State ex rel. Steinke v. Coriden
| Decision Date | 19 July 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A04-0408-CV-435.,49A04-0408-CV-435. |
| Citation | 831 N.E.2d 751 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana on the Relation of Thomas STEINKE, And, Thomas Steinke, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. George Terrance CORIDEN, William Rollen Howell, Linda Peterson Powell, John Albert Rader, Alec James Sarkisian, Susan Marie Severtson, and Andrew Scott Ward, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Thomas Steinke, Indianapolis, Appellant pro se.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Elizabeth Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellees.
Thomas Steinke appeals the trial court's determination that he lacks standing to seek an order of mandate. Steinke presents two issues, which we consolidate and restate as follows: Does an attorney who practices before the Worker's Compensation Board of Indiana (the Board) have standing to seek an order of mandate directing members of the Board to adhere to certain statutory guidelines?
We affirm.
The undisputed facts are that Steinke is an Indiana attorney whose practice includes representing employees before the Board. On March 4, 2004, Steinke filed a Verified Complaint for Writs of Mandate1 (the Complaint), alleging that members of the Board (the Board Members) violated The Worker's Compensation Act, i.e., Ind. Code Ann. § 22-3-1-1 et seq. (West, PREMISE through 2005 Public Laws) (the Act) in the following respects:
8. ... [E]ach of the Defendants fails to devote his/her entire time to the discharge of the duties of his/her office as a Board Member.
9. ... [E]ach of the Defendants holds other position(s) of trust or profit, and/or engages in some occupation(s) or business(es) interfering with or inconsistent with the discharge of his/her duties as a Board Member.
10. As a result ..., the residents of the State of Indiana are deprived of their statutory right of access to a full-time ... Board composed of Members whose sole focus and loyalty is toward the proper administration of the Workers' Compensation Act.
11. As a result ..., attorneys representing parties in workers' compensation matters ... lack access to a full-time [Board.]
12. As a result ..., the residents and institutions of the State of Indiana are harmed.
Appellant's Appendix at 6-8. Steinke has cited no specific incident or episode in which he was harmed by the alleged violations, but instead filed his action on behalf of the residents of Indiana.
On May 26, 2004, the Board Members moved for a dismissal of the Complaint, alleging Steinke lacked standing to seek an order of mandate. Thereafter, Steinke filed a Supplement to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, alleging: "[I]n addition to standing as a member of the public interested in the fulfillment of the state's laws, [Steinke] has general standing as an attorney affected by the Defendants' failure to fulfill their duties." Id. at 32-33. After a hearing, the trial court issued an Order of Dismissal, concluding Steinke lacked standing as a member of the public, as an attorney, and under the public standing doctrine. Steinke challenges that ruling on appeal.
The Board Members filed their motion to dismiss under both Trial Rule 12(B)(1) () and T.R. 12(B)(6) (). The trial court granted the motion under T.R. 12(B)(1), concluding that a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a lawsuit in which the plaintiff lacks standing to press the action. We note, however, that motions to dismiss for lack of standing are properly brought under T.R. 12(B)(6). Huffman v. Office of Envtl. Adjudication, 811 N.E.2d 806 (Ind.2004). Therefore, we must determine whether dismissal is sustainable under that rule. When reviewing a ruling on a T.R. 12(B)(6) motion, we must take as true all allegations upon the face of the complaint. Id. We may dismiss only if the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any set of facts admissible under the allegations of the complaint. Id. Upon review, we view the pleadings in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party — in this case Steinke — and draw every reasonable inference in favor of that party. Id.
Our supreme court has explained standing as follows:
The judicial doctrine of standing focuses on whether the complaining party is the proper person to invoke the court's power. It is designed to assure that litigation will be actively and vigorously contested. The standing requirement is a limit on the court's jurisdiction which restrains the judiciary to resolving real controversies in which the complaining party has a demonstrable injury. This Court recently described the interest which a party must possess to confer standing: "[I]n order to invoke a court's jurisdiction, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and must show that he or she has sustained or was in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue."
Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ind.1990) (quoting Higgins v. Hale, 476 N.E.2d 95, 101 (Ind.1985)). When reviewing a trial court's decision to dismiss for lack of standing, we review the matter de novo. Area Plan Comm'n of Evansville-Vanderburgh County v. Hatfield, 820 N.E.2d 696 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). The question of whether Steinke has standing is purely one of law and does not require deference to the trial court's determination. Id. Reversal is appropriate if an error of law is demonstrated. Id.
Steinke contends he has general standing as an attorney representing clients before the Board.
Under our general rule of standing, only those persons who have a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation and who show that they have suffered or were in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct will be found to have standing. Absent this showing, complainants may not invoke the jurisdiction of the court. It is generally insufficient that a plaintiff merely has a general interest common to all members of the public.
State ex rel. Cittadine v. Indiana Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Ind.2003) (citations omitted). Here, Steinke claims he is injured because "attorneys such as himself `lack access to a full-time ... Board composed of Members whose sole focus and loyalty is toward the proper administration of the Workers' Compensation Act [sic].'" Appellant's Brief at 22 (quoting the Complaint). Although Steinke presents a hypothetical scenario in which the Board's unavailability could or would delay payments due him, he alleges no incidents when this or any other harm actually occurred. In the absence of a showing that he has suffered or will immediately suffer a direct injury, there is no standing under the general rule.
We have determined that Steinke does not have standing under the general rule, but he claims Indiana's public standing doctrine, an exception to the general rule, confers standing to file an action for mandate. See Embry v. O'Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157 (Ind.2003).
Indiana cases recognize certain situations in which public rather than private rights are at issue and hold that the usual standards for establishing standing need not be met. This Court held in those cases that when a case involves enforcement of a public rather than a private right the plaintiff need not have a special interest in the matter nor be a public official. Specifically, the public standing doctrine eliminates the requirement that the relator have an interest in the outcome of the litigation different from that of the general public.
State ex rel. Cittadine, 790 N.E.2d at 980 (citations omitted). Although the supreme court did not define "public right" in this context, it cited several examples where a public right was found to have existed. See Miller v. City of Evansville, 244 Ind. 1, 189 N.E.2d 823 (Ind.1963) (); Davis Const. Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Boone County, 192 Ind. 144, 132 N.E. 629 (1921) (); Brooks v. State, ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980 (1904) (); Hamilton v. State ex rel. Bates, 3 Ind. 452, 1852 WL 2934 (1852) ().
The supreme court discussed the public standing doctrine in Embry v. O'Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157, wherein the appellant's action was grounded not on private rights, but rather on shared taxpayers' interest in the allegedly unconstitutional expenditure of public funds. One member of the court, writing separately, stressed the exceptional and limited nature of conferring standing based upon taxpayer status, noting "the `availability of taxpayer or citizen standing' is limited to `extreme circumstances'." Id. at 168-69 (Sullivan, J., concurring) (quoting State ex rel. Cittadine, 790 N.E.2d at 983).
Unlike the public interests found to exist and confer standing in Cittadine and Embry, rights created under the Act are private. "[T]he underlying policy and purpose of the Act ... is designed for the humanitarian purpose of providing injured workers with an expeditious and adequate remedy." Sims v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 782 N.E.2d 345, 352 (Ind.2003) (citations omitted); see also Walker v. State, Muscatatuck State Dev. Ctr., 694 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind.1998) (...
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