State ex rel. Scott v. Superior Court for Thurston County

• Citation: 173 Wash. 547,24 P.2d 87
• Decision Date: 18 July 1933
• Docket Number: 24640.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SCOTT v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THURSTON COUNTY et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

24 P.2d 87

173 Wash. 547

STATE ex rel. SCOTT v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THURSTON COUNTY et al.

No. 24640.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

July 18, 1933

Petition by the State, on the relation of Kenneth Scott, against the Superior Court for Thurston County, and Hon. D. F. Wright one of the judges thereof, whereby a judgment dismissing an action was brought to the Supreme Court for review.

Judgment affirmed.

Edwin H. Flick and Herald A. O'Neill, both of Seattle, for petitioner.

G. W Hamilton and W. J. Lindberg, both of Olympia, for respondents.

Charles S. Albert, of Seattle, Reuben C. Carlson, of Tacoma, and Thomas Balmer, of Seattle, amici curiae.

MAIN, Justice.

By this action it is sought to enjoin the defendants as state officers from enforcing the provisions of chapter 166, Laws of 1933 (page 613). To the complaint, a demurrer was interposed and sustained. From the judgment dismissing the action, the plaintiff brings the case here for review.

The plaintiff, as relator, says that the act is unconstitutional because it denies to him what is guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The title of the act relates to transportation by motor vehicles over the public highways of this state, and provides for the supervision regulation, and taxation thereof and the payment of certain fees. In the act, transportation by motor vehicles is divided into four classes, 'certified operator,' 'contract hauler,' 'for hire carrier,' and 'private carrier.' We are here concerned only with the classifications of 'contract hauler' and 'for hire carrier.'

Subdivision f of section 1 defines 'contract hauler' to mean 'Every person owning, controlling, operating or managing any motor vehicle used in the business of transporting property for compensation, other than as a certified operator, over any public highway between fixed termini or over a regular route, not operating exclusively within the incorporated limits of any city or town: Provided, That the term 'contract hauler' shall not include any person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any motor vehicle operated exclusively in transporting agricultural horticultural, or dairy or other farm products from the point of production to the market.'

It will be observed that from the definition of 'contract hauler' is specifically excluded any person engaged in transporting 'agricultural, horticultural, or dairy or other farm products.' This proviso does not set the haulers of such products outside of the provisions of the act, but only eliminates such transportation from the classification of 'contract hauler.'

Section 13 defines the term 'for hire carrier' to mean: 'Every person, owning, controlling, operating or managing any motor vehicle used in the business of transporting property for compensation over any public highway, except such persons as are included in the terms 'certificated [certified] operator' and 'contract hauler' as hereinBefore defined, not operating exclusively within the incorporated limits of any city or town.'

By this definition, it is said that 'every person' shall be within its classification except 'certified operator' and 'contract hauler.' 'Every person,' of course, would necessarily include those transporting by motor vehicles agricultural, horticultural, dairy, and other farm products, and the haulers of such products are thus brought definitely within the provisions of the act, and are under the classification of 'for hire carriers.'

We do not understand it to be contended that, if the carriers of agricultural, horticultural, dairy, or other farm products are within the classification of 'for hire carriers,' the rights of the relator have been invaded.

The cases of Louis v. Boynton (D. C.) 53 F. (2d) 471 Nutt v. Ellerbe (D. C.) 56 F. (2d) 1058, and Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1464, relied upon by the relator as controlling, are not in point. In each of those cases, the court was considering a statute regulating transportation over the public highways by motor vehicles in which the transportation of agricultural, horticultural, and dairy products was expressly excluded from the provisions of the act. As we have seen, there is no ...