State ex rel. Sorsaia v. Stowers

• Decision Date: 11 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–0940.,15–0940.
• Citation: 783 S.E.2d 867
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia ex rel. Mark A. SORSAIA, Prosecuting Attorney for Putnam County, Petitioner v. Honorable Phillip M. STOWERS, Judge of the Circuit Court of Putnam County, and Caleb Toparis, Respondents.

783 S.E.2d 867

STATE of West Virginia ex rel. Mark A. SORSAIA, Prosecuting Attorney for Putnam County, Petitioner

v.Honorable Phillip M. STOWERS, Judge of the Circuit Court of Putnam County, and Caleb Toparis, Respondents.

No. 15–0940.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Jan. 20, 2016.

Decided Feb. 11, 2016.

Kristina D. Raynes, Esq., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Winfield, WV, for State of West Virginia.

Robert B. Kuenzel, Esq., Kuenzel & Associates, PLLC, Chapmanville, WV, for Caleb Toparis.

LOUGHRY, Justice:

The State of West Virginia by petitioner, Mark A. Sorsaia, Prosecuting Attorney for Putnam County, invokes this Court's original jurisdiction and seeks a writ of prohibition to prohibit the respondent, the Honorable Phillip M. Stowers, Judge of the Circuit Court of Putnam County, from dismissing two misdemeanor charges against the respondent, Caleb Toparis. The State contends that the circuit court erred in finding that Mr. Toparis's right to a speedy trial had been violated. Upon consideration of the parties' briefs and arguments, the submitted appendix, and pertinent authorities, we find sufficient grounds to grant the requested writ.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On April 24, 2014, a Putnam County Sheriff's deputy filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Toparis. A warrant was issued that same day by a Putnam County magistrate for Mr. Toparis's arrest for the felony offense of unlawful assault and the misdemeanor offenses of domestic assault and domestic battery. The alleged victim was Mr. Toparis's girlfriend.¹

On April 25, 2014, Mr. Toparis became aware of the arrest warrant and voluntarily presented himself to a magistrate in Logan County, who conducted an arraignment. Thereafter, a preliminary hearing was held on May 9, 2014, in the Magistrate Court of Putnam County. At that hearing, the magistrate found probable cause to hold the felony unlawful assault charge for the Putnam County grand jury's consideration. Mr. Toparis then voluntarily filed a motion to transfer the remaining two misdemeanor charges to the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The magistrate court granted the motion and transferred the misdemeanor charges to the Circuit Court of Putnam County by order entered May 9, 2014.

Subsequently, on February 27, 2015, the State filed an information in the Circuit Court of Putnam County charging Mr. Toparis with the misdemeanor offenses of domestic assault and domestic battery.² The parties appeared for a status hearing on March 27, 2015, and a pre-trial conference on May 1, 2015. At the pretrial conference, Mr. Toparis moved to dismiss the information, arguing that his right to a speedy trial had been violated because he had not been tried on the misdemeanor charges within one year of the execution of the warrant. Mr. Toparis based his motion upon this Court's decision in State ex. rel Stiltner v. Harshbarger, 170 W.Va. 739, 296 S.E.2d 861 (1982). In syllabus point three of Stiltner, this Court held:

Unless one of the reasons specifically set forth in W.Va.Code, 62–3–21 [1959] for postponing criminal trials in circuit court beyond three terms of the circuit court exists, a criminal trial in magistrate court must be commenced within one year of the issuance of the criminal warrant and lack of good cause for delay beyond one year as defined in Code, 62–3–21 [1959] should be presumed from a silent record.

In response, the State asserted Stiltner was not applicable because Mr. Toparis had voluntarily transferred the misdemeanor charges against him to circuit court. Rejecting the State's argument, the circuit court concluded that the State was required to bring Mr. Toparis to trial within one year of the execution of the warrant because the case originated in the Magistrate Court of Putnam County. Accordingly, the circuit court granted Mr. Toparis's motion to dismiss because the one-year period had expired. The dismissal order was entered on June 4, 2015, and this petition for a writ of prohibition followed.

II. Standard for Issuance of a Writ of Prohibition

This Court held in syllabus point five of State v. Lewis, 188 W.Va. 85, 422 S.E.2d 807 (1992) :

The State may seek a writ of prohibition in this Court in a criminal case where the trial court has exceeded or acted outside of its jurisdiction. Where the State claims that the trial court abused its legitimate powers, the State must demonstrate that the court's action was so flagrant that it was deprived of its right to prosecute the case or deprived of a valid conviction. In any event, the prohibition proceeding must offend neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Furthermore, the application for a writ of prohibition must be promptly presented.³ (footnote supplied)

In this instance, the State contends that the circuit court abused its legitimate powers when it ruled that Mr. Toparis had not been afforded a speedy trial. We review de novo a circuit court's legal rulings and statutory interpretations. Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). With these standards in mind, we consider whether the requested writ of prohibition should be granted.

III. Discussion

This Court has long recognized that "[t]he right to a trial without unreasonable delay is basic in the administration of criminal justice and is guaranteed by both the State and Federal constitution. U.S. Const. Amend. VI ; W.Va. Const. Art. 3, § 14." Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Foddrell, 171 W.Va. 54, 297 S.E.2d 829 (1982).⁴ In Stiltner, this Court observed that "[o]ur Legislature has given a statutory definition to the constitutional term ‘without unreasonable delay’ in circuit courts in W.Va.Code 62–3–21" which "defines ‘speedy trial’ for circuit court proceedings as requiring that an accused be brought to trial within three terms of court after indictment."⁵ Stiltner, 170 W.Va. at 741, 296 S.E.2d at 863–64. In other words, "[i]f a conviction is validly obtained within the time set forth in the three-term rule, W.Va.Code 62–3–21 [1959], then that conviction is presumptively constitutional under the speedy trial provisions of the Constitution of the United States, Amendment VI, and W.Va. Constitution Art. III, § 14." Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Carrico, 189 W.Va. 40, 427 S.E.2d 474 (1993). This Court found in Stiltner, however, that no "precise definition to W.Va. Const. art. III, § 14 in the context of misdemeanor prosecutions upon warrants in magistrate court" existed. Stiltner, 170 W.Va. at 741, 296 S.E.2d at 863. Recognizing that the right to a speedy trial is equally applicable to the prosecution of misdemeanors in magistrate court, this Court proceeded to essentially apply to magistrate court criminal proceedings the three-term rule applicable in circuit court. Id. at 743, 296 S.E.2d at 865. Using, by analogy, the provisions of West Virginia Code § 62–3–21, this Court crafted the rule that a criminal trial in magistrate court must be commenced within one year of the execution of the criminal warrant absent good cause for delay beyond one year. Stiltner, 170 W.Va. at 740, 296 S.E.2d at 862, syl. pt. 3.⁶

In this case, the State argues that by filing the motion to transfer his misdemeanor charges to circuit court, Mr. Toparis waived his right under Stiltner to be tried on those charges within one year of the execution of the criminal warrant. The State maintains that after the motion to transfer the misdemeanor charges was granted, Mr. Toparis became subject to the speedy trial rules applicable in circuit court. The circuit court rejected this argument based upon this Court's decision in State ex rel. Johnson v. Zakaib, 184 W.Va. 346, 400 S.E.2d 590 (1990). In Johnson, the defendant was arrested on a misdemeanor charge of aiding and abetting credit card fraud and was scheduled for trial in magistrate court. However, when the State and its witnesses did not appear for trial, the magistrate court dismissed the charges without prejudice. More than a year later, the defendant was indicted by a grand jury on the same charge. Thereafter, the defendant sought a writ or prohibition from this Court to prevent her prosecution. This Court granted the writ, finding that despite the concurrent jurisdiction afforded by the West Virginia Constitution to circuit courts over misdemeanor offenses, the State was not permitted to revive the misdemeanor charge by bringing a new indictment in circuit court more than one year after the execution of the original warrant. Johnson, 184 W.Va. at 351, 400 S.E.2d at 595. Accordingly, this Court held:

Where a misdemeanor warrant in a magistrate court is dismissed, further prosecution for the same offense by a new warrant or by an indictment after one year from execution of the original warrant is barred unless the record shows that one or more of the exceptions contained in W.Va.Code, 62–3–21 (1959), applies.

Johnson, 184 W.Va. at 348, 400 S.E.2d at 592, syl. pt.6. In finding Johnson applicable, the circuit court summarily discounted the fact that Mr. Toparis voluntarily transferred his case to circuit court. We find, however, that this critical distinction cannot be ignored.

In syllabus point two of State ex rel. Burdette v. Scott, 163 W.Va. 705, 259 S.E.2d 626 (1979), this Court held: "W.Va.Code, 50–5–7 (1976), requires that if a defendant is charged by warrant in the magistrate court with an offense over which that court has jurisdiction, he is entitled to a trial on the merits in the magistrate court." Yet, this Court recognized that a defendant can expressly waive the right to trial in magistrate court. Burdette, 163 W.Va. at 710 n. 5, 259 S.E.2d at 630 n. 5. The motion to transfer executed by Mr. Toparis stated that he "expressed his ... desire to waive the right to a magistrate court trial and instead ... have his ... misdemeanor case go directly to the circuit court for hearing and resolution." Unlike the defendant in Johnson, whose case was dismissed by the magistrate court because ...