et al.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

59 P.2d 48

102 Mont. 521

STATE ex rel. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 29, FLATHEAD COUNTY, et al. v. COONEY, Governor, et al.

No. 7514.

Supreme Court of Montana

June 26, 1936

Appeal from District Court, Lewis and Clark County; George W Padbury, Jr., Judge.

Mandamus proceeding by the State of Montana, on the relation of School District No. 29, Flathead County, Mont., and others comprising the board of trustees of said school district against Frank H. Cooney, Governor of the state of Montana and others, comprising the state board of education of the state of Montana. Judgment for relators, and the defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with instructions.

Raymond T. Nagle, Atty. Gen., and Jeremiah J. Lynch, Asst. Atty Gen., for appellants.

S. C. Ford and Sam D. Goza, Jr., both of Helena, for respondents.

MORRIS Justice.

The petition in this action was filed in the district court for Lewis and Clark county July 23, 1935, and alleges, in substance, that school district No. 29, Flathead county, Mont., has maintained an accredited 2-year high school for a period of 16 years; that "during the school year 1934-1935," the board of trustees determined it was for the best interests of the school to provide for a third year of high school work; that the prescribed course of study as required by the state board of education was provided for, duly installed, and given by competent instructors, and by reason of the school's compliance with the standards fixed by the state board it has become the duty of the state board to accredit the plaintiff school as a 3-year high school; that demand was made upon the state board for such accrediting, and by the state board arbitrarily and capriciously denied. This action followed.

The alternative writ and order to show cause were issued as prayed for, and served. Defendants appeared and moved to quash the writ on the grounds that the affidavit upon which the writ was based did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action nor entitled the plaintiffs to the relief sought; the motion was taken under advisement, and, without waiving any rights under the motion, defendants answered and proceeded to trial. The motion to quash was later overruled. The answer denies all the material allegations of the petition. When the matter came on for hearing, defendants objected to the introduction of any evidence; the objection was overruled, testimony was received on behalf of the plaintiffs, and both parties introduced numerous exhibits. The matter was taken under advisement by the court, and on September 28, 1935, judgment was made and entered in favor of the plaintiffs and the peremptory writ issued. This appeal is from the judgment.

Defendants assign three specifications of error: (1) The court erred in overruling defendants' motion to quash; (2) the court erred in overruling defendants' objection to the introduction of any evidence; and (3) the court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs directing that the peremptory writ issue. The assignments of error all involve the power of the court to issue the writ of mandate under the circumstances, and the assignments will be considered as a whole.

It is obvious that the controversy arises out of a misconception of the relative functions of the state board of education and the superintendent of public instruction, on the one hand, and the local board of school trustees, on the other. Certain duties and powers are vested in the former, and others in the local board, and each, acting within the law, is supreme in its respective sphere so long as no act is done arbitrarily or capriciously. Among the duties imposed upon the state educational officials, generally speaking, is that of establishing and maintaining a general uniform and thorough system of public instruction. A specific duty is that they shall establish uniform standards of study and maintain certain standards to which all local schools must conform before such local schools are entitled to be placed upon the accredited list. Certain powers of local control and management are vested in the local school board, such as the employment of teachers, the admission of students from other districts, the selection of school sites, etc. Both the state board and superintendent and the local board are quasijudicial bodies or officials, and both exercise discretionary powers (School District No. 2 v. Richards, 62 Mont. 141, 205 P. 206; State ex rel. Stephens v. Keaster, 82 Mont. 126, 266 P. 387), and when such powers are exercised in the manner prescribed by law, no right of review exists. This phase of the controversy will be adverted to later.

We think a review of the powers and duties, respectively, of the state board of education, the superintendent of public instruction, the board of trustees of the school district, and consideration of the facts as shown by the record, will readily suggest the correct determination of the controversy.

The state board of education is a constitutional board (article 11, § 11); that section of the Constitution provides in part: "The general control and supervision of the state university and the various other state educational institutions shall be vested in a state board of education, whose powers and duties shall be prescribed and regulated by law. The said board shall consist of eleven members." The following mandate is imposed upon the Legislature by the Constitution: "It shall be the duty of the legislative assembly of Montana to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free, common schools." Article 11, § 1. The state board of education is a part of the executive department of the state government. State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Brannon, 86 Mont. 200, 283 P. 202, 67 A.L.R. 1020. The provision of the Constitution first above mentioned vests in the state board general control over and supervision of all state educational matters, including district and high schools. State ex rel. Stephens v. Keaster, supra. The state board may prescribe and accredit such high schools as maintain the standards prescribed. Subsection 4, § 836, Rev.Codes 1921. It shall have power, and it shall be its duty, to adopt rules and regulations for the execution of the duties and powers conferred. Subsection 2, § 836, Id.; see, also, section 70, ch. 148, Laws of 1931.

The superintendent of public instruction is one of the seven executive officers of the state provided for by the Constitution (article 7, § 1); a constitutional member of the state board of land commissioners having control of the school lands (article 11, § 4); a constitutional member of the state board of education (article 11, § 11). By statute the superintendent has supervision of all public schools of the state, subject to general supervision of the state board (section 932, Rev.Codes 1921), and must report annually to the Governor (section 939, Id.); "shall prepare, or cause to be prepared, with the co-operation and approval of such educators as may be named by the state board of education, a course of study for all the public elementary and high schools of the state, and shall prescribe to what extent the same is to be used" (section 941, Id.); shall decide all appeals from decisions of county superintendents (section 943, Id.); shall be the secretary of the state board of education (section 833, Id.); shall have general supervision over the budgets of elementary schools and the enforcement thereof (section 25, ch. 146, Laws of 1931); on approval of the state board of education, shall appoint a supervisor of high schools who shall inspect all such schools of the state and report from time to time (section 69, ch. 148, Laws of 1931.) "When the Board of Trustees of any school district desires to establish a high school, it shall petition the Superintendent of Public Instruction, prior to June first of the current year for the permission to do so. *** An investigation shall be made thereafter by a designated representative of the Superintendent of Public Instruction and his report on the petition filed with it before the petition is acted upon. The Superintendent of Public Instruction must have passed favorably on any such petition before the high school proposed may be established by the district." Chapter 9, Laws of 1933, amending section 38 of chapter 148, Laws of 1931.

A school district is a public corporation, a political subdivision of the state; its board of trustees are its directors and managing officers. McNair v. School District No. 1, of Cascade County, 87 Mont. 423, 288 P. 188, 69 A.L.R. 866; Henderson v. School District No. 44, 75 Mont. 154, 242 P. 979; State ex rel. School District No. 4, Rosebud County v. McGraw, 74 Mont. 152, 240 P. 812. A school board cannot act except through its board of directors, and in a formal meeting. Day v. School District No. 21, 98 Mont. 207, 38 P.2d 595; Dierks Special School District v. Van Dyke, 152 Ark. 27, 237 S.W. 428; Daugherty v. Board of Education 86 W.Va. 522, 103 S.E. 406; Cloverdale Union High School District v. Peters, 88 Cal.App. 731, 264 P. 273. A regularly convened session is essential to the validity of the act of such a public body. The statute vests the power to act in the board, not in the individual members. Day v. School District No. 21, supra; Board of Education v. American Nat. Co., 135 Okl. 253, 275 P. 285; Coleman v. District of Columbia, 51 App.D.C. 352, 279 F. 990.

The structure outlined in the mandatory provisions of the Constitution heretofore quoted looking to the establishment of a system of free public schools, and perfected by legislative act, is built around the state board of education and the superintendent of public instruction. Both of these state agencies are executive in...