State Ex Rel. Simmons v. Harris

• Citation: 119 Fla. 375,161 So. 374
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SIMMONS v. HARRIS et al.
• Decision Date: 15 May 1935
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

161 So. 374

119 Fla. 375

STATE ex rel. SIMMONS v. HARRIS et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

May 15, 1935

Error to Circuit Court, Sarasota County; Paul C. Albritton, Judge.

Mandamus proceeding by the State, on the relation of F. W. Simmons against W. S. Harris and others. To review a judgment quashing the alternative writ, relator brings error.

Reversed and remanded.

COUNSEL

C. L. McKaig, of Sarasota, and Waller & Pepper, of Tallahassee, for plaintiff in error.

Winder H. Surrency and John F. Burket, both of Sarasota, for defendants in error.

OPINION

BUFORD Justice.

We review here judgment quashing alternative writ of mandamus.

The alternative writ showed the lawful issuance of donds; that relator was the owner and holder of certain of the bonds so issued, and at the time of the issuance of the writ were past due and unpaid; that taxes sufficient to pay relator's delinquent bonds had been levied and collected for the purpose of paying bonds of the issue referred to when the same should be due and payable; that the board of county commissioners, instead of paying bonds with the money produced by such tax levy, have entered into a purported trust agreement with the Palmer National Bank & Trust Company of Sarasota, Fla., whereby the board of county commissioners delivered the money so acquired to said bank and attempted to pass the title to the fund to the bank in trust to be prorated amongst bondholders if and when a refunding of the bond issue of which these bonds are a part should be accomplished; that such transaction occurred on March 20 1933, and under the terms of the agreement the purported trust was to be discharged on or before July 1, 1933 otherwise the fund should at that date be deposited in an account to be known as 'Court House Bond Interest and Sinking Fund' to the credit of the county and subject to its order; that later the purported trust agreement was by a written instrument in the form of a resolution continued in force 'until the Trustee receives written notice from this Board that said Refunding Contract has or has not been declared operative,' and was later continued in force until September 30, 1934; that the bank accepted the trust and assumed to take title and possession of the fund, all of which trust agreement and the action taken by the board of county commissioners and the bank was without authority of law and was null and void for any purpose other than to constitute a deposit of the fund subject to being used for the purposes for which the tax levy which produced it was levied and collected.

Unless the purported trust agreement and the action of the board of county commissioners and the bank pursuant thereto place the fund beyond the reach of the relator, he is clearly entitled to the relief prayed under authority of opinions and judgments in the cases of State ex rel. Gillespie et al. v. Carlton et al., 103 Fla. 810, 138 So. 612; State ex rel. Du Pont Ball v. Livingston et al., 104 Fla. 33, 139 So. 360; City of Winter Haven et al. v. State ex rel. Baynes, 114 Fla. 527, 154 So. 879.

When the fund involved was collected, it became a trust fund in the hands of the board of county commissioners for the benefit of the relator and others like situated. As long as that fund had not been paid out by the board of county commissioners in the payment of the obligations for which it was levied and collected, it was a fund from which the relator had the right to demand the payment of his bonds, and if his demand was refused, he then had the legal right to institute proceedings to coerce the payment of his bonds from that fund. The institution of legal proceedings by the relator would operate to give him a prior claim on the fund for the payment of his bonds. See State ex rel. Du Pont Ball v. Livingston et al., supra. We think that it is so elementary as not to be questioned that a trustee holding a fund subject to specific disposition cannot legally create another trusteeship and pass the fund into the hands of, and control of, that newlycreated trustee, so as to place the fund beyond the reach of the cestui que trust of the original trustee entitled to the trust fund.

By attempting to place this fund beyond the reach of the relator, the respondents violated section 10, article 1 of the Constitution of the United States. See Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 18 L.Ed. 403. It is well settled that the obligation of a contract in the constitutional sense is the means provided by law by which it can be enforced. These means are methods by which the parties obligated can be compelled to perform it. Any legislation which lessens the efficiency of the means impairs the obligation, and so does any conduct on the part of one party which attempts to place it beyond the power of the other party to enforce the contract impair the obligation thereon. See Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 24 L.Ed. 793.

So we must hold that the purported trust agreement...