State Ex Rel. Sparks v. Lee

Decision Date14 March 1941
Citation146 Fla. 367,200 So. 909
PartiesSTATE ex rel. SPARKS et al., Board of County Com'rs v. LEE, State Comptroller et al.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

En Banc.

Original proceeding by the State, on the relation of W. R. Sparks and others, as and constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Charlotte County, for a writ of mandamus, commanding J. M Lee, as Comptroller of the State, to draw a warrant, payable to the Board, for money in his hands, or respondents comptroller, the Board of Public Instruction of such county and the City of Punta Gorda, to show cause for noncompliance with the terms of the writ. On motion to quash the alternative writ.

Motion denied, and peremptory writ awarded.

COUNSEL Earl D. Farr, of Punta Gorda, for petitioner.

J. Tom Watson, Atty. Gen., and Lawrence A. Truett, Asst. Atty. Gen for respondents.

OPINION

BUFORD Justice.

To alternative writ of mandamus addressed to Honorable J. M. Lee as Comptroller of the State of Florida, commanding him 'as Comptroller, to draw your warrant payable to the Board of County Commissioners of Charlotte County, Florida for the aforesaid $4000.00 now in your hands as Comptroller, or that you, the said J. M. Lee, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, City of Punta Gorda, Florida, and the Board of Public Instruction of Charlotte County, Florida, individually and severally show cause before this Honorable Court on or before the 10th day of March A. D. 1941, at 10 o'clock in the morning, why you have not complied with the terms of this writ', the respondent has filed return and motion to quash.

The question for our determination is whether the fund accruing to Charlotte County shall be distributed and paid out by the Comptroller under the provisions of Chapter 18091, Acts of 1937, or under the provisions of Chapter 14832, Acts of 1931, as amended by Chapter 19106, and 19170 Acts of 1939.

The record shows that Charlotte County is no longer in the bracket of classification attempted to be established by Chapter 18091, Acts of 1937, and, therefore, is not now within its attempted purview.

Aside from this, Chapter 18091 was void as a general law because by its very terms it could have applied only to Charlotte County and it was void as a special or local law because it was not passed by the legislature in conformity with the provisions of Section 21, Article III of the Constitution of Florida. It was, therefore, void ab initio and...

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