State ex rel. Smith v. Cronkhite
| Decision Date | 28 July 1881 |
| Citation | 9 N.W. 681,28 Minn. 197 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota ex rel. Warren Smith v. Edgar Cronkhite |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Waseca county, Buckham, J., presiding, directing the issue of a peremptory writ of mandamus.
Order affirmed.
M. D L. Collester, for appellant.
Lewis & Leslie, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court directing the issuing of a peremptory writ of mandamus to appellant, as auditor of Waseca county, to compel him, as such auditor, to issue to respondent, pursuant to the provisions of Laws 1878, c. 1, § 97, (Gen. St 1878, c. 11, § 97,) an order on the county treasury of said county for the amounts paid by him or his assignors into the county treasury, at the tax sales of a certain tract of land in said county for the taxes for the years 1862 to 1875, inclusive, all of which taxes and tax sales had been duly declared void, by judgment of court duly rendered, for the reason, stated in said judgment, that said land was, during all these years, United States land, and not subject to taxation. The tax sales thus declared void took place in the years 1863 to 1876, inclusive. The judgment declaring them void was rendered October 30 1880. The order appealed from was made on the 8th of December, 1880.
Appellant expressly waives any questions as to whether mandamus is the proper remedy in such a case, and rests his opposition to the issuing of the writ solely upon two grounds, which will now be considered: First, that the provisions of Laws 1878, c. 1, § 97, (Gen. St. 1878, c. 11, § 97,) only apply (1) to sales made and already declared void by judgment of court prior to the passage of the act; and (2) to sales made subsequent to the passage of the act; but that they do not apply to a case like the present, where the sale was made prior, but the judgment declaring it void rendered subsequent, to the date of the act.
The statute cited reads as follows: The whole argument of appellant in support of his position hinges upon his assumption that the words "so declared void" refer exclusively to sales made subsequent to and under the act, and thereafter declared void as prescribed in the first clause of the section. We think any such construction of the act is untenable. No possible reason can be suggested why the legislature should leave a class of cases like the present unprovided for. Similar statutes for the protection of purchasers at tax sales had been in force for years, broad enough to cover all such cases, and it can hardly be supposed that, by re-enacting in substance an existing law, the legislature designed to omit from its benefits any such class of cases without any conceivable reason for so doing. It would have to appear clearly that such was the expressed intent of the act before a court would feel bound to give it any such consideration. But we think the language of the act will not reasonably admit of the construction claimed. The first clause of the section simply provides what shall be the form of any judgment thereafter to be rendered declaring void a sale of land for taxes. The second clause is a general provision for the reimbursement of all purchasers at tax sales declared void by judgment of court. Its language is broad and comprehensive, and covers every tax sale declared void by judgment of court, without regard to whether the sale was made before or after the passage of the act, or whether such judgment was rendered prior or subsequent to that date. The words "so declared void" simply mean declared void by judgment of court, without reference to the date of the sale or the date of the judgment.
The second objection urged to the issuing of the writ is...
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