State ex rel. Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services v. Castro

• Decision Date: 08 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 56075,56075
• Citation: 235 Kan. 704,684 P.2d 379
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, ex rel. SECRETARY OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony J. CASTRO, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 379

684 P.2d 379

235 Kan. 704

STATE of Kansas, ex rel. SECRETARY OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony J. CASTRO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 56075.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

June 8, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. K.S.A. 39-718a, which provides for reimbursement to the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) for support payments made under the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), is not unconstitutional as a violation of the absent parent's due process rights.

2. An action brought by the secretary of the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) pursuant to K.S.A. 39-718a or K.S.A. 39-755 to recover from an absent father payments made to support his minor children is an action to enforce the children's nonstatutory right to support. In such an action, the defendant father may assert whatever defenses he might have as if the action had been brought by the children's mother.

3. Under K.S.A. 39-718a, an absent parent is a parent who does not reside with the child in the child's home and who has some parental obligation to support the child.

4. The fact that a father, who was living apart from his minor children, provided some support in the form of medical insurance, clothing, shoes, shelter, and money for the children during the period he was living apart from them does not prevent him from being an absent parent within the meaning of K.S.A. 39-718a in an action brought by SRS for recoupment of support payments. Evidence of support provided by the father may be considered by the trial court in determining the case.

Michael E. Riling, of Riling, Norwood, Burkhead & Fairchild, Chartered, Lawrence, argued the cause and was on brief, for defendant-appellant.

Calvin K. Williams, State Dept. of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Ottawa, argued the cause and was on brief for plaintiff-appellee.

PRAGER, Justice:

This is an action brought by the secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) to recover from a father payments made to support his three minor children under the federal program for Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children (AFDC). The defendant in the action is Anthony J. Castro, husband of Theda Castro and father of three minor children. The evidentiary record in the case is rather sparse. The parties stipulated at the trial as to support payments made by SRS and the marital history of the parties. The defendant, Castro, and his wife, Theda, were married on January 30, 1970. Two children were born and the Castros were divorced on July 23, 1976. They were then remarried on October 27, 1976. A third child was born as a result of their reunion. SRS made child support payments to Mrs. Castro from July 1975 to June 1976, and then again from January 1980 to September 1982. SRS produced copies of the checks paid to Mrs. Castro and the times and amounts of the payments were undisputed.

The only witness called at the trial by either party was defendant Castro, who testified that he had from time to time provided money for the children for clothing, shoes, and food. This testimony was rather vague and defendant did not attempt to itemize any support provided. It was established that defendant had maintained a health insurance policy for his family through his employer, but he did not provide the court with any figures as to how much he spent on this item during the course of the separation. Defendant further testified that he knew his family was receiving aid from SRS during 1981 and 1982. Through a voluntary agreement with his wife, defendant paid her $40 per month child support. SRS credited these payments to the defendant and subtracted them from the children's share of the approved grant. During the entire period payments were made, defendant was employed except for the period from January 1980 through March 1980, during which time he received unemployment compensation and did odd jobs. Defendant's income at the time of the trial exceeded $1100 per month. The defendant offered no testimony as to the exact amount received by him as income.

Castro testified that, when his wife left him in January 1980, she did not tell him where she was going. There was an attempt for a reconciliation which apparently did not work out. At the time of the hearing, defendant was living with and supporting his wife and three children. Mrs. Castro owned a two bedroom house in Pomona which she owned during the entire time support payments were paid by SRS. Defendant kept the payments on the house current at all times, and it appears that Mrs. Castro, at least a part of the time, lived in the home. Defendant was not sure of the exact times that his wife occupied the family home. Defendant testified that he attempted several times to have his wife come home with the children, and that at no time did he refuse to let them live in his home.

This action was filed by SRS on November 9, 1982, pursuant to K.S.A. 39-718a and K.S.A. 39-755. In the petition, it was alleged that SRS had paid $8,376.21 in assistance since July of 1975, by reason of the fact that the defendant had been continuously absent from home and the custodial parent, Theda L. Castro, had assigned to SRS support rights to which the children are entitled. It was further alleged that the defendant is not obligated under any current order to provide child support; that the defendant is an able-bodied man capable of supporting his minor children; and that a reasonable sum in the amount of $250 per month should be set aside as child support. In its petition, SRS sought to recover the sum of $8,376.21 for past support payments made.

In his answer, defendant admitted that he was the father of the three children named and that he was not obligated under any current court order to provide child support for the children. Defendant admitted that he was capable of supporting his children. He raised as an affirmative defense the statute of limitations and reserved the right to assert other affirmative defenses which he might learn through discovery. Defendant never filed an amended answer. The case was set for trial and the parties appeared.

In the trial court, defendant raised three legal issues for determination by the court:

(1) K.S.A. 39-718a, which provides for reimbursement to SRS from an absent parent for AFDC payments made, violates the absent parent's constitutional rights since it permits the state to recover without affording him a hearing and without taking into account the absent parent's ability to pay, station in life, health, and support payments made directly to or for his children.

(2) The defendant was not an absent parent within the meaning of the statute (K.S.A. 39-718a) because he provided support in the form of a home, medical insurance, clothing, shoes, and some food for the children.

(3) Defendant was not an absent parent under K.S.A. 39-718a, because his wife moved out of the home taking the children with her, and therefore, defendant was not absent from the home, because he lived in the home and made payments on it.

The parties submitted trial briefs on these issues. The district court, on August 18, 1983, filed a memorandum opinion in which it entered judgment in favor of SRS in the sum of $7,596.96 to reimburse SRS for child support payments paid by SRS during the years from 1980 through 1982. The trial court refused to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff for child support payments made during 1975 and 1976, because there was already an existing judgment in favor of the children's mother in the divorce case in the district court of Franklin County. That portion of the trial court's judgment which denied SRS recoupment for support payments made in 1975 and 1976 has not been appealed, and its validity is not before the court at this time.

The trial court rejected defendant's contention that K.S.A. 39-718a is unconstitutional as a denial of due process because it does not provide a due process hearing to the absent father. The trial court ruled, in substance, that, although SRS has the power and authority under K.S.A. 39-718a to file an action and collect child support payments made, the absent father, as the defendant, may assert whatever defenses he may have in that proceeding and, therefore, has a full right of hearing before judgment is rendered. The court further held that defendant Castro was an absent father within the meaning of the Kansas statutes and that SRS was entitled to judgment for child support payments made during 1980 through 1982. The defendant brought a timely appeal to this court.

To understand the issues raised on this appeal, it would be helpful at the outset to carefully examine the federal and state statutory provisions authorizing financial assistance to needy families with children. Prior to 1962, the program was generally known as Aid to Dependent Children. Since 1962, it has been denominated Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children. The federal statute which authorized the expenditure of substantial federal funds for aid to dependent children, was originally enacted in 1935 and may be found at 42 U.S.C.A. § 601. The purpose of the federal statute is to encourage the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives. The federal funds are made available to states which have submitted state plans approved by the secretary for aid and services to needy families with children.

42 U.S.C.A. § 602 sets forth the minimum requirements for a state plan. Among other requirements, a state plan must provide, as a condition of eligibility for aid, that each applicant or recipient will assign to the state any rights to support from any other person which the applicant may have in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant or recipient is applying for or receiving aid. Each applicant or recipient under the program must also agree to cooperate with ...