State ex rel. Scotten v. Brill
| Decision Date | 10 July 1894 |
| Docket Number | 8925 |
| Citation | 59 N.W. 989,58 Minn. 152 |
| Parties | State ex rel. Frederick Scotten et al. v. Hascal R. Brill, District Judge |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Argued June 21, 1894
Certiorari issued out of this court on the relation of Frederick Scotten and twenty two others to Hascal R. Brill one of the judges of the District Court of Ramsey County requiring him to certify and return to this court the record files and proceedings remaining in that court before him in the proceedings to establish Indian Mound Park in the City of St. Paul and assess the benefits arising therefrom in part upon adjacent real estate.
Judgment reversed.
S. L. Pierce and Edward G. Rogers, for relators.
In making the assessment the district was divided into three subdistricts. Assessment was based on the location of the lots exclusively. There were pieces of unplatted land. In assessing these the board took into consideration how the piece of property would cut up, what town lots it would make, and pet a value on each proposed lot estimating six lots to the acre. There is a lake in the assessment district owned by one of the relators. This was assessed as lots. It made no difference whether it was hill or hollow, farm land or swamp, the same benefit was assessed. State ex rel. v. Judges of District Court, 51 Minn. 539; State ex rel. v. District Court, 33 Minn. 295; People ex rel. v. Mayor, 63 N.Y. 291; State ex rel. v. District Court, 47 Minn. 406.
Leon T. Chamberlain, city attorney, and Walter L. Chapin, for respondent.
The board knew the character and topography of the land assessed. They considered the property and the size and number of the lots which could be carved out of unplatted property as one of the elements bearing on the benefits assessed. They did not labor under any mistake of fact. They exercised their best judgment. A large park specially benefits a large area of contiguous territory. The special benefits do not depend so much on the topography of the land as on proximity to the park, and, the assessments being comparatively small, it would not be practicable or reasonable to vary the amounts according to the height or depth of the property above or below the street grades. The judgment of the board must stand unless impeached for fraud or mistake of fact, as has been held many times by this court under the St. Paul Charter. Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494; Carpenter v. City of St. Paul, 23 Minn. 232; State ex rel. v. Board of Public Works, 27 Minn. 442; State ex rel. v. District Court, 29 Minn. 62; State ex rel. v. District Court, 33 Minn. 164; State ex rel. v. District Court, 33 Minn. 295; State ex rel. v. District Court, 47 Minn. 406.
Mitchell, J. Buck, J., absent, sick, took no part.
Certiorari to review the judgment of the District Court confirming assessments against relators' property for benefits from a proposed improvement, called "Indian Mound Park," on Dayton's bluff, in St. Paul. The relators assail the validity of the park act (Sp. Laws 1891, ch. 35) on the following grounds:
First, that it makes no adequate provision for the payment of compensation for land taken;
Second, it authorizes local assessments for improvements which are not certain to be made;
Third, it requires that there be added to the damages for land taken an amount sufficient to provide for interest probable to accrue before the assessments can be collected;
Fourth, it authorizes unequal taxation.
The first and second objections are practically the same, the latter being a mere corollary from the former. In Re Lincoln Park, 44 Minn. 299, (46 N.W. 355,) the former park act was held invalid on this ground; that is, because the park fund, which was the only source from which land taken was to be paid for, was limited in amount, and might be inadequate to meet the demands upon it. The present act is not obnoxious to this objection.
At the outset, there is a park fund derived from the sale of city bonds. After designating the lands to be acquired for a particular park, the park board are required to determine how much of the cost, not exceeding 40 per cent., shall be paid out of this fund, "as the same then exists," and at the same time to appropriate and set apart such amount from the moneys "then in the park fund" towards payment of any damages awarded in such condemnation proceedings, which "shall be applicable to no other purpose whatever." They are then required to order the board of public works to proceed and ascertain the amount of damages or compensation to be paid for taking the land, and to assess the amount of such damages and expenses, less the amount appropriated out of the park fund, on the property specially benefited. Adequate means are provided for making and collecting these assessments with all reasonable speed. The assessments, when collected, are to be applied only to pay for the park for which they were made. If the assessments are not paid, provision is made for selling the land assessed. In case there are no purchasers, the land is struck off in the name of the city. If the city is unable to sell the certificates of sale within thirty days, it is required forthwith to issue certificates of indebtedness for the amount of the certificates of sale held by it. These certificates of indebtedness are the absolute obligations of the city.
The owners of the property taken are allowed interest on the damages awarded from the date of the award until thirty days after publication of notice that there is sufficient money in the treasury ready to pay them. This notice the city treasurer is required to give as soon as there is sufficient money in the treasury with which to pay the damages awarded, and not until then is the city authorized to enter and take possession of the property. It would be difficult to contrive any system, short of requiring all the money to be in the city treasury in advance of initiation of any proceedings, that would more fully secure payment of compensation to those whose property is taken. Whatever uncertainty there is about it is only such as is necessarily incident to all human transactions. The relators, however claim that the proviso to Sp. Laws 1891, ch. 35, § 37, p. 266, (St. Paul Municipal Code 1893, § 441), limiting city indebtedness exclusive of such as then existed, for park purposes, to $ 500,000, introduces an element of uncertainty as to the payment of compensation. If this argument is sound, we do not see why, on the same ground, every act authorizing the exercise of eminent domain by any municipal corporation would not be invalid, wherever there is a limitation upon the amount of indebtedness which it may contract. But, whatever else this proviso may mean, it is certain that it cannot affect the validity of any proceedings to acquire land for park purposes until the city indebtedness for such purposes reaches the limit. If, after the limit is reached, the park board is deprived of power to initiate proceedings for any new park, such want of power can be invoked in that particular instance. It has nothing to do with the constitutionality of the law, or with the power of the board to proceed while keeping within...
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