State ex rel. Simpson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 July 1912
• Docket Number: Nos. 17,495 - (14).,s. 17,495 - (14).
• Citation: 118 Minn. 380
• Parties: STATE ex rel. GEORGE T. SIMPSON v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 380

118 Minn. 380

STATE ex rel. GEORGE T. SIMPSON v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY.¹

Nos. 17,495 - (14).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 5, 1912.

Upon the relation of George T. Simpson, Attorney General, the district court for Ramsey County issued its writ of mandamus directing

[Note] Power to require carriers to give reduced rates to certain classes of persons, see notes in 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 973 and 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 956.

defendant to furnish transportation to the adjutant general, or show cause why it should not be furnished. The matter was heard by Kelly, J., who directed the writ be made peremptory. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment, defendant appealed. Affirmed.

F. W. Root, for appellant.

Lyndon A. Smith, Attorney General, Clifford L. Hilton, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

HOLT, J.

Chapter 493 [p. 616] of the General Laws of 1909¹ reads as follows:

"An act fixing the charges to be paid to the railroads for transporting the Minnesota National Guard or the Minnesota Naval Militia or Reserve and their baggage, the terms of transporting the same and prescribing a penalty for the violation of said act.

"Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Minnesota:

"Rate of One Cent. — Section 1. That whenever it shall be necessary for any or all of the officers or men of the Minnesota National Guard or the Minnesota Naval Militia or Reserve to travel upon any railroad in the state under orders from competent authority to perform military duty, such railroads shall furnish transportation at the rate of one cent per mile for the whole distance to be traveled upon such railroad or railroads within the limits of this state, for each officer or enlisted man so carried including the usual amount of baggage; and all station or ticket agents or conductors shall sell first class tickets or furnish first class passage at the rate named, upon being notified that such officer or officers or enlisted men are traveling upon military duty. Such notification must be issued by the adjutant general, and may be by telegraph or by filing a copy of the order issued by the adjutant general for such transportation with the station or ticket agent or conductor. This rate shall apply to officers or men traveling under orders, either single or in companies, so that whenever one or more members of the guard shall present an order for transportation issued by the adjutant general, it shall be honored by the ticket agent or by the conductor and received in lieu of fare, and when presented by the railroad companies to the adjutant general, shall be audited to be paid at once at the fixed rate."

Section 2 prescribes the penalty for violation of section 1.

On July 28, 1909, Brigadier General Fred B. Wood, Adjutant General of the state of Minnesota, and a member of the National Guard, acting under orders from the commander in chief thereof, was required, in the discharge of his military duties, to travel from St. Paul to Lake City, in this state. The defendant, a railway company, operating a line of railway between the two places mentioned, on which are run several passenger trains daily, was duly notified by the presentation to its ticket agent of the written order which, under the provisions of section 1 of the above act, entitled said Wood to passage on defendant's train to Lake City, but the defendant refused to furnish him transportation. It is admitted that the defendant will, in the future, refuse to comply with the law in question. The state, on the relation of the attorney general, obtained a writ of mandamus from the district court, directing the appellant railway company to furnish the transportation or show cause why it should not be done. On trial had the court ordered a peremptory writ to issue, and from the judgment entered thereon the railway company appeals.

The assignment of errors raises three main objections to the judgment. First, the act contravenes the Federal and state Constitutions alike; second, it is illegal discrimination; third, the act seeks to deprive the railway company of the right to require cash payment to be made in advance, and invades the right of the company to manage its own affairs.

It is claimed that section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the Federal Constitution is violated by the act, because the railway company is denied equal protection of the laws, and its property rights are invaded without compensation, and that it contravenes sections 2, 7, and 13 of article 1 of the state Constitution on the same grounds. The argument proceeds on the theory that the two-cent passenger law (chapter 97, p. 109, Laws 1907)¹ establishes a reasonable compensation or rate for carrying passengers on railways; hence it follows that one-half of that rate must be less than a fair compensation for the service. It is also said the stringent anti-pass law (chapter 449, p. 685, Laws 1907)¹ prohibits the granting by any railroad of special privileges. On the last proposition nothing more need be said than this: If there be conflict between two acts of the legislature relating to the same subject-matter, the latest act prevails, provided it is otherwise valid legislation. The railway company in its answer, in addition to demanding protection under the constitutional and statutory provisions referred to, alleged as follows:

"Seventh. It avers that the rate prescribed in and by the said act is wholly inadequate to compensate this defendant for the cost of conducting its business of transporting passengers between points within the state of Minnesota, and is wholly inadequate to compensate this defendant for the cost of transporting the persons enumerated in said act.

"Eighth. It avers that the provisions of said act, requiring this defendant to furnish transportation at one cent per mile, are invalid and unconstitutional, and would, if enforced, amount to confiscation of the property of the defendant, and would deprive it of its property without due process of law, in violation of the provisions of said section 1 article 14 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of the provisions of said section 7 of article 1 of the Constitution of the state of Minnesota."

At the trial no evidence was taken to sustain these allegations of the answer, and the attorney for appellant, at the opening of the trial, stated: "The defendant at this time waives any defense or contention made under paragraphs seventh and eighth of its answer." Under this state of the record there can be but one conclusion: That it does not appear that, by compelling the appellant to carry the National Guard of the state at the rate of one cent per mile, it is deprived of its property or any of its rights or privileges without just compensation or without due process of law.

It must be conceded that authority rests in the state to compel the common carriers within its territory to render reasonable service as such carriers, and to regulate such service as to mode and compensation provided the regulation is not so onerous that the carrier, as a result thereof, is deprived of its property without compensation or without due process of law. The equal protection of the law in the constitutional guaranty does not mean that a common carrier shall be allowed to derive as great a profit in the conduct of its business as others are permitted to make, or that it shall be as free from regulation as obtains in some other lines of business, or even to the extent that may be allowed in some other lines of common carriage. It may, however, be conceded that the equal protection of the laws prohibits the legislature from singling out certain railway companies to transport troops at reduced rates, or from directing them to be carried over different railways at unequal rates.

We cannot conceive of any violation of any provision in either Federal or state Constitution where the state requires a railway company to carry its military force for a fair and reasonable compensation. The mere fact that a maximum passenger rate has been fixed at two cents per mile does not prove that a lower rate is not compensatory or reasonable under certain conditions. On the contrary, we think it should be assumed, till the contrary appears, that the rate of one cent per mile established by the act is valid, and to be valid implies that the compensation is a just and fair equivalent for the service required. But the express waiver of inadequate compensation as a defense takes out of the case the contention that the law deprives the railway company of its property without due compensation, or without due process of law, and that defendant, for that reason, is not given equal protection under the laws.

The contention that the law is discriminatory presents a more doubtful question. It is singular that a state apparently keenly sensible of the necessity and justice of compelling all railway companies to treat all persons alike, as evidenced by the anti-pass act, should, for itself, exact more favorable terms than the general public enjoys from these companies. For the transportation it requires the great state of Minnesota is undoubtedly able to pay the same rate that it permits the carrier to charge its citizens or the traveling public. But, while the example of civic righteousness set by the state may be bad, the law may nevertheless be valid. The discrimination is not against the railway company, because under the facts in this case it receives all it may...