State ex rel. Smythe v. Magney
| Decision Date | 04 November 1897 |
| Citation | 72 N.W. 1006,52 Neb. 508 |
| Parties | STATE EX REL. SMYTHE, ATTORNEY GENERAL, v. MAGNEY ET AL. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Chapter 25, Sess. Laws 1897, an act establishing a municipal court in cities of the metropolitan class, violates section 19, art. 6, of the constitution, and is void.
2. The constitution classifies or grades all courts which exist or may exist in the state, and the legislature has no authority to alter such classification.
3. Within the limits of the constitution, the legislature may enact laws defining the jurisdiction and powers of all courts in the state; but such a law, to be valid, must be uniform as to all courts of the same grade, wherever situate.
4. The constitution prohibits the legislature from vesting in the county courts or justices of the peace of one county a jurisdiction or power that is not vested in the county courts and justices of the peace of every other county of the state.
5. When it is apparent that an unconstitutional section of a legislative act was the sole inducement to the enactment, the whole law will be held void.
6. A legislative act, valid and complete in itself, which contains a provision repugnant to some other existing law, repeals such law by implication.
Quo warranto by the state, on the relation of Constantine J. Smythe, attorney general, against George A. Magney and others. Writ awarded.C. H. Smythe, Atty. Gen., Ed. P. Smith, and J. J. Boucher, for petitioner.
Geo. A. Day, Will H. Thompson, and W. H. Herdman, for respondents.
The legislature of 1897 passed an act entitled “An act to create a municipal court in cities of the metropolitan class and to fix and define the organization, powers and jurisdiction of the same.” See Sess. Laws 1897, c. 25, p. 193. The judges and clerk of the court provided for by the act have been appointed, qualified, and entered upon the performance of their duties. This is a quo warranto proceeding, brought to this court to test the right of said judges and clerk to the offices which they hold. The question presented is the constitutionality of the act. We have reached the conclusion that the entire act is unconstitutional and void, and will now briefly state our reasons for such conclusion.
1. Section 1 of the act creates in each city of the metropolitan class a municipal court. Section 2 provides for the appointment and election of the judges of said court, and section 6 for the appointment of the clerk of the court. Section 8 of the act, so far as material here, is as follows: “The municipal court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases when the amount in controversy does not exceed one thousand ($1000) dollars exclusive of interest and costs; in actions of replevin when the appraised value of the property does not exceed one thousand dollars ($1000), and to recover the possession of real property situate in said city, where the plaintiff or the defendant or any one of them is a resident of the city for which such court is established; * * * and concurrent jurisdiction with the district court of the county over all other civil actions involving a sum not exceeding one thousand ($1000) dollars exclusive of interest and costs.” By this last section the jurisdiction of the municipal court is limited as follows: to civil cases, to cases in which some party thereto is a resident of the metropolitan city in which is established said court, and in which case the amount in controversy does not exceed $1,000, exclusive of interest and costs. But the jurisdiction of the municipal court over the class of cases mentioned in the act is made concurrent with that of the district court of the county in which is situate the metropolitan city, and exclusive as regards the jurisdiction of all other courts in said county. In other words, the effect of the act is, if valid, to take away the jurisdiction of the county courts and justices of the peace of the county in which is situate a metropolitan city in the class of civil cases referred to in the act, and vest that jurisdiction exclusively in the municipal court. The act under consideration is not an amendatory one, but a complete act in itself; and, if valid, the effect of the act is to repeal the statutes in force at the time of its passage, which vested the county court of each county with jurisdiction in civil cases where the amount in controversy did not exceed $1,000, and justices of the peace of each county with jurisdiction in civil cases where the amount in controversy did not exceed $200. State v. Moore, 48 Neb. 870, 67 N. W. 876, and cases there cited. Now section 19, art. 6, of the constitution declares that: “All laws relating to courts shall be general and of uniform operation, and the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings and practice of all courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated by law, * * * shall be uniform.” At and prior to the passage of the act under consideration the legislature had provided for the election in each county of the state of a county judge and certain justices of the peace; and these officers were by law given jurisdiction, in a certain class of civil cases, co-extensive with the limits of the county in which they were elected. These laws are still in force, and by virtue thereof the jurisdiction of each county judge in the state is the same, and the jurisdiction of each justice of the peace is the same. But the effect of the act under consideration is to take away from the county court and the justices of the peace of counties in which is situate a metropolitan city jurisdiction over the class of civil cases provided for by the act, and vest that jurisdiction exclusively in the municipal court, thus destroying the uniformity of the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace and county courts of the state. True, the constitutional requirement that all laws relating to courts, their jurisdiction, powers, etc., shall be uniform, limits the uniformity required to the same class or grade of courts. But it is to be observed also that the constitution itself (section 1, art. 6) has classified or graded the courts which exist or may exist in the state. They are the supreme court, district courts, county courts, justices of the peace, police magistrates, and courts inferior to district courts for cities and incorporated towns. The supreme court is one grade, the district court is another class or grade, the county courts a third class, justices of the peace a fourth, police magistrates a fifth, and courts inferior to the district court created for cities and incorporated towns a sixth, class of courts. Where the constitution itself does not fix the jurisdiction of any class or grade of courts, then the jurisdiction and powers of any such class may be regulated by the legislature. But when the legislature attempts to regulate the jurisdiction and powers of the courts of any class or grade, the constitution requires that the jurisdiction conferred upon the class or grade shall be a uniform one; that it shall apply alike throughout the state,--that is to say, the legislature may prescribe, within the limits of the constitution, the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace; but, when it does so, the jurisdiction of one justice must be the same as that of every other justice of the state. Within the limits of the constitution, the legislature may confer certain jurisdiction upon the county courts and upon the district courts, but it cannot confer a different jurisdiction upon the district or county courts of one county from that conferred upon the district courts and county courts of every other county of the state. The legislature has no authority to change the classification of courts made by the constitution. It cannot divide district courts into two or more classes any more than it can say that the district courts west of a certain meridian in the state shall have certain jurisdiction, and the district courts east of that meridian shall have a different jurisdiction. This section 19, art. 6, of our constitution was copied literally from section 29, art. 26, Const. Ill. 1870. In 1872 the legislature of the state of Illinois passed an act increasing the jurisdiction of the county courts of that state, but the act declared that the provisions thereof should not apply to counties having 100,000 population. The supreme court of Illinois, in Myers v. People, 67 Ill. 503, held that the division of the county courts of the state into the two classes attempted by the act was void. The act under consideration here attempts to divide the county courts of the state into two classes with different jurisdiction. It attempts to divide the justice courts of the state into two classes with different jurisdiction. This cannot be done. It only remains to be said that it is obvious that the deprivation of justices of the peace and county courts, of counties in which are situate metropolitan cities, of jurisdiction in the class of civil cases mentioned in section 8 of the act was the inducement, if not the sole inducement, which led to its passage; and, since the validity of the whole act depends upon the validity of said section 8, that being void, the entire act must fall. State v. Lancaster Co., 17 Neb. 85, 22 N. W. 228;Bailey v. State, 30 Neb. 855, 47 N. W. 208;State v. Hurds, 19 Neb. 317, 27 N. W. 139;State v. Hardy, 7 Neb. 377. A judgment of ouster against the respondents will be entered as prayed. Writ awarded.
The validity of chapter 25, Laws 1897, an act creating a municipal court in each city of the metropolitan class, is assailed by the relator upon nine distinct grounds, of which one alone will be noticed, namely, that section 8 of said act contravenes section 19, art. 6, of the constitution of the state, since said section 8, in its scope, purpose, and effect, attempts to curtail or abridge the jurisdiction and powers of...
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