State ex rel. Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services v. Guy, 76174
| Decision Date | 09 May 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 76174,76174 |
| Citation | 23 Kan.App.2d 943,937 P.2d 1252 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, ex rel. SECRETARY OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, Appellee, v. Scott W. GUY, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Whether a trial court has erred in construing a statute is a question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review.
2. The several provisions of an act, in pari materia, must be construed together
with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony and giving effect to the entire statute if it is reasonably possible to do so.
3. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.
4. General and special statutes should be read together and harmonized whenever possible, but to the extent a conflict between them exists, the special statute will prevail unless it appears the legislature intended to make the general statute controlling.
5. When an irreconcilable conflict exists between two statutes, the last enactment supersedes, repeals, or supplants the earlier by implication, since it is presumed that the legislature did not intend to leave contradictory acts on the books.
6. Where the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room left for a judicial construction so as to change the language employed therein.
Kelli J. Benintendi of Legal Aid Society, Topeka, for appellant.
Robert R. Hiller, Jr., of the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Topeka, for appellee.
Before GREEN, P.J., ROYSE, J., and JENNIFER L. JONES, District Judge, Assigned.
Scott W. Guy appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS). SRS sued Scott, seeking reimbursement in the amount of $17,521.04 for medical assistance furnished to his minor son, Kyle Guy. On appeal, Scott contends that the trial court erred in holding him responsible for the repayment of his son's medical expenses. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
In May 1992, Scott accidentally backed his vehicle over the foot of his 21-month old son, Kyle. Kyle along with his mother, Paula Crespi, father, and his sister, Jessica Guy, were all receiving assistance in the form of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (ADC). As a result, each of them received a medical card. Kyle's card was presented for payment when he was treated for the injuries to his foot. The cost of Kyle's treatment was approximately $20,793.
In November 1994, SRS sued Scott seeking a judgment against him for $17,521.04, the difference between the cost of the treatment and PIP benefits paid by Scott's car insurance carrier. The petition claimed that Scott had a legal obligation to pay medical expenses on behalf of Kyle and that Kyle's injuries were caused by Scott's negligence. The petition further stated that it was filed under K.S.A. 39-719a, which allows SRS to recover medical expenses it has paid from any third party who has a legal obligation to pay such medical expenses of the recipient. In moving for judgment on the pleadings, SRS also stated that Scott's legal obligation arose under both a common-law duty and a statutory duty under K.S.A. 39-718b. Scott, however, argued that SRS had improperly switched its cause of action from one of negligence to one based on a parent's obligation to his or her child. Scott also argued that one of the exceptions set out in K.S.A. 39-718b exempted him from having to reimburse SRS for the assistance provided.
The trial court construed SRS's motion as a motion for summary judgment. Emphasizing the distinctions between the terms "assistance" under K.S.A. 39-718b and "medical assistance" under K.S.A. 39-719a, the trial court reasoned that because K.S.A. 39-719a entitled SRS to recover medical assistance paid, K.S.A. 39-718b was inapplicable. Consequently, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of SRS.
In arguing for summary judgment, SRS maintained that K.S.A. 39-719a allowed it to seek reimbursement from Scott for medical expenses paid on behalf of Kyle. K.S.A. 39-719a provides in pertinent part:
On the other hand, Scott argued that he falls within one of the enumerated exceptions in K.S.A. 39-718b, which describes a parent's liability for assistance furnished to a minor child. The relevant portion of K.S.A. 39-718b provides:
. ...
(2) assistance provided during a month in which the needs of the parent or guardian were included in the assistance provided to the child. ...
....
"(e) Actions authorized herein are in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies." (Emphasis added.)
Whether the trial court erred in construing the above statutory provisions is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. See State v. Donlay, 253 Kan. 132, 134, 853 P.2d 680 (1993). " 'The several provisions of an act, in pari materia, must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony and giving effect to the entire statute if it is reasonably possible to do so.' " Guardian Title Co. v. Bell, 248 Kan. 146, 151, 805 P.2d 33 (1991). Simply stated, a court should interpret a statute as a whole in order to determine its meaning. See State v. Sims, 254 Kan. 1, Syl. p 7, 862 P.2d 359 (1993). Finally, " '[i]t is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.' " City of Wichita v. 200 South Broadway, 253 Kan. 434, 436, 855 P.2d 956 (1993).
The issue before this court presents a question of first impression. Neither party refers this court to any applicable case law, nor has our research revealed any cases interpreting the interplay between K.S.A. 39-718b and 39-719a with regard to the issue before this court. Moreover, the legislative history of these two statutes has failed to furnish this court with any insight into the legislature's intent as to the relationship between the two statutes.
K.S.A. 39-719a(a) provides that "[w]here medical assistance has been paid by the secretary and a third party has a legal obligation to pay such medical expenses to or on behalf of the recipient, the secretary may recover the same from the recipient or from the third party." It is undisputed that the first prong of the statute was met in that SRS paid for Kyle's medical expenses. However, the parties disagree as to the second prong of K.S.A. 39-719a; that is, whether Scott has a legal obligation to reimburse SRS for medical assistance furnished to Kyle.
Kansas has long recognized a parent's common-law duty to support his or her children. See State ex rel. Secretary of SRS v. Castro, 235 Kan. 704, 711-12, 684 P.2d 379 (1984). In this regard, K.S.A. 39-718b(a) provides that a child's parents are liable to repay the secretary of SRS for assistance expended upon the child's behalf "regardless of the specific program under which the assistance is or has been provided." However, this obligation does not apply where the "assistance [is] provided during a month in which the needs of the parent or guardian were included in the assistance provided to the child." K.S.A. 39-718b(b)(2). Because Scott and Paula both received food stamps and medical cards for the family, the needs of Scott were included in the assistance provided to Kyle.
SRS does not argue that Scott does not fall under the exception at K.S.A. 39-718b(b)(2). However, SRS argues that because K.S.A. 39-719a is the specific statute, this statute controls over K.S.A. 39-718b. But for this rule to apply, some conflict must exist between the two statutes. In requiring that a conflict must exist between the statutes, our Supreme Court has stated: "General and special statutes should be read together and harmonized whenever possible, but to the extent a conflict between them exists, the special statute will prevail unless it appears the legislature intended to make the general statute controlling." Kansas Racing Management, Inc. v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 244 Kan. 343, 353, 770...
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