State ex rel. Standard Oil Co. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Division

• Decision Date: 11 October 1951
• Docket Number: No. 28751,28751
• Citation: 101 N.E.2d 60,230 Ind. 1
• Parties: STATE ex rel. STANDARD OIL CO. v. REVIEW BOARD OF INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 60

101 N.E.2d 60

230 Ind. 1

STATE ex rel. STANDARD OIL CO. v. REVIEW BOARD OF INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION et al.

No. 28751.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 11, 1951.

Arthur L. Gilliom, Robert D. Armstrong and Elbert R. Gilliom, Indianapolis, Albert L. Green, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

J. Emmett McManamon, Atty. Gen., Clarence F. Merrill and Glen F. Kline, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellees.

DRAPER, Chief Justice.

Sixteen women, unmarried when employed by relator, married and left the employment. Each filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits. Each claim was resisted by relator on the ground that the claimant had left work voluntarily to marry, and that under the provisions of § 1507(a) of the Indiana Unemployment Security Act, Burns' 1951 Repl. § 52-1539f, the claimant was not entitled to any benefit rights based upon wages earned from the relator.

Such proceedings were had that the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division found that the claimants did not leave work voluntarily to marry, and they were entitled to benefits.

On review by the Appellate Court the decision of the Review Board was reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed in the opinion of that court, which is reported in 119 Ind.App. 576, 88 N.E.2d 567.

Thereafter the Board, pursuant to notice, fixed the date for a hearing at which the claimants were to have an opportunity to show cause, if any they had, why their wage credits should not be cancelled and their benefit rights denied, in accordance with § 1507(a) of the Act.

The relator requested the Board to vacate the notices and cancel the hearings. The Board denied this request. The relator obtained a temporary and alternative writ of prohibition in the court below. From a judgment dissolving that writ, and denying a permanent and absolute writ of prohibition, prohibiting the Board from further entertaining, hearing, considering or determining the sixteen claims, the relator appeals.

The appellee interprets the mandate of the Appellate Court, in the opinion above mentioned, as requiring the Board to proceed with the hearings it seeks to conduct. The Appellate Court did not direct the Board to proceed in any particular manner. Under the mandate the Board had the right and duty to proceed further in any lawful manner which was not inconsistent with the views expressed by the Appellate Court. See Heflin v. Red Front Cash & Carry Stores, Inc., 1948, 225 Ind. 517, 75 N.E.2d 662.

It is asserted that the proviso to § 1507(a) contravenes Article III, § 1 ¹, and ARTICLE IV, § 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION² of Indiana and the Review Board has no jurisdiction to proceed in accordance therewith.

Insofar as now of interest, § 1507 reads as follows:

'Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, no benefit rights shall accrue to any individual based upon wages earned from any employer prior to the day upon which:

'(a). Such individual left work voluntarily to marry or because of marital, parental, filial, or other domestic obligations; Provided, however, That a referee or the review board in accordance with the procedure established in section 1803 hereof, may, upon good cause shown, waive or modify such denial of benefits for such reasons.'

Do we have here an unwarranted delegation of legislative authority? The rule of action which must govern in controversies between adversary parties must be laid down by the legislature itself. It cannot be left to the discretion of administrative agencies. While a law as enacted must be complete, where the legislature has laid down a standard which is as definitely described as is reasonably practicable, it may authorize an administrative agency to amplify or implement that legislation, within prescribed limits, by adopting rules and regulations of general application to all alike, and it may authorize an administrative agency to determine whether facts or circumstances exist upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend, but it cannot confer upon any body or person the power to determine what the law shall be. As has been said, there is a clear distinction between the delegation of power to make a law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Hollingsworth v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 1940, 217 Ind. 373, 28 N.E.2d 64; Financial Aid Corporation v. Wallace, 1939, 216 Ind. 114, 23 N.E.2d 472, 125 A.L.R. 736; Edwards v. Housing Authority of City of Muncie, 1939, 215 Ind. 330, 19 N.E.2d 741; Albert v. Milk Control Board of Indiana, 1936, 210 Ind. 283, 200 N.E. 688; Kryder v. State, 1938, 214 Ind. 419, 15 N.E.2d 386; Id., 305 U.S. 570, 59 S.Ct. 154, 83 L.Ed. 359; Arnett v. State, ex rel., 1907, 168 Ind. 180, 80 N.E. 153, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 1192; Blue v. Beach, 1900, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89, 50 L.R.A. 64; Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 1935, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570; Id., 2 Cir., 76 F.2d 617; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 1935, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446; Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 5 Cir., 71 F.2d 1; Ryan v. Panama Refining Co., 5 Cir., 71 F.2d 8.

The general rules above stated are well recognized, and there is no dispute concerning them. Indeed, both parties have cited and now rely upon several of the above authorities. The difference of opinion lies in the application of such rules to the specific section of the statute now under consideration.

Sec. 101 of the Act, Burns' 1951 Repl. § 52-1525, which outlines the target at which this legislation is aimed, is written in general terms and seems to be of little assistance to us here. It is not suggested that the denial or modification of benefits can only be granted by the Board for the purpose of avoiding any of the consequences of unemployment there so justly deplored, or accomplishing any of the objectives there outlined.

We gather from a reading of § 1507 that it is the broad legislative policy of this state that no benefit rights shall accrue to one who has left work voluntarily to marry, or because of marital, parental, filial or other domestic obligations. The rule or standard thus fixed applies equally to all persons equally situated. The proviso seeks to enable the Board to annul that policy in individual cases upon a showing of 'good cause' for such action by an individual claimant. But the proviso does not furnish any rule or standard to be followed by the Board in determining whether or not it could set aside the legislative rule or standard already fixed.

'Good cause' is not defined in the Act. The Board is not authorized to implement the Act by making rules which would lay down conditions and tests of general application to all cases within the legislative framework from which it could be determined to what classes of cases the broad legislative policy above mentioned should not apply. There is no rule or standard, legislative or otherwise, for the ascertainment of what is or is not 'good cause' for waiving or modifying the denial of benefits. It seems to us the choice is left wholly to the unbridled discretion of the Board. The Board may find the facts, but, having found them is without any legal yardstick by which to measure the rights of the parties. The Act does not state, even in a general way, in what circumstances or under what conditions the Board shall, or even may, waive or modify the denial of benefits. It establishes no criterion to govern the Board's course. It arms the Board with a high-powered vehicle but no road map. The attempted delegation of authority involves more than methods or details. It permits to the Board such a wide discretion as to vest in them the power not only to find the facts, but to make the law which shall be applied to those facts. The range of the Board's discretion as to what constitutes 'good cause' might vary from claim to claim and from day to day, and in the final analysis depend largely, if not entirely, on the changing complexion of the Board itself, for 'good cause' might mean one thing to one mind and something entirely different to another. We think the legislature would have no difficulty in drafting a statute which would not leave to the Review Board the legislative power of choice.

Does the court below have the authority, in a proper case, to issue a writ of prohibition addressed to the Review Board? The writ of prohibition is a common law writ of ancient origin. The power to issue the writ inheres in any court of general common law jurisdiction. Burns' 1946 Repl. § 1-101; 42 Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 34, p. 169; 2 Gavit Pldg. & Prac., § 236, p. 1748. Under art. 7, § 4 of our Constitution this court has only such original jurisdiction as the General Assembly may confer. We are not authorized by statute to issue a writ of prohibition directed to an administrative agency. Burns' 1946 Repl. § 3-2201. But the right of trial courts of general jurisdiction to issue the writ has been recognized and regulated by our statutes. The Marion Superior Court has been given the same power to issue writs of prohibition as is had by Circuit Courts, Burns' 1946 Repl. § 4-1418, and jurisdiction of all appeals in such cases has been expressly conferred upon this court. Burns' 1946 Repl. § 4-214.

The writ of prohibition will issue to prohibit administrative officers or boards from exercising quasi-judicial power which they have no jurisdiction to exercise. 42 Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 14, p. 153; Financial Aid Corporation v. Wallace, 1939, 216 Ind. 114, 122, 23 N.E.2d 472, 125 A.L.R. 736; Quinby v. Public Service Commission, 1918, 223 N.Y. 244, 119 N.E. 433, 3 A.L.R. 685; Annotation 115 A.L.R. 3. It may properly issue from this court to certain lower courts to prohibit action pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, State, ex rel. Hovey v. Noble et al., 1889, 118 Ind....