State ex rel. Skyllingstad v. Gunn
| Decision Date | 24 June 1904 |
| Docket Number | 13,902 - (108) |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. THEODORE T. SKYLLINGSTAD v. ANGUS GUNN and Others |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Alternative writ of mandamus issued from the district court for Pine county on relation of Theodore T. Skyllingstad commanding defendants, as county commissioners of that county, to cause to be issued and negotiated pursuant to chapter 181, Laws 1901, certificates of indebtedness sufficient to pay a county warrant for $597 held by relator and from the proceeds of such certificates to pay said warrant with interest. From a judgment entered pursuant to the order of Crosby, J., quashing the writ and dismissing the proceedings, plaintiff appealed. Reversed and remanded.
Certificates of Indebtedness.
Chapter 181, p. 253, Laws 1901, entitled "An act to authorize county commissioners to issue certificates of indebtedness in certain cases," and purporting to legalize certain county orders issued under the provisions of chapter 302, Laws 1895, which had been declared unconstitutional, and to authorize the county commissioners to provide for their payment, is constitutional.
Title of Act.
The subject of the act is expressed in its title. It is not special legislation. Nor does it attempt to impose unjust and unequal taxation, or to exercise judicial power by legislation.
Mandamus.
The county commissioners may be compelled by mandamus to take the necessary action to provide for the payment of the orders.
Ell Torrance, for appellant.
M. B. Hurley, County Attorney, and S. G. L. Roberts, for respondents.
Appeal from a judgment quashing the alternative writ of mandamus, and dismissing the proceedings herein, on the ground that neither the petition nor the writ states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or to entitle the relator to the relief demanded.
The facts alleged in the petition and writ are to the effect following:
On July 15, 1896, the board of county commissioners of the county of Pine, in the state of Minnesota, upon a proper petition, and in conformity with the provisions of Laws 1895, p. 712, c. 302, duly made an order laying out and establishing in the county a public highway described in the petition and writ. The road is seven miles in length. The board, upon notice duly given, and in full compliance with such statute, entered into a written contract with C. A. Kelsey for the construction of such road for the sum of $4,179. The contractor in all things performed the contract on his part. His work was inspected and accepted by the board, and the road so constructed has ever since been, and now is, used as a public highway. On September 28, 1896, the county auditor of the county of Pine duly issued, to the contractor for such work, orders on the treasurer of the county in various sums and to the aggregate amount of the contract price, in accordance with section 11 of the act herein referred to. The orders were then presented to the county treasurer for payment, and by him indorsed: One of the orders, for the sum of $597, was thereafter purchased by the relator in good faith, for a valuable consideration, and without knowledge on his part of any defect in the statute under which it was issued. The order was duly indorsed and delivered to him. No provision has been made by the county for the payment of the order, and no part thereof has ever been paid. The act under which the highway was laid out and the orders for the payment of the work of its construction were issued was on June 26, 1900, adjudged unconstitutional. In view of the hardships resulting to the relator and others in like situation, the legislature of the state enacted chapter 181, p. 253, Laws 1901, approved April 9, 1901. The relator on May 8, 1901, at a regular meeting of the respondents, as the board of county commissioners of the county of Pine, duly requested them to take proper steps to issue and negotiate the certificate of indebtedness of the county, sufficient in amount to pay and take up such orders. They, however, refused to comply with such request or with the requirements of such act, or to make any provision for the payment of the orders. The petition prayed that a writ of mandamus be issued commanding them to discharge such duty.
Chapter 181, p. 253, Laws 1901, is entitled: "An act to authorize county commissioners to issue certificates of indebtedness in certain cases."
Section 1 thereof provides that in all cases where any public highway theretofore laid out by the commissioners of any county pursuant to chapter 302, p. 712, Laws 1895, and for the construction of which orders have been drawn upon the county treasurer for the whole or any part of the contract price, and presented for payment and indorsed "Not paid for want of funds," for the payment of which no provision has been made, shall become a lawful indebtedness of such county. And, further, that the county commissioners of such county "in which said public road or highway has been constructed and has been, and is now, used as a public road or highway" are authorized to issue and negotiate certificates of indebtedness of the county for an amount sufficient to take up and pay such orders, with interest at the rate of four per cent. per annum.
Section 2 of the act provides that the board of county commissioners shall levy a tax sufficient to meet the principal of such certificates as they mature.
It is obvious that the allegations of the petition and writ are sufficient to bring the relator's case within the purview of chapter 181. It follows, then, that if this act is constitutional, and mandamus is the appropriate remedy to enforce its provisions the decision of the trial court was wrong. The first and important question, then, is the constitutionality of the act. The respondent claims that it is unconstitutional, for the reasons following:
1. The subject-matter of the act is not expressed in its title. It is the contention of the respondent that the real subject of the act is the creating of a debt against counties without their consent, while the subject, as expressed in the title, "An act to authorize county commissioners to issue certificates of indebtedness in certain cases," is merely incidental to the actual subject of the act. The rules of construction applicable to the constitutional mandate that "no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title," have been so definitely settled and fully illustrated by the repeated decisions of this court that it is unnecessary to repeat them here, further than to say that any statement in the title of an act which fairly calls attention to the subject of the bill, although in general terms, is all that is required. Lien v. Board of Commrs. of Norman Co., 80 Minn. 58, 82 N.W. 1094; Winters v. City of Duluth, 82 Minn. 127, 84 N.W. 788; State v. Board of Control, 85 Minn. 165, 88 N.W. 533. There is nothing in the body of the act in question foreign to the subject expressed in the title. On the contrary, the title clearly suggests the provisions found in the body of the act, for the words of the title, "An act to authorize county commissioners to issue certificates of indebtedness in certain cases," necessarily imply that the act deals with county indebtedness as a basis for such certificates, and fairly advise the legislature and all interested persons and parties that the act relates to such indebtedness. The title of the act is sufficient. Flynn v. Little Falls Ele. & W. Co., 74 Minn. 180, 77 N.W. 38, 78 N.W. 106.
2. It is further claimed that the act is void as special legislation, for the reason that it is based upon an improper classification, because it singles out those cases where the holders had presented their warrants or orders to the county treasurer and had them indorsed "Not paid for want of funds," and says that those warrants shall constitute a lawful indebtedness of the counties. All other warrants, orders, and bonds still remain void, even though they may have been issued for the same purpose, and even to the same man, as were those which are declared a lawful indebtedness of the counties. This assumes what does not appear from the face of the act, and of the existence of which we have no actual knowledge, namely, that there were at the time of the passage of the act outstanding orders or warrants issued by counties for the building of public roads established under the provisions of chapter 302, p. 712, Laws 1895, for the payment of which no provision had been made other than those provided for by the act. The presumption is that the act is constitutional, and that the legislature included in the classification adopted all cases of like character.
While we are required to take judicial notice of all facts bearing upon the constitutionality of a statute (State v Cooley, 56 Minn. 540, 58 N.W. 150, and State v. Stearns, 72 Minn. 200, 75 N.W. 210), yet we do not in fact know, and have no means of knowing, whether there were similar orders outstanding which had never been presented for payment. The presumption is that there were not, and that all orders would in the ordinary course of business be presented and indorsed as the act provided. The act is a remedial one, and applies to all counties of the state which have established roads and issued orders for their construction, under the provisions of the act, for which no provision for their payment has been made. The existing conditions which are made the basis of this classification are such as to suggest a practical necessity and a manifest propriety for different legislation with reference to such counties than would be necessary or proper for the...
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