State ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, s. 41461

• Decision Date: 14 May 1951
• Docket Number: 41558,Nos. 41461,s. 41461
• Citation: 240 S.W.2d 106,362 Mo. 101
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. MAYFIELD, Judge. STATE ex rel. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. v. MURPHY, Judge.

Page 106

240 S.W.2d 106

362 Mo. 101

STATE ex rel. SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. MAYFIELD, Judge.

STATE ex rel. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. v. MURPHY, Judge.

Nos. 41461, 41558.

Supreme Court of Missouri, en Banc.

May 14, 1951.

Rehearing Denied June 11, 1951.

Fred W. Schwarz, St. Louis, Bruce A. Campbell, East St. Louis, Ill., for Southern Ry. Co., Fordyce, Mayne, Hartman, Renard & Stribling, St. Louis, Mo., Kramer, Campbell, Costello & Wiechert, East of St. Louis, Ill., H. G. Hedrick, Washington, D. C., of counsel.

John H. Lathrop, Sam D. Parker, Kansas City, for Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., R. S. Outlaw, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.

Joseph B. McGlynn, East St. Louis, Ill., Roberts P. Elam, St. Louis, for Waldo C. Mayfield, Judge, etc., respondent.

Harvey B. Cox, Roberts P. Elam, St. Louis, for David J. Murphy, Judge, etc., respondent, Jerome F. Duggan, St. Louis, William F. Smith, Cox & Cox, St. Louis, of counsel.

VANDEVENTER, Judge.

These are two original proceedings in mandamus, seeking to compel two trial courts in the City of St. Louis to exercise discretion in ruling upon motions to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Each of these cases in St. Louis was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 51 et seq. The first case there was filed by Lelia M. Blevins, Administratrix of her husband's estate, seeking to recover $100,000 for his death. She was a resident of Tennessee, was appointed administratrix by the appropriate county court of Tennessee, her deceased husband had been a resident of Tennessee, and the alleged act of negligence occurred near the boundary between the states of Virginia and Tennessee, some 700 miles from St. Louis. The defendant, Southern Railway Company, was a Virginia corporation.

The second case filed in the circuit court of the City of St. Louis was by Floyd P. Seachris. He was a citizen of Oklahoma, and the defendant in that suit, The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, was a Kansas corporation. The alleged injuries, for which he sought damages in the sum of $100,000 occurred at Waynoka, Oklahoma, approximately 647 miles from St. Louis.

Each of the defendants in these cases maintained agents in the City of St. Louis upon whom lawful service could be and was had. In each of these cases, a motion was filed to dismiss the actions on the ground of an inappropriate forum within the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In the case against the Southern Railway Company, the trial court made the following order: 'Defendant's motion to dismiss upon the ground of forum non conveniens denied upon the sole ground that in the opinion of the Court, the Court has no jurisdiction or discretion to entertain or grant such a motion.'

A similar order was made in the case against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway. Each of these defendants has filed a petition in this court seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the circuit judges in St. Louis City to exercise their discretion in passing upon the motions. Alternative writs were issued. These two cases were consolidated in this court because the question in each is identical. The causes were argued here and in an opinion dated October 10, 1949, this court quashed the alternative writs it had issued. State ex rel. Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield, Judge. (State ex rel. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Murphy, Judge,) 359 Mo. 827, 224 S.W.2d 105.

By certiorari, 339 U.S. 918, 70 S.Ct. 623, the Supreme Court of the United States took jurisdiction of the cases for review 'because they involved questions important to the enforcement of the Federal Employers' Liability Act by the courts of the States.' 340 U.S. 1, 71 S.Ct. 1, 2. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment of this court and remanded it for further proceedings because it appeared to the Supreme Court of the United States that it was not clear, from the opinion of this court, whether this court 'did not deem itself bound to deny the motions for dismissal on the score of forum non conveniens by view of the demands of our decisions in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 [62 S.Ct. 6, 86 L.Ed. 28], and Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 [62 S.Ct. 827, 86 L.Ed. 1129].' The United States Supreme Court said: 'Therefore, if the Supreme Court of Missouri held as it did because it felt under compulsion of federal law as enunciated by this Court so to hold, it should be relieved of that compulsion. It should be freed to decide the availability of the principle of forum non conveniens in these suits according to its own local law. To that end we vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri and remand the cause to that Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.' 71 S.Ct. 3.

In its opinion the Supreme Court of the United States further said that the highest court of a state, in determining whether to accept or reject the doctrine of forum non conveniens, in an action based on the Federal Employers' Liability Act, may rest its decision on its own motions of procedural policy 'for all causes of action begun in its courts', but that its decision must not infringe on the provisions of the Privileges and Immunities clause of the Constitution of the United States by discriminating against citizens of sister states, art. IV, Sec. 2, U. S. Constitution, and must not 'involve a discrimination against Employers' Liability Act suits * * *.' That a state court may also reject the doctrine of forum non conveniens because it may deem itself compelled by federal law to reject it. The opinion then stated that there was nothing in the Federal Employers' Liability Act to 'force a duty' upon the state courts to entertain or retain such litigation 'against an otherwise valid excuse'.

The case is now again before this court in the same condition it was in 1949, when first decided, with the knowledge that in now deciding this case we are not under compulsion of federal law as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court and that we are therefore relieved of that idea, if it were entertained by this court, when the original opinion was written.

The United States Supreme Court opinion further stated: 'Therefore Missouri cannot allow suits by non-resident Missourians for liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act arising out of conduct outside that State and discriminatorily deny access to its courts to a non-resident who is a citizen of another State.'

It was further held that if Missouri chooses to open its courts to all 'residents' and deny access to all 'non-residents', whether citizens of Missouri or of other states, it may do so, and such a policy may include actions for personal injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.

In other words, there is nothing in the Federal law that compels Missouri to open its courts to cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 49 S.Ct. 355, 73 L.Ed. 747, but if it does so, the same rights must be accorded to citizens of other states as are given to citizens of this State.

This court said in its previous opinion:

'Also, Missouri permits citizens of this state to file Federal Employer's Liability cases in its courts. To deny the...