State ex rel. Smith v. City of International Falls
| Citation | 156 N.W. 249,132 Minn. 298 |
| Decision Date | 04 February 1916 |
| Docket Number | 19,727 - (269) |
| Parties | STATE EX REL. LYNDON A. SMITH v. CITY OF INTERNATIONAL FALLS AND OTHERS |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Action in the district court for Koochiching county by the attorney general to restrain defendant city and its officers from issuing licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquor. The case was tried before McClenahan, J., who ordered judgment in favor of plaintiff. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment, defendants appealed. Affirmed.
County option law.
1. Chapter 23 of the Laws of 1915, known as the county option law, does not infringe the rights granted by section 36 of article 4 of the Constitution to cities operating under so-called home rule charters, and is valid.
County option law -- governs in city with home rule charter.
2. Where, under and pursuant to the county option law, a county votes to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors therein the power to issue licenses for the sale of such liquors is withdrawn from every municipality within such county including cities operating under so-called home rule charters.
F. J. McPartlin, City Attorney, Marshall A. Spooner, George R. Robbins, and George A. Bangs, for appellants.
Lyndon A. Smith, Attorney General, and Louis S. Headley, Department Clerk, for respondent.
At an election held under and pursuant to chapter 23, p. 24, of the Laws of 1915, known as the county option law, the voters of Koochiching county voted to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors within that county. In 1910 the city of International Falls, located within Koochiching county, adopted a so-called home rule charter, under and pursuant to section 36 of article 4 of the Constitution and the enabling act passed by the legislature pursuant thereto, which charter conferred upon the city the power to license and regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors within the city. Claiming that the county option law did not deprive the city of the right given by its charter to issue licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors, the officers of the city were on the point of issuing such licenses when this action was brought to enjoin them from doing so. The trial court rendered judgment enjoining the city and its officers from issuing such licenses and they appealed therefrom.
The sole question presented is whether the power to issue licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors given the city by its charter has been suspended by the county option law.
Defendants contend: (1) That if the provisions of the county option law be held to apply to cities operating under home rule charters, the law is unconstitutional as infringing the rights granted to such cities by section 36 of article 4 of the Constitution; (2) that such provisions do not apply to such cities, for the reason that the law has not expressly named such cities as subject thereto.
1. The legislature possesses plenary power to regulate, restrict or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor to any extent it may see fit; and the legislature may grant to each of any class or classes of the political subdivisions of the state the right to determine for itself whether the sale of such liquors shall be permitted within its borders, unless some portion of the power over such matters previously possessed by the legislature has been taken from it by the amendment to the Constitution invoked by defendants. This amendment is lengthy but so far as here material provides:
Charters adopted under this constitutional provision have been before this court frequently, and it has uniformly been held that such charters "may embrace all appropriate subjects of municipal legislation, and constitute an effective municipal code, of equal force, as a charter granted by a direct act of the legislature." Grant v. Berrisford, 94 Minn. 45, 101 N.W. 940, 1133. It has also uniformly been held that the provisions of such charters relating to municipal matters supersede prior general laws relating to such matters, unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended that such general laws should still apply thereto. Peterson v. City of Red Wing, 101 Minn. 62, 111 N.W. 840; Turner v. Snyder, 101 Minn. 481, 112 N.W. 868; American Electric Co. v. City of Waseca, 102 Minn. 329, 113 N.W. 899. For instances of general laws which still applied to such cities notwithstanding charter provisions, see Townsend v. Underwood's Second Addition, 91 Minn. 242, 97 N.W. 977; Young v. City of Mankato, 97 Minn. 4, 105 N.W. 969, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 849; City of Duluth v. Orr, 115 Minn. 267, 132 N.W. 265; Laird Norton Yards v. City of Rochester, 117 Minn. 114, 134 N.W. 644, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 473; Hjelm v. City of St. Cloud, 129 Minn. 240, 152 N.W. 408. It is said that the provisions of a home rule charter have the force and effect that is given to an act of ...
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