State ex rel. Southland Corp. v. City of Woodson Terrace
| Decision Date | 20 May 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 41646,41646 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri ex rel. the SOUTHLAND CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF WOODSON TERRACE, John L. Brown, Lawrence H. Besmer, Linus Eulentrop, John P. Gerlach, Virgil E. Griffin, Gerald Neuner, William Ratchford, Gary L. Stroot, James F. Traube and Dorothy Rickard, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
John S. Sandberg, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.
John B. Gray, Clayton, for defendants-respondents.
The application of The Southland Corporation doing business under the name of 7-Eleven Stores for a package liquor license at 4300 Woodson Road was denied by the Board of Aldermen of the City of Woodson Terrace. Southland then applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of the license in the St. Louis County Circuit Court. When the writ was denied, appeal was taken to this court. We affirm the circuit court's denial.
Woodson Terrace City Ordinance No. 354 sets out various requirements necessary for approval of an application for liquor license by the Board of Aldermen of Woodson Terrace. Sections 4 and 6 read in part as follows:
The ordinance also requires that for every license issued for the sale of intoxicating liquor at retail in the original package, "there shall be paid by the licensee to the City Collector the sum of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) per year. . . ."
The Southland Corporation contends generally that in denying the application for the writ of mandamus, the circuit court erred because Southland had properly filled out the forms supplied by the city clerk, its managing officer was of good moral character and a legal voter and resident of the State of Missouri, and the required fee was tendered with the application.
It is well established that cities may fix standards to be met before issuing a liquor license, the only requirement being that the ordinance must not conflict with the state statute. State ex rel. Kemerling v. Peterson, 240 Mo.App. 700, 214 S.W.2d 739, 741(1-3) (1948). In a mandamus proceeding, in the absence of evidence from which a contrary determination can reasonably be found or inferred, it is presumed that municipal authorities act legally and are influenced by proper motives. State ex rel. Kopper Kettle Restaurants, Inc. v. City of St. Robert, 424 S.W.2d 73, 78(9) (Mo.App.1968) . The issuance of a license, however, may be compelled by mandamus where the pleadings and the evidence conclusively show that the relator is in every way qualified and the only question to be resolved is one of law. Id. at 80(17). And in establishing its qualifications, relator has the burden of proof. Id. at 79(13). We examine the pleadings and the evidence in the instant matter to determine whether these standards have been met.
When Mr. Daniel Ballard who styled himself as "buyer-merchandiser and managing officer of 7-11 Stores" filed with the City of Woodson Terrace a verified license application for the store at 4300 Woodson Road, no license fee was deposited at that time with the city clerk. In defense of its failure to tender the fee when filing the application, Southland submitted that the city clerk told Ballard that the fee need not be paid until the application was acted upon and the license granted. Dorothy Rickard the city clerk testified that at the time when the application form had been submitted seeking the license she customarily told whoever came in for that purpose to wait and send in the check after the application was approved by the board; that practice had been changed since then; this was the way she intended to handle the Southland application.
Although the petition in mandamus filed by relator recites generally that all information required by the application form was furnished to the respondents and that relator complied with the requirements of the ordinance, there is no specific allegation that a tender of the required fee payable to the collector in the sum of $50 was made. The city clerk testified that she had never received any check or money from the applicant. She did not recall any conversation with Mr. Ballard, the person who brought in the application with regard to the payment or tender of the fee although she admitted that it was her practice at the time not to require such a payment or tender before the application was filed. A copy of a certificate of incorporation or license to do business in Missouri indicating the legal status of the applicant was never filed nor was there filed any affidavit or other evidence indicating the capacity of Mr. Ballard, the person who signed the application.
Payment of a license fee is deemed a reasonable requirement and the denial of a license where such fee has not been paid is proper. State ex rel. Bigham v. Williams, 297 Mo. 607, 250 S.W. 44, 45(1) (banc 1923). The ordinance specifically requires that the application must be accompanied by a deposit of the license fee. Since mandamus will not issue to compel the issuance of a liquor license unless all statutory and ordinance requirements are satisfied, the license was properly denied.
In defense of its failure to pay the licensing fee upon tender of the application, Southland submits that the city clerk told Mr. Ballard the fee need not be paid until the application was acted upon and the license granted. Although testimony revealed that the city clerk did in fact indicate such a course of action may have been permissible at the time, respondents are not estopped from asserting noncompliance as a legitimate ground for refusing to issue the license in this case. Estoppels are not favored by the law and will not be casually invoked. Dickinson v. Bankers Life & Casualty Company, 283 S.W.2d 658, 663(9) (Mo.App.1955); John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance...
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