State ex rel. Schwanke v. Utecht

• Decision Date: 22 March 1951
• Docket Number: No. 35505,35505
• Citation: 233 Minn. 434,47 N.W.2d 99
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SCHWANKE v. UTECHT.

Page 99

47 N.W.2d 99

233 Minn. 434

STATE ex rel. SCHWANKE v. UTECHT.

No. 35505.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 22, 1951.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Although the record may not contain, as it should, a formal plea of guilty, an adjudication of guilt based on such a plea is not subject to attack if the record of the proceedings leading to the sentence of the accused unmistakably establishes that he did in fact plead guilty.

2. A warrant in a criminal case has the sole function of giving the court jurisdiction over the person of the accused By bringing him in person before the court to answer the charge made against him; and, once the accused is before the court, the warrant becomes wholly inoperative and any defect therein ceases to be material.

3. By entering a plea of either guilty or not guilty in a criminal prosecution, a person waives objection to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.

4. Good practice not only requires that the court, before arraignment, inform the defendant, In precise terms, of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel but that such informative action by the court Be made a matter of record.

5. The denial of certain constitutional rights--as well as certain statutory rights--Where the right to due process of law is left unimpaired is not fatal to the jurisdiction of the court, And the error resulting from such denial is to be corrected through appeal and not by resorting to the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus.

6. Habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for a writ of error or appeal or as a cover for a collateral attack upon a judgment of a competent tribunal which had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the defendant, and this principle is applicable even though defendant has permitted the time for appeal to elapse.

Alfred A. Donaghue and John R. Carey, Minneapolis, for appellant.

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., Ralph A. Stone, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

MATSON, Justice.

Upon relator's appeal from an order of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, respondent moves for a dismissal of the appeal.

On March 24, 1948, a sworn complaint was made and filed in the municipal court of Mankato, Minnesota, charging that appellant committed the crime of carnal knowledge with a female child on or about October 20, 1946. Subsequently a warrant was issued on the basis of the complaint alleging that the above crime was committed on October 20, 1948. Appellant was arrested and brought before the municipal court where he waived the reading of the complaint and the preliminary hearing but reserved the privilege of returning and asking for such hearing later. Thereafter on March 24, 1948, he made a written application to the court Stating that he wished to plead guilty and that he desired the court to issue an order directing the county attorney to file an information against him for such crime of carnal knowledge. The order was issued. Appellant was thereupon bound over to the district court.

We are not advised as to what occurred between March 24, 1948, and April 8, 1948--the date sentence was imposed. It appears, however, from the transcript of the proceedings before the district court on April 8, 1948, that prior thereto an information had been filed and that upon arraignment appellant entered a plea of guilty. On the day of sentence, Carl W. Peterson was formally appointed counsel for appellant, and appellant was sentenced upon his plea of guilty for the crime of carnal knowledge committed on October 20, 1946.

Appellant asserts that he was illegally convicted upon the following grounds:

(a) That he was sentenced without a plea of guilty or without a verdict of guilty by a jury.

(b) That his arrest was illegal in that the warrant under which he was arrested charged the commission of a crime on October 20, 1948, whereas the complaint upon which the warrant was based alleged the commission of a crime on October 20, 1946.

(c) That he did not have the assistance of counsel.

1. Appellant's contention that sentence was imposed without a formal plea of guilty is without merit. If we were to hold otherwise, we should be exalting the shadow of a meaningless technicality for substance. Although the record may not contain, as it should, a formal plea of guilty, an adjudication of guilt based on such a plea is not subject to attack if the record of the proceedings leading to the sentence of the accused unmistakably establishes that he did in fact plead guilty. In appellant's written application to the court for an order directing that an information be filed against him, he expressed the Desire to plead guilty. That he subsequently did plead guilty sufficiently appears from the recorded proceedings on the day he was sentenced. Immediately before sentence was imposed, before the court and In the presence of appellant, the county attorney in moving for the imposition of sentence said that relator 'has made his request to plead guilty, And he has so plead.' (Italics supplied.) The court then sentenced appellant in the following words:

'You, Carl T. Schwanke, Upon your own plea of guilty stand convicted of the crime of carnal knowledge of a female child, said crime having been committed on the 20th day of October, 1946.' (Italics supplied.)

2--3. The warrant, pursuant to which appellant was arrested and brought before the court, erroneously stated that the crime was committed on October 20, 1948. The complaint, information, and sentence, however, all gave the correct date as October 20, 1946. The typographical error in the warrant did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction. A warrant in a criminal case has the sole function of giving the court jurisdiction over the person of the accused By bringing him in person before the court to answer the charge made against him; and, once the accused is before the court, the warrant becomes wholly inoperative and any defect therein ceases to be material. State v. Nugent, 108 Minn. 267, 121 N.W. 898; State v. Binder, 190 Minn. 305, 251 N.W. 665; 2 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 2433. The warrant itself confers no jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the person has its commencement with, and its sole foundation in, the actual presence of the accused before the court. It has been held that once a court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused, such jurisdiction is not subject to attack because no warrant was issued, ¹ or the warrant was technically defective in that, for example, it contained no specification as to bail, ² or the warrant related to a different criminal charge from that upon which the accused was tried, ³ or the arrest of the accused was illegal ⁴ or he was illegally brought into the state. ⁵ Under the complaint, the court had jurisdiction of the offense, and by his presence in court jurisdiction was acquired over the person. We do not mean to say that in the event of an illegal arrest there may not be, in certain cases, a remedy by appropriate action for that wrong. Furthermore, aside from the immateriality of the defect or typographical error in the warrant of arrest, appellant, by reason of his plea of guilty, is in no position to challenge the jurisdiction of the court. By entering a plea of either guilty or not guilty in a criminal posecution, a person waives objection to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. State v. Warner, 165 Minn. 79, 205 N.W. 692; State ex rel. Brown v. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn. 534, 53 N.W. 799; 2 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 2421.

4. Was appellant denied the assistance of counsel in violation of Minn. Const. art. I, § 6, M.S.A., and in violation of the due process clause of both Minn. Const. art. I, § 7, and U.S.Const.Amend. XIV? It is elementary that the right to counsel guaranteed by the U.S.Const. Amend. VI, has no application to a state criminal prosecution. ⁶ Minn.Const. art. I, § 6, gives the defendant the right to have the assistance of counsel in his defense. ⁷ It is also provided by M.S.A. § 630.10 that:

'If the defendant shall appear for arraignment without counsel, he shall be informed by the court that it is his right to have counsel Before being arraigned, and shall be asked if he desires the aid of counsel.' (Italics supplied.)

It goes without saying that good practice not only requires that the court, before arraignment, inform the defendant, In precise terms, of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel but that such informative action by the court Be made a matter of record. State v. McDonnell, 165 Minn. 423, 206 N.W. 952. Here the record does not show that appellant had counsel at his arraignment or that, if...