State ex rel. Smartt v. Judicial Standards Commission

• Decision Date: 02 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-768.,01-768.
• Citation: 50 P.3d 150,310 Mont. 295,2002 MT 148
• Parties: The STATE of Montana, ex rel., Michael S. SMARTT, Petitioner and Appellant, v. JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION and its Members, Honorable John Warner, Chairman; Victor F. Valgenti; Barbara Evans; Patty Jo Henthorn; and Honorable Ed McLean; and Staff, Respondents and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

50 P.3d 150

2002 MT 148

310 Mont. 295

The STATE of Montana, ex rel., Michael S. SMARTT, Petitioner and Appellant, v. JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION and its Members, Honorable John Warner, Chairman; Victor F. Valgenti; Barbara Evans; Patty Jo Henthorn; and Honorable Ed McLean; and Staff, Respondents and Respondents.

No. 01-768.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs May 2, 2002.

Decided July 2, 2002.

Channing J. Hartelius, Hartelius, Ferguson, Baker & Kazda, and Michael S. Smartt, Great Falls, Montana, for Appellant.

Stanley T. Kaleczyc, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven, Helena, Montana, for Respondent.

Justice W. WILLIAM LEAPHART delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Michael S. Smartt (Smartt) appeals the Order of the First Judicial District Court modifying a writ of prohibition to allow the Judicial Standards Commission to cure ministerial defects before commencing formal proceedings regarding alleged violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. We affirm.

¶ 2 We consolidate the issues raised by Smartt on appeal as follows:

¶ 3 1. Did the District Court err by modifying and then dismissing its writ of prohibition?

¶ 4 2. Did the District Court err by granting summary judgment in favor of the Judicial Standards Commission?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 5 The Judicial Standards Commission (the Commission) received a written but unverified complaint against Justice of the Peace Smartt on October 23, 2000. The complaint alleging judicial misconduct was submitted by Samuel L. Harris (Harris), another Cascade County Justice Court judge. The Commission sent a copy of the complaint to Smartt the next day and received Smartt's response in mid-November 2000. The Honorable John Warner (Warner), chairman of the Commission, was directed to pursue an informal resolution of the Harris complaint, pursuant to Judicial Standards Commission Rule 10. Warner learned that Smartt was also the subject of a Montana Department of Justice investigation. On November 29, 2000, Warner obtained an order from the First Judicial District Court directing the Department's Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) to release its report on Smartt to the Commission. The CIB investigation had been conducted at the request of the Cascade County Sheriff and recounted statements made by Troy Nelson Dye (Dye) before a Richland County Justice of the Peace, alleging that Smartt had broken into Dye's home in Sidney, Montana, and sexually assaulted him. At the completion of the CIB investigation, the Richland County Attorney declined to prosecute, and Dye did not file a complaint against Smartt with the Commission. After Warner shared the findings of the CIB report with the Commissioners, the Commission decided to expand its investigation of Smartt's judicial misconduct to include the Dye allegations.

¶ 6 On December 30, 2000, Warner met with Smartt and his attorneys to discuss informal disposition and informed Smartt that he could avoid further Commission proceedings by voluntarily resigning from his position as Justice of the Peace. After the meeting, Warner sent Smartt transcripts of interviews with Dye from the CIB file and Smartt submitted a response to Dye's allegations. The Commission then hired attorney Gregory Gould (Gould) to file a formal complaint against Smartt with the Montana Supreme Court. Smartt then notified Gould and the Cascade County Commissioners that he intended to resign from his position as Justice of the Peace effective July 1, 2001. On June 28, 2001, Smartt withdrew his resignation. On July 3, 2001, Gould filed the Commission's formal complaint with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.

¶ 7 Smartt petitioned the First Judicial District Court for a writ of prohibition, which was issued on July 20, 2001. The writ barred the Commission from further proceedings against Smartt based on an unverified complaint until further order of the court.

¶ 8 The Commission moved to vacate the writ of prohibition and for summary judgment on various procedural and constitutional issues raised in the affidavit accompanying Smartt's petition. Following oral argument, the court entered an Order on August 15, 2001, that modified the writ, awarded attorney fees to Smartt and reserved ruling on the motion for summary judgment. The Order allowed the Commission to proceed on the basis of verified complaints alleging matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission. On October 25, 2001, the court granted the Commission's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Smartt's petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 Our standard of review in appeals from summary judgment rulings is de novo. Andrews v. Plum Creek Mfg., LP., 2001 MT 94, ¶ 5, 305 Mont. 194,

¶ 5, 27 P.3d 426, ¶ 5. When we review a district court's grant of summary judgment, we apply the same evaluation, based on Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., as the district court. Andrews, ¶ 5 (citing Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264, 900 P.2d 901, 903). In Bruner, we set forth our inquiry:

The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Bruner, 272 Mont. at 264-65, 900 P.2d at 903.

¶ 10 When we review a district court's conclusions of law, the standard of review is plenary and we must determine whether the district court's conclusions of law are correct as a matter of law. State v. Anderson, 2001 MT 188, ¶ 19, 306 Mont. 243, ¶ 19, 32 P.3d 750, ¶ 19.

DISCUSSION

¶ 11 The Judicial Standards Commission is constitutionally mandated to investigate complaints, subpoena witnesses and documents, and make recommendations to the Montana Supreme Court concerning the discipline of members of the judiciary. Article VII, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution reads:

(1) The legislature shall create a judicial standards commission consisting of five persons and provide for the appointment thereto of two district judges, one attorney, and two citizens who are neither judges nor attorneys.

(2) The commission shall investigate complaints, and make rules implementing this section. It may subpoena witnesses and documents.

(3) Upon recommendation of the commission, the supreme court may:

(a) Retire any justice or judge for disability that seriously interferes with the performance of his duties and is or may become permanent; or

(b) Censure, suspend, or remove any justice or judge for willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to perform his duties, violation of canons of judicial ethics adopted by the supreme court of the state of Montana, or habitual intemperance.

(4) The proceedings of the commission are confidential except as provided by statute.

¶ 12 The Legislature outlined the Commission's procedures for initiating an investigation and conducting formal proceedings. A complaint from any citizen may cause the Commission to initiate an investigation. Section 3-1-1106(1)(a), MCA. The Commission is directed to notify the judicial officer of the citizen's complaint and of the initiation of an investigation. Section 3-1-1106(1)(b), MCA. If the Commission's investigation indicates that additional proceedings may be justified, "the Commission shall require the citizen who filed the original written complaint to sign a verified written complaint before conducting such additional proceedings." Section 3-1-1106(1)(a), MCA. Notice must again be given if a verified written complaint is filed. Section 3-1-1106(1)(b), MCA. This notice must be signed by the Commission and include the charges made, the grounds for the charges, and a statement that the judicial officer may file an answer. Section 3-1-1106(1)(b), MCA.

¶ 13 Issue 1. Did the District Court err by modifying and then dismissing its writ of prohibition?

¶ 14 The writ of prohibition Smartt obtained from the First Judicial District Court was grounded, in part, on allegations that the Commission had committed errors that violated Smartt's rights to due process and confidentiality. The alleged errors included the filing of a formal complaint against Smartt with the Montana Supreme Court based upon an unverified complaint by Harris that was not presented on the proper standardized form. The writ directed the Commission to "desist and refrain from any further action and proceedings in the matter relating to the Hon. Michael S. Smartt."

¶ 15 Smartt premises his appellate argument on an assumption that the District Court was correct as a matter of law to issue the writ. The Commission concedes that the court was correct to enjoin the Commission from instituting formal proceedings before it had obtained a verified complaint, but erred in using the writ of prohibition, which enjoined the commission from taking any action, including obtaining the required verifications.

¶ 16 The function of a writ of prohibition is to halt proceedings that are "without or in excess of the jurisdiction" of the entity exercising judicial functions. Section 27-27-101, MCA. The statutory definition reads:

The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate. It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person exercising judicial functions when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person.

Section 27-27-101, MCA. We have defined the term "jurisdiction" to mean "the power to hear and determine a particular case." State ex rel. Yuhas v. Board of Medical Examiners (1959), 135 Mont. 381, 383, 339 P.2d 981, 982. This Court examined the application of the writ of prohibition in State ex rel. Lee v. Montana Livestock Sanitary Bd. (1959), 135 Mont. 202, 339 P.2d 487, where we stated:

[T]he writ of prohibition would not

...